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This dissertation investigates three interrogative sentence types that are each
associated with a particular speaker bias. In asking one of these questions, the
speaker invariably conveys a prior expectation, or belief, that a specific answer
to the question is the true one. These sentence types include reversed-polarity
tag questions, negative polar questions, and questions containing a strong negative
polarity item or a constituent that is emphatically focused. For each of these three
question types, I address the two questions: (1) What kind of meaning is bias; and
(2) what grammatical feature, if any, is the bias to be linked to?
In answer to the first question, I argue that bias is an assertion (rather than,
for example, a conversational implicature). As a result, biased questions can be
viii
thought of as a type of indirect speech act (Searle 1975). Following Asher and
Lascarides (2001), I model biased questions as instances of a complex speech act
type assertion • question. On this analysis, biased questions are simultaneously
assertions and questions. I provide evidence, for this claim, showing these question
types share distributional properties of both assertions and questions.
With regard to the second question, I argue that intonation, in addition to
syntax and compositional and lexical semantics, plays a key role in linking the use
of the kind of interrogative sentence described above to an assertion. Indeed, one
of the benefits to studying biased questions is that they provide a case study of the
interaction of intonation and discourse function. I begin to develop an analysis of
intonation within the theory of discourse provided by Asher and Lascarides (2003)
which builds on the work of Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) and Steedman
(2000, 2003), amongst others. Specifically, I argue that intonation provides informa-
tion about the speaker’s cognitive state, i.e. about his or her beliefs and intentions.
Thus intonation contributes information that can be used to compute the rhetorical
contribution of an utterance to a discourse or dialogue. On this model, intonation
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1.1 Bias in Questions
Interrogative sentences, e.g. those characterized in English by subject-auxiliary in-
version, are associated with questions. Semantically, questions are defined by their
possible answers (cf. Hamblin 1958). The denotation of an interrogative sentence
on this view is a set of propositions, viz. those that count as direct answers to
the question. This set is arrived at compositionally from the words that make up
the sentence and how they are put together. As a pragmatic concept, the typical
question is an inquiry. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002), “to make a
(genuine) inquiry is to ask a question to which one does not know the answer with
the aim of obtaining the answer from the addressee” (p. 866). A similar idea is
found in Searle (1969). However, not all questions are inquiries in this sense. For
example, it is not normally true of exam questions that the speaker does not know
the answer. Rather, the speaker knows the answer and wants to know whether
or not the addressee knows it. Other questions do not expect an answer at all,
e.g. those asked for purely expository purposes. In any case, there is some relation
between the syntax and semantics of an interrogative sentence, certain pragmatic
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factors, and the discourse function of an utterance. At least, this is the conventional
wisdom.
The examples in (1), found on the internet, are interrogative, as is evident
from the subject-auxiliary inversion. However, there is something “unquestionlike”
about these examples, though it is difficult to say exactly how without assuming a
good deal of prior analysis.
(1) a. Isn’t it rather ironic that, on a day which is supposed to honor the
working person, the only people who actually get the day off to celebrate
AREN’T WORKING CLASS?!
b. Somebody tried to kill me, and did Joe Lieberman lift a finger?
Intuitively, their use conveys a speaker bias, i.e. a belief or expectation that a par-
ticular answer to the question is the true one. In (1a), for example, the speaker
believes that it is ironic that the only people who do not have to work on Labor Day
are not working class. Similarly, in (1b) the speaker believes that Joe Lieberman
didn’t lift a finger. In other words, the speaker already knows the answer to the
question. Yet, these questions are unlike exam questions: the speaker does not want
to know whether the addressee knows the answer. Rather, he or she appears to be
telling the addressee something and requesting some type of feedback.
So what is one to make of such examples? There are two possible approaches
given the conventional wisdom (as described above). First, one might assume that
the meaning of the questions in (1) is marked in some sense, yielding a particular
speaker bias. On this approach, there is something about the form of the question,
the presence of a particular lexical item or syntactic construction, that interjects
the bias. Alternatively, one might argue that it is simply a fact about the context
in which the question is used that produces bias.
Recent analyses of rhetorical questions adopt the latter kind of approach,
2
arguing that their defining property is that they are uninformative or redundant.
Both Rohde (2006) and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007), for instance, argue that
a question is interpreted as a rhetorical question if, and only if, the speaker and
addressee mutually believe the answer to the question; that is, both the speaker
and addressee believe it, each believes that the other believes it, and so on. The
interpretation of an interrogative sentence as a rhetorical question, then, is a function
of the discourse context, specifically of the content of the common ground. As a
result, these analyses tend to minimize the role of linguistic form in the interpretation
of biased questions.
The alternative is to derive bias in some way from the literal meaning of
an interrogative sentence. There is often still a pragmatic component to these ap-
proaches. For example, Krifka (1995) and Guerzoni (2004), inter alia, argue that
the denotation of strong negative polarity items like lift a finger or bat an eye, in
conjunction with certain pragmatic constraints, is responsible for the negative bias
inherent to examples like (1b). On Krifka’s approach, for instance, (1b) conver-
sationally implicates that the speaker believes that Joe Lieberman did essentially
nothing. For Guerzoni, the “live answers” to (1b) given the presuppositions of the
npi are reduced to a singleton set containing just the proposition that Joe Lieberman
did nothing. On these approaches the meaning of certain interrogative sentences is
the primary source of speaker bias.
There is arguably something to be said for both accounts, but the question
remains how exactly to characterize speaker bias. Is it a pragmatic presupposition
(cf. Stalnaker 1974), as Rohde (2006) and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) would have
it? Or is it a conversational implicature (Krifka 1995, van Rooy 2003, Romero and
Han 2004), or semantic presupposition (Guerzoni 2004)?
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1.2 Bias as Indirect Assertion
The current thesis argues that the speaker bias described in the previous section
is an assertion. As such, the use of a biased question issues in a commitment on
the part of the speaker. On this account, the current proposal stands in opposition
to the those in Krifka (1995) or Romero and Han (2004), to name two, which
analyze particular biases as conversational implicatures. Because implicatures can
be felicitously canceled by the speaker, they arguably do not express a speaker
commitment. Furthermore, the current proposal differs from those in Rohde (2006)
and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) in that it does not necessarily assume that this
assertion is uninformative nor that the “rhetorical” nature of biased questions can
be judged solely on the basis of extra-linguistic context, e.g., the content of the
common ground.
The assertion conveyed by a biased question is – at least in principle –
inferable from the literal meaning of the question, world knowledge and the as-
sumption that one’s interlocutors are rational and cooperative (cf. Grice 1975),
though this inference need not be calculated on-line. The current analysis, then,
falls squarely within the analysis of conventionalized indirect speech acts proposed
by Searle (1975). Biased questions are still questions, however, in both the semantic
and pragmatic sense. This much follows from the default association of certain goals
with the use of interrogative sentences and the assumption, just noted, that the in-
direct assertion associated with a biased question is derived, in part, from the literal
meaning of the interrogative. It is important to note that the proposition that is
asserted by a biased question is semantically an answer to the literal question. This
is not a problem in the discourse based framework I adopt below. In this frame-
work, the meaning of a question, or of any utterance for that matter, goes beyond its
mere compositional semantics. This modeled via the semantic consequences of the
rhetorical relation that connects an utterance to the antecedent discourse context
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(Asher and Lascarides 1998b, 2003).
Evidence that biased questions have a complex discourse function comes from
examples like (2) (taken from the web). Intuitively, the use of ask in (2) indicates
that the underlined clause should be understood as a question. The addressee’s
response, however, expresses agreement with the reported speech act. One cannot
agree with a question or request, however. Given these observations, the underlined
clause must be understood as both a question and an assertion. More generally, (2)
provides evidence that negative polar questions like (1a) are grammatically associ-
ated with a complex speech type composed of both a question and an assertion.
(2) I asked him whether democracy wasn’t more important than toiletry. “You’re
absolutely right,” he said, after much thought. “I’ll ask them to get you a
roll also.”
Following Sadock (1971, 1974), I rely on distributional facts similar to those in
(2) throughout the dissertation to argue in favor of the position that certain in-
terrogative sentences are grammatically associated with a complex speech act type
assertion • question.
A second focus of the dissertation is the relationship between linguistic form
and bias. How are biased questions formally marked and how is their interpretation
linked to the presence of an assertion? Each of the major levels of linguistic analysis
are potentially relevant in this regard, including:
• clausal syntax and semantics,
• lexical semantics, and
• intonation
Intonation, I argue, is especially important to understanding bias. On the analysis
below, inferring that a question conveys an indirect assertion requires that one infer
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that the speaker has certain goals behind his or her utterance, specifically the goals
that one normally associates with an assertion. Intonation, I argue, plays a central
role in inferring these goals.
Building on previous research, I assume that intonation provides important
information about the speaker’s cognitive state. For example, whether an utter-
ance ends with rising or falling pitch signals some relationship between the speaker
and the propositional content of her utterance (Gussenhoven 1984, Gunlogson 2003,
Nilsenová 2006). The placement of the nuclear pitch accent provides information
about the discourse status of some bit of information, distinguishing given from
new information e.g. (Steedman 2000), in addition to introducing salient alterna-
tives (Rooth 1992, inter alia). This information is very rich, but at the same time
semantically underspecified. As a result, a particular intonation contour might be
associated with a range of discourse functions depending on the available linguistic
and contextual evidence.
The present account of intonational meaning is integrated with a “glue logic”
responsible for computing the rhetorical contribution of an utterance to a dialogue.
As a result, the information about the speaker’s cognitive state contributed by into-
nation (as described above) indirectly affects the rhetorical contribution of an utter-
ance to a conversation by providing the interpreter limited access to the speaker’s
cognitive state, i.e. his beliefs and intentions. In some cases, the meaning of an
interrogative coupled with a particular intonation allow the interpreter to infer that
the speaker has goals consistent with those of an assertion.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the formal background
for Chapters 3, 4 and 5. I introduce discourse representation structures (Kamp and
Reyle 1993) for describing the logical form of individual sentences in a discourse
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and provide a dynamic semantic interpretation. In addition, I briefly discuss the
semantics of polar questions. Since the analyses I propose are rooted in the dis-
course function of utterances, I introduce a framework for describing the structure
and interpretation of multi-sentence discourse and dialogue. Segmented Discourse
Representation Theory (Asher and Lascarides 2003) is a dynamic semantic theory
of discourse structure that posits rhetorical relations between utterances and larger
segments of discourse. Inferring that a particular discourse relation relates two dis-
course segments has semantic consequences. As a result, the interpretation of a
discourse goes beyond the mere conjunction of the utterances that make it up. Two
features of sdrt that play an important role in the current analyses are its logics for
inferring which relation links two discourse segments and for reasoning about the
cognitive state of a discourse participant based on his contribution to the discourse.
These two components interact, as a result information about a speaker’s beliefs
and intentions influences the rhetorical contribution of an utterance.
The next three chapters are case studies of particular interrogative construc-
tions. I focus on polar questions throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the
interpretation of reversed-polarity tag questions. The analysis in this chapter acts
as a kind of “proof of concept” for the analyses which follow in Chapters 4 and 5, as
the complex discourse function of tag questions is mirrored by a similarly complex
syntax and compositional semantics. I argue that the declarative main clause of a
tag question is asserted and that the reduced interrogative tag itself denotes a full
polar question. These facts can be modeled either by assuming that tag questions
perform two distinct illocutionary acts or by assigning them a complex speech act
type following Asher and Lascarides (2001). I argue that both possibilities are open
and that the affect on interpretation is minimal (though non-null). Furthermore, I
argue that the discourse functions associated with tag questions and noted by most
descriptive grammars are a reflex of the rhetorical relation connecting the tag to
7
the main clause. This relation is inferred on the basis of the relationship between
the compositional semantic meaning of the main clause and the tag and from in-
formation about the speaker’s cognitive state contributed by intonation. Finally, I
discuss readings of tag questions that do not assert the main sentence. I argue that
this reading follows from a specific lexical semantic feature of the main sentence.
Chapter 4 addresses the interpretation of interrogative sentences containing
a negated auxiliary verb (like the web-example in (1a)). These questions have a
number of properties that set them apart from positive polar questions. I provide
some background on these properties and argue for a new characterization of an am-
biguity noted in Ladd (1981). Specifically, I argue that so-called outside-negation
negative questions are an instance of a conventionalized indirect assertion based on
the overlapping distributional properties of negative questions and prototypical as-
sertions. So-called inside-negation negative questions, on the other hand, are simple
questions, but are restricted to a specific discourse function given their semantic
equivalence with positive polar questions.
Chapter 5 addresses questions that convey a negative bias. Following the dis-
cussion in Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that this bias is an indirect assertion. A good
portion of the chapter is devoted to isolating the grammatical feature responsible
for this bias. While this particular bias has received the most attention from se-
manticists of any of the biases discussed in the dissertation, previous research tends
to focus on examples like (1b) that contain strong npis. While the presence of a
strong npi is a sufficient condition for a question to convey a negative bias, it is not
a necessary condition. I argue based on an examination of a wide range of cases that
the formal correlate of negative bias is a particular intonation contour. I provide an
interpretation for this contour (building on the discussion in Chapter 3 and previous
research by Steedman 2000) and show how the information it contributes is used to
infer that the speaker intends to assert a certain proposition.
8






The current chapter introduces the formal background necessary to follow the analy-
sis of biased questions presented in the chapters that follow. Briefly, §2.2 introduces
Discourse Representation Theory (drt: Kamp and Reyle 1993), while §§2.3 and
2.4 introduce Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (sdrt: Asher and Las-
carides 2003). §2.5 discusses the analysis of indirect speech acts presented in Asher
and Lascarides (2001). Recall that the central claim of the thesis is that (at least
some) biased questions are indirect assertions. Taken together, then, this chapter
provides a formal framework for talking about the meaning of an utterance in a
discourse or dialogue. Readers who are already familiar with drt and sdrt can
safely skip this chapter.
2.2 Discourse Representation Theory
The ensuing chapters contain very little discussion of the compositional semantics
of individual sentences, as my primary concern are the relations between utterances
and their semantic consequences. Nonetheless, the theory of discourse assumed
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throughout the thesis assumes some formal framework for talking about the logical
form and meaning of sentences. The current section therefore introduces Discourse
Representation Theory (drt: Kamp and Reyle 1993) as the formal framework to fill
this role. The choice of drt is inessential (any formalism that can be given a dynamic
semantic interpretation will do) and in the ensuing chapters I often use simplified
logical formula and lambda terms to describe the meaning of various expressions.
A discourse representation structure, or drs, K is an ordered pair of a set
of discourse referents UK for individuals, objects and events and a set of conditions
CK stating n-ary predications over discourse referents. drss are built up recursively
as follows (Asher and Lascarides 2003):
K := 〈U, ∅〉 |K∩γ
K∩γ is the drs that results from appending the condition γ to K’s list of conditions.
drs conditions are formed according to the following rules:
• If P is an n-ary relation symbol and x1, . . . , xn are discourse referents, then
P (x1, . . . , xn) is a drs condition.
• If K is a drs, then ¬K is a drs condition.
• If K1 and K2 are drss, then K1 ⇒ K2 is a drs condition.
Discourse referents for individuals are introduced by indefinite NPs, definite
descriptions, proper names and other referring expressions, expanding the set of
objects that can be referred to via pronouns and other anaphoric devices (Heim
1982, Kamp and Reyle 1993). In addition, verbs and tense introduce discourse
referents for eventualities and times respectively. The drs in (1b) represents the
logical form for the sentence in (1a). It includes an individual discourse referent x,
a referent e1 for an eventuality and referents t and now for times. The conditions
11
in CK state that x refers to Max, that e1 is an event of x falling that holds at the
time t before the utterance time.1
(1) a. Max fell.
b.





drss are interpreted as relations between input and output states consisting
of a possible world w and a partial assignment function f from the set of discourse
referents to the domain DM of a first-order model M (van Eijck and Kamp 1997).
The full relational interpretation is stated relative to a model M = 〈DM ,WM , IM 〉,
where DM is the domain of M , WM is a set of possible worlds, and IM is an
interpretation function mapping n-ary predicate symbols to n-ary relations over
DM at a world w.
On the relational interpretation drss are understood as actions on contexts.
According to the first bullet below, for instance, a drs changes the input context
by extending the domain of the assignment function to include additional discourse
referents.
• (w, f)[[〈U , ∅〉]]M (w′g) iff w = w′, f ⊆ g and dom(g) = dom(f) ∪ U
• (w, f)[[K∩γ]]M (w′, g) iff there is a pair (w′′, h) such that (w, f)[[K ]]M (w′′, h)
and (w′′, h)[[γ]]M (w
′, g)
1I fore-go the details of how the logical form in (1b) is constructed compositionally from the
syntactic representation associated with (1a), as it does not bear directly on the primary concerns
of the thesis. I refer the reader to Zeevat (1989) or Asher (1993) for examples of compositional
approaches.
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This is the only way that drss change input contexts, at least on the limited seman-
tics presented here. drs conditions, in particular, are tests on contexts, since they
do not change the input context in any way, but rather check to see that certain
conditions hold of certain discourse referents.
• (w, f)[[P(x1 , . . . , xn)]]M (w′, g) iff (w, f) = (w′, g) and 〈f(x1), . . . , f(xn)〉 ∈
IM (P )(w)
• (w, f)[[¬K ]]M (w′, g) iff (w, f) = (w′, g) and there is no (w′′, h) such that
(w, f)[[K ]]M (w
′′, h)
• (w, f)[[K1 ⇒ K2 ]]M (w′, g) iff (w, f) = (w′, g) and every (w′′, h) such that
(w, f)[[K1 ]]M (w
′′, h) there is a (w′′′, k) such that (w′′, h)[[K2 ]]M (w
′′′, k)
On this kind of relational interpretation, (w, f)[[(1b)]]M (w, g) holds just in case f ⊆
g, dom(g) = dom(f) ∪ {x, e1, t,now} and 〈g(x)〉 ∈ IM (max )(w), 〈g(e1), g(x)〉 ∈
IM (fall)(w), etc.
In order to talk about the meaning of interrogative sentences, I add an op-
erator ‘?’ to the core drt language that applies to a drs to yield the logical form
of a polar question.2 Some care is required in specifying which drss this function
can apply to. For example, it is not immediately apparent that a drs prefixed with
‘?’ ever occurs in the scope of negation, as it is not clear what the negation of a
question expresses. On the other hand, it is possible for a question to occur in the
consequent of a conditional as in (2).
(2) If Mary comes to the party, will John leave?
I leave this issue aside for now and assume that ‘?’ always has wide scope over any
2One can generalize the syntax to cover constituent questions by assuming that ‘?’ applies to
lambda expressions λx1 . . . λxnP (x1, . . . , xn) for n ≥ 0, where P (x1, . . . , xn) is a drs whose universe
may be empty or contain discourse referents other than x1 . . . xn. (See Asher and Lascarides 2003,
who follow Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984.) Polar questions are covered by the case where n = 0.
13
logical operators. So for any drs K formed according to the definitions above, I
assume that ?K is also a drs. This is obviously a gross simplification. I refer the
reader to Krifka (2001, 2004) and Asher (to appear) for more nuanced discussions
of embedded speech acts.
I assume the general picture of interrogative semantics outlined in Hamblin
(1958). On this view, (i) an answer to a question is a proposition, (ii) to know
the meaning of a question is to know which propositions count as direct answers to
it, and (iii) the possible answers to a question form an exhaustive set of mutually
exclusive possibilities. The first two assumptions are more or less standard now
in formal semantics. However, it is still a matter of debate whether or not the
direct answers to a question need to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Hamblin
himself provides the non-exhaustive analysis of constituent questions sketched in
(3b) (Hamblin 1973). On this analysis, the answers to (3a) are all propositions of
the form x walks, for x in the domain of entities. For example, if the domain contains
just the individuals John and Mary, then (3b) is the set of propositions that John
walks and that Mary walks. These propositions are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that both John and Mary walk.
(3) a. [[Who walks?]](w)
b. = {p : ∃x ∈ DM .p = [[walks]]M (x) ∧ x is human }
c. = λw′[λx[walks ′(x,w)] = λx[walks ′(x,w′)]]
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), alternatively, assume the exhaustive inter-
pretation of wh-interrogatives sketched in (3c). On this analysis, the extension of
(3a) at w is the proposition consisting of those worlds w′ that agree with w on the
extension of the predicate walks. Thus if IM (walks)(w) = {john}, the answer to (3a)
according to (3c) is the proposition that John and no one else walks. The intension
of (3a) on this analysis (given our toy domain) includes in addition the propositions
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that Mary and no one else walks, that Mary and John and no one else walks and
that nobody walks.
Since this thesis focuses on polar questions, the issue of whether one should
adopt an exhaustive or non-exhaustive interpretation does not arise. The answer
sets to polar questions are always exhaustive, assuming that the only direct answers
to polar questions are those conveyed by yes and no. Following Hamblin (1973),
for example, the denotation of (4a) is the set in of propositions in (4b), where the
domain Dyn includes the identity function on propositions, λφ.φ, and the negation
function, λφλw.¬φ(w).
(4) a. [[Did Max fall?]]M (w)
b. = {p : ∃f ∈ Dyn .p = f(λw.fell ′(m,w))}
= {p : p = λw.fell ′(m,w) ∨ p = λw.¬fell ′(m,w)}
Given that the semantics in (4b) quantifies only over just these two functions, it
follows that the answers to (4a) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. If the propo-
sition that Max fell is true at a world w, then the proposition that he did not fall
is false at that same world. Furthermore, every world is included in one of these
two propositions. The same observation applies to the account in Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1984).
Below I assume a Hamblin-style semantics for closed interrogative sentences.
Specifically, I adopt the semantics in (5). This definition modifies the analysis in
Asher and Lascarides (1998b), who assume following Karttunen (1977) that the
denotation of a question contains just the true answers.
(5) (w, f)[[?K ]]M = {[[p]]M : p = ∧K ∨ p = ∧¬K}
∧K and p are propositional terms. As such, they denote dynamic propositions,
15
i.e. sets of pairs of world-assignment pairs:
[[∧φ]]w,fM = {
〈
(w, g), (w′, h)
〉
: w = w′, g ⊇ f, and (w, g)[[φ]]M (w
′, h)}
Answerhood is defined simply as set-membership. Following Asher and Las-
carides (2003), Answer(K, p) holds just the proposition p is contained in the deno-
tation of the question K:
(w, f)[[Answer(K , p)]]M (w
′, g) iff (w, f) = (w′, g) and [[p]]w,fM ∈ [[K ]]
w,f
M
Finally, I make occasional use of function core-proposition which applies to a
drs K and returns the underlying propositional content. The core, or underlying,
proposition of an utterance is the proposition expressed by the drs for that utterance
with any markers of sentence mood removed. Thus the core proposition is the
semantic correlate, in some sense, to the sentence radicals in Stenius (1967). For
example, the underlying, or core, proposition of the polar questions Is Mary coming?
is the proposition that Mary is coming. Formally, if K has the form ?K ′, then
core-proposition(K) = ∧K ′, otherwise core-proposition(K) = K.
2.3 Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (sdrt: Asher 1993, Asher and Las-
carides 2003) is an extension of drt that takes into account the rhetorical rela-
tions that hold between utterances and their semantic consequences. Asher and
Lascarides (2003) argue that including discourse relations is useful for capturing
a number of important generalizations about the interpretation of multi-sentence
discourse and dialogue. In particular, it has been used to capture constraints on
individual and abstract entity anaphora that standard drt fails to account for. In
addition, discourse relations have been useful in accounts of presupposition and
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bridging (Asher and Lascarides 1998a,c) and in modelling the temporal structure of
texts (Lascarides and Asher 1993). Additionally, sdrt provides an alternative model
of speech acts on which discourse relations are conceived of as relational speech act
types (Asher and Lascarides 2001, 2003).
Segmented discourse representation structures, or sdrss, are relational struc-
tures that encode the rhetorical connections between discourse segments. Discourse
segments may be single clauses or larger, multi-utterance spans of conversation.
sdrss also impose a hierarchical structure on discourse and dialogue (which I de-
scribe in more detail below). Formally, a sdrs is a triple 〈A,F ,LAST 〉, where:
• A is a set of labels;
• F is a function from A to the set of well-formed sdrs-formulae; and
• LAST is a distinguished label in A for the last clause added to the discourse.
A includes labels for drss (as described in §2.2), in addition to labels for multi-
sentence spans. The labels in A are associated with tokens of logical forms. Thus
each utterance in a discourse introduces a labeled drs. This label can be thought
of as a discourse referent for a particular speech act.
The well-formed sdrs formulae include labeled drss, in addition to formulae
of the form R(α, β), where R is a rhetorical relation and α and β are labels in A,
and the dynamic conjunction and negation of sdrs formulae. The discourse in (6)
from Asher (1993) illustrates many of the important features of sdrss.
(6) a. (π1) John had a lovely evening last night.
b. (π2) He had a great meal.
c. (π3) He ate salmon.
d. (π4) He devoured lots of cheese.
e. (π5) He then won a dancing competition.
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Intuitively, (6b) and (6e) elaborate the eventuality described in (6a). That is, they
provide additional details about John’s evening. In addition, (6e) forms a narrative
segment with (6b), i.e. John had a great meal and then he won a dancing competi-
tion. (6c) and (6d) elaborate the great meal and form a second narrative segment.
The sdrs 〈A,F ,LAST 〉 for the discourse in (6) is shown below.
• A = {π0, π1, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6, π7}





F(π0) = Elaboration(π1, π6)
F(π6) = Narration(π2, π5) ∧ Elaboration(π2, π7)
F(π7) = Narration(π3, π4)
• LAST = π5
Note that π6 and π7 label discourse segments that span more than one clause. π7,
for example, labels the narrative segment formed by π3 and π4 and which elaborates
the eventuality introduced in π2. Similarly, the label π0 spans the entire discourse.
sdrss are visualized as a directed acyclic graphs, where the labels in A pro-
vide the nodes and the rhetorical connections between labels introduce labeled edges
between nodes. If an sdrs contains the sub-formula R(α, β), the corresponding
graph contains an edge from the node α to the node β labeled R. Coordinating
discourse relations like Narration introduce horizontal edges, while subordinating
relations introduce vertical edges. The graph representation of (6) is shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. The formula corresponding to the top most label in the sdrs for (6), which
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is omitted in the graph, is Elaboration(π1, π6). Since Elaboration is a subordinating






























Figure 2.1: sdrs graph for the discourse in (6).
While building the sdrs for a particular discourse, only those labels in A
on the right-frontier of the current graph are available for the attachment of new
information. Formally, the available labels in an sdrs include LAST and any node
that outscopes it. A label γ immediately outscopes α iff F(γ) includes as a conjunct
R(α, δ) or R(δ, α) for some R and δ, or if there is a λ such that F(λ) includes
R(γ, α) and R is subordinating. The available labels in an sdrs, then, are those
in the transitive closure of the immediately outscopes relation on LAST . In Figure
2.1, the right frontier includes π5, i.e. LAST , π6 and π1.
In addition to constraining where new information can attach, the right-
frontier constraint is useful in stating generalizations about anaphoric accessibility
that are not easily captured in standard drt. Specifically, it is assumed that only
discourse referents introduced in available discourse segments (and which are drt
accessible within those segments) are accessible for the resolution of anaphoric de-
pendencies. As a result, the sentence in (7) can not be used to elaborate on the
salmon, as its discourse referent is introduced in π3, which is not in the set of
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available labels.
(7) #It was a beautiful pink.
While this example demonstrates the utility of the structures posited by
sdrt; the interpretation of these structures is also interesting for linguistic perspec-
tive, as the semantic consequences of discourse relations may provide information
about the temporal structure of a text, amongst other things. sdrss are interpreted
as relations between input and output world-assignment pairs. Therefore one can
simply build their interpretation on top of the existing relational semantics for drss
from §2.2. Consider the sdrs for (6) above. This sdrs is satisfied relative to an
input state (w, f) just in case there is an output state (w, g) such that:
(w, f)[[Kπ0 ]]M (w, g) iff (w, f)[[Elaboration(π1 , π6 )]]M (w, g)
In other words, the truth conditions for the entire discourse follow from unpacking
the truth conditions for the unique label in A that outscopes all other labels. By
convention, Kπ specifies the sdrs formula corresponding to F(π).
The interpretation of a formula of the form R(π1, π2) depends on the prop-
erties of the relation R. For example, for veridical discourse relations:3
R(α, β) ⇒ (Kα ∧Kβ)
Therefore, Kπ0 is satisfiable with respect to the input context (w, f) just in case
there is a way to extend the assignment function f with the discourse referents
introduced in π1 and π6 that satisfies all of the necessary conditions, in addition to
3Elaboration, Narration, Explanation, Parallel , Contrast , Background , Result , Evidence are all
veridical relations.
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satisfying the condition imposed by the discourse relation Elaboration:
(w, f)[[Kπ1 ∧Kπ6 ∧ φElaboration(π1 ,π6 )]]M (w, g)
The semantic contribution of a discourse relation is introduced by a meaning
postulate associated with that relation. Schematically, these meaning postulates
have the form φR(α,β) ⇒ conditions(α, β), where conditions(α, β) expresses con-
ditions on Kα and Kβ, or on discourse referents introduced therein. To provide
a concrete example, Elaboration imposes temporal constraints on the eventualities
described in the discourse segments that it relates. Specifically, if β elaborates α
then the main eventuality described in β is temporally included in (or a part of) the
eventuality described in α.
• Temporal Consequence of Elaboration:
φElaboration(α,β) ⇒ Part-of(eβ, eα)
The consequence of inferring that Elaboration links π6 to π1 in the sdrs for (6) is
that the meal described in π2 and the dancing competition in π5 must both occur
during the interval denoted by “last night” in π1. Thus inferring that a certain
relation links two discourse segments can fill in information about the temporal
structure of a discourse.
Not all discourse relations are veridical of course. For example, Alternation
and Consequence, which mirror the the logical connectives ∨ and ⇒ respectively,
do not entail the content of the discourse segments that they relate. Another class
of non-veridical discourse relations which are of particular use in the ensuing chap-
ters are divergent relations, which include Correction and Counterevidence. These
relations dispute the content or appropriateness of a prior discourse segment. Thus
if R is divergent, R(α, β) entails ¬Kα and Kβ.
Consider the discourse in (8) (from Asher and Lascarides 2003). B’s turn in
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(8b) corrects A’s assertion that Max owns several classic cars. A’s response in (8c)
provides counterevidence to B’s correction (and elaborates the original assertion in
(8a)).
(8) a. (π1) A: Max owns several classic cars.
b. (π2) B: No he doesn’t.
c. (π3) A: He owns two 1967 Alfa spiders.
The sdrs for (8) (at least on an intuitive understanding) is given below:
• A = {π0, π1, π2, π3}




• LAST = π3
Given the semantics of divergent relations, however, this sdrs is inconsistent,
since Correction(π1, π2) entails Kπ2 and Counterevidence(π2, π3) entails ¬Kπ2 . To
alleviate this problem divergent relations must have a nonmonotonic affect on sdrs
update. In order to maintain consistency, Correction(π1, π2) above is replaced with
Dis(Correction)(π1, π2) when the sdrs is updated with π3. Dis(R)(α, β) indicates
that R(α, β), which was part of the input sdrs, is now in dispute. In particular,
Dis(R)(α, β) entails that the speaker of β believes R(α, β), but ¬R(α, β) is entailed
by the discourse.
Finally, sdrt makes use of a separate logic for computing the rhetorical
relations between utterances based on information from syntax and compositional
and lexical semantics. This “glue logic” contains axioms for inferring that particular
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discourse relations link two discourse segments. Since each discourse segment is
assigned a unique label, these axioms exploit information about labels provided by
descriptions of the sdrs assembled so far and of the new discourse constituent β
which is to be linked to the available discourse constituent α. These descriptions
specify discourse structures in terms of which segments are related to which other
segments, and by stating in which larger segment that information is found. Thus,
a binary discourse relation R that relates α and β is represented in the description
language as a three place predicate symbol R(α, β, λ) conveying that the constituent
labeled by β stands in the relation R to α and that this information is contained
within the larger discourse segment labeled λ.
The axioms of the glue logic exploit standard propositional logic connectives
and a weak conditional operator > that serves to represent defeasible rules about
discourse structure. The general form of these rules follows the schema in (9).
(9) (?(α, β, λ) ∧ Info(α, β, λ)) > R(α, β, λ)
(9) says that if β attaches to α with some underspecified relation ? in the larger
discourse segment λ and certain information about α, β and λ holds, then normally
β attaches to α in λ with R. These conditionals support a defeasible form of modus
ponens. As a result, when the left hand side of (an instance of) (9) holds, one
can defeasibly infer R(α, β, λ).4 Additional information, however, may block this
inference.
4Asher and Lascarides (2003) give a complete specification of the glue logic, in particular of the
defeasible consequence relation |∼. Defeasible modus ponens is represented using |∼ as follows:
(i) A > B,A|∼B, but A > B,A,¬B |∼/ B
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2.4 The Logic of Cognitive Modelling
Computing discourse relations in dialogue often requires reasoning about the beliefs
and intentions of discourse participants. This kind of information is also useful in
computing conversational implicatures. For these reasons, sdrt includes a separate
logic of cognitive modelling that interacts in a limited fashion with the glue logic
to yield inferences about the speaker’s beliefs and intentions as revealed by his
contribution to the conversation. This logic is shallow in the sense that it is not
a full logic of propositional attitudes. As such, the model is rather course-grained.
As Asher and Lascarides (2003) state, the logic of cognitive modelling is silent on
“how people resolve conflicting desires, how they decide which intentions have the
maximum utility, and most importantly how beliefs and intentions change as agents
perform actions and change the world (p. 376)”. However, they argue that it is
sufficient for reasoning in a restricted way about beliefs and intentions based on an
agents utterances in specific discourse. In this section, I provide a quick overview of
cognitive modelling and refer the reader to chapter 9 of Asher and Lascarides (2003)
for the full details. I only introduce concepts below that play a central role in the
discussions in chapters 3–5.
The logic itself includes expressions from the glue logic – labels, propositional
connectives and the weak conditional operator >, in addition to a set of modal op-
erators for beliefs and intentions, BA,BB, . . . , IA, IB, . . ., where A and B are agents.
Belief is understood as epistemic necessity and given a standard interpretation rel-
ative to an accessibility relation RBA over worlds:
• [[BAφ]]M (w) = 1 iff for all w′ such that wRBAw′, [[φ]]M (w′) = 1
The language also contains functions S and H that map labels to agents. Intuitively,
S(α) is the speaker of α and H(α) is the addressee, or hearer.
Defaults modelling rationality and cooperativity and axioms associating spe-
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cific goals with utterances of a particular linguistic form can be stated in this logic.
The latter, specifically, encode Sadock and Zwicky’s (1985) notion of sentence type,
i.e. a “coincidence of grammatical structure and conversational use (p. 155)”. These
goals are also known as speech-act related goals, or sargs.
The default sarg of an utterance is stated in Default Schema, though a
number of more specific axioms exist which I discuss further below. In plain English,
Default Schema says that the sarg of an utterance is that the addressee believe
its rhetorical contribution to the discourse.
• Default Schema:
Suppose Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β))|∼R(α, β, λ).
Then: Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β))|∼ sarg(β,BH(β)(R(α, β, λ)).
It is useful to consider a concrete example like (10a) to illustrate this concept.
Intuitively, π2 explains why Max fell. This is modeled in sdrt by assuming that
the relation Explanation links π2 to π1 as shown in (10b). This information is
inferred based on lexical semantic information available to the glue logic: to put it
coarsely, “pushing” events cause “falling” events. According to Default Schema,
then, π2’s sarg is that H(π2) believe that John’s pushing Max explains Max’s
falling, i.e. Explanation(π1, π2, π).
(10) a. (π1) Max fell. (π2) John pushed him.
b. π : Explanation(π1, π2)
When R is a veridical relation and λ occurs in a veridical segment of the
discourse – i.e. F(λ) must be true in order for the discourse as a whole to be true
– it is possible to derive a more specific goal, viz. that the addressee believe the
proposition pβ conveyed by the speaker’s utterance.5 This new sarg follows from
5pβ is a propositional term that is linked to Kβ in the logic of information content by constraints
on admissable models. These constraints guarantee that Kβ and pβ are satisfied in the same worlds.
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Default Schema and the closure of belief under logical consequence. For example,
because Explanation is a veridical relation, the sarg of π2 in (10a) is that the
addressee believe that John pushed Max.
Veridical relations are associated with assertions, in so far as assertions are
characterized by commitment. Furthermore, assertions are associated with declar-
ative (or equivalently, indicative) sentences. As a result, the more specific sarg is
codified by a separate axiom called Indicative Related Goals.
• Indicative Related Goals (IRG):
Suppose Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β))|∼R(α, β, λ).
Then: Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β)) ∧ veridical(R, λ)|∼sarg(β,BH(β)(pβ)).
Thus declarative sentences that attach with a veridical relation and within a veridical
segment of the discourse are by default associated with the sarg that the addressee
believe the proposition conveyed by the sentence.
The sarg of a question is that the speaker believe an answer to it. This is
captured by the default Question Related Goals. Sanswer(α, p) is a predicate in
the logic of cognitive modelling that indicates that p is an answer to the question
labeled by α. Sanswer is thus appropriately linked to the predicate Answer from
the logic of information content (defined in §2.2). QRG states that if the proposition
p is an answer to the question labeled α, then the sarg of α is that the speaker of
α believe p.
• Question Related Goals (QRG):
Sanswer(α, p) > sarg(α,BS(α)p)
It is important that axioms like QRG and IRG are formulated as defaults,
since these goals can be overridden by conflicting information. For example, it is
not always the case that the sarg of a question is that the speaker wants to know
an answer. Take a question on an exam or quiz show. In these cases, it is clearly
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not a goal of the speaker that he believe the answer p. Presumably, he already
believes p and wants to know if the addressee believes p. In order to block the
incorrect sarg in these cases, a more specific axiom Known Answers is introduced,
blocking the consequence of QRG when the speaker believes a particular answer p to
his question.
• Known Answers:
(Sanswer(α, p) ∧ BS(α)p) > ¬sarg(α,BS(α)p)
One class of questions where Known Answers is useful are questions that can be
answered with varying degrees of precision. Where-questions, for example, can be
answered at the “street” level, the “city” level, the “state” level, etc. But in many
cases where such questions are used it is obvious that the speaker believes certain
answers to the question already. As a result, Known Answers blocks the sarg that
the speaker believe those particular answers. In the context in (11), for instance,
(11b) is a reasonable answer, whereas (11c) is somewhat marked.
(11) [A and B are on Congress Avenue in downtown Austin]
a. A: (Excuse me.) Where is Waterloo Records?
b. B: It’s on Sixth and Lamar.
c. #B: It’s in Austin, Texas.
B can reasonably assume that A believes that he is in Austin and may further
assume that A believes that Waterloo Records is in Austin given that it is a salient
Austin landmark. This information blocks as a sarg for (11a) that A believe that
Waterloo Records is in Austin. The city-level answer is too coarse-grained, in other
words. What A wants to know is a particular address. In another context, the
city-level answer may be perfectly reasonable. For example, if B is standing in the
middle of Times Square in New York City wearing a Waterloo Records T-shirt.
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sargs are properties of utterances. Sometimes it is useful, however, to talk
directly about the intentions of agents. To this end, cognitive modelling includes
axioms that relate sargs to intentions. For example, the axiom below states that
if the sarg of an utterance α is φ, then normally the speaker of α intends to see to
that φ. (δ is the stit, or “see to it that” operator. It takes a formula to an action
term.)
• SARGs to Intentions: sarg(α, φ) > IS(α)(δφ)
In addition to the axioms above which reveal the goals and intentions behind
utterances, cognitive modelling includes axioms that provide information about an
agent’s beliefs. Two axioms are relevant here: Sincerity and Competence. These
axioms considered together capture much of the reasoning encoded in Grice’s Maxim
of Quality: try to make your contribution one that is true (Grice 1975). Sincerity
states that an utterance β is sincere only if S(β) believes its intended rhetorical
contribution (as encoded by the relation R with which it attaches to the prior
discourse). For example, if S(π2) in (10a) sincerely utters π2, then normally one
infers that he believes that Explanation(π1, π2, π). Sincerity reflects the speaker’s
beliefs about the content of the discourse and only indirectly his beliefs about the
world.
• Sincerity: R(α, β, λ) > BS(β)R(α, β, λ)
Asher and Lascarides (2003) argue that the formulation of sincerity above
is more sophisticated than other formulations since it takes into account rhetorical
relations. Perrault (1990), for example, assumes that β is a sincere assertion if S(β)
believes pβ. Asher and Lascarides note that this formulation of sincerity sometimes
produces unintuitive results. Consider the dialogue in (12). Given the semantics of
why-questions and the axioms of the glue logic it follows that B’s answer in (12b)
explains why B was late.
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(12) a. (π1) A: Why are you late?
b. (π2) B: I ran out of gas.
Now suppose that B did in fact run out of gas but was late because he had a secret
rendezvous with A’s spouse. An account of sincerity that does not take into account
rhetorical relations predicts that B is sincere when he asserts π2, since B does in
fact believe that he ran out of gas. He does not believe however that this is the
reason why he was late. It is not clear in this case that we want to characterize
π2 as a sincere assertion. Certainly there is an element of subterfuge to it. The
axiom Sincerity above predicts that B’s utterance is sincere only if he believes
that running out of gas caused him to be late.6
Competence encodes the assumption that speakers are competent with re-
spect to the information they contribute to a discourse. That is, if A contributes
some information to a discourse and A believes this information and has evidence
for it (à la Grice), then normally B adds A’s contribution to their own beliefs.
• Competence: BAφ > BBφ
Sincerity and Competence interact to accomplish the sarg specified by Default
Schema (or IRG if R is veridical), i.e. the goal that one’s conversational partner
add the information one contributes to their own set of beliefs (at least for the
purposes of the conversation at hand). If A sincerely contributes some information
to a conversation and B considers A competent with respect to that information,
then normally B adds that information to his or her own beliefs.7
6This type of example was suggested to me by David Beaver, p.c. Asher and Lascarides (2003)
discuss a similar case on page 397.
7I make use of two more axioms from cognitive modelling in chapter 3. I mention them here for
convenience and refer the reader to Asher and Lascarides (2003) for more details. First, the axiom
Rationality of Action encodes the assumption that actions are normally performed intentionally.
• Rationality of Action: Done(a) > IS(a)(a)
Second, Intentions and Defaults states that the non-accidental, nonmonotonic, consequences
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2.5 Indirect Speech Acts in sdrt
In §2.4, I described a version of the “literal force hypothesis” (Levinson 1983),
i.e. the idea that there is a one-to-one correspondence between linguistic form and
discourse function. That is, the major sentence types of a language are associated
with specific illocutionary forces: declaratives with assertions, interrogatives with
questions, imperatives with requests, etc. The literal force hypothesis was modeled
via the axioms associating sargs with sentence types, i.e. IRG, QRG and RRG for
requests.
Exceptions to the literal force hypothesis, however, are all too common. The
interrogative in (13a), for example, intuitively performs a request. Searle (1975)
argues that this and similar examples carry in addition to their literal force an in-
ferred, or indirect force. He proposes an analysis of indirect speech acts (isas) in
which this indirect force is inferred based on mutually believed background informa-
tion, including both linguistic and non-linguistic information, and general principles
of rationality and cooperativity, for example as provided by Grice (1975). It is not
the aim of the current section to argue convincingly for a specific analysis of isas.
(That is a thesis topic in itself.) Rather, I introduce here the analysis and formalism
in Asher and Lascarides (2001), which is in many respects a formal implementation
of Searle’s analysis, so that it may be applied in the analysis of biased questions
below.
There are two aspects to isas that are interesting in the context of this thesis.
First, both the literal force and the indirect force are accessible in the discourse. In
of one’s intentions are also intended.
• Intentions and Defaults:
If Γ,Done(a), φ|∼ψ, and Γ, φ |∼/ ψ, then Γ|∼(IA(a) ∧ BA(φ)) > IA(δψ).
It is important that ψ 6∈ Γ∪{φ} in order to guarantee that performing a is essential for inferring ψ.
As Asher and Lascarides (2003) note, this axiom is too simple to model how intentions really work
(Bratman 1990, Cohen and Levesque 1990), but it is sufficient for the simple model of cognition
required by sdrt for predicting the content of a dialogue.
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(13), for example, (13a) is clearly intended as a request (as evident from the felicity
of preverbal please). Yet the literal force is still available, as demonstrated by the
fact that B answers the question in (13b). In other words, (13a) is simultaneously
a question and a request.
(13) a. A: Can you please pass the salt?
b. B: Yes, I can. [uttered as B passes the salt.]
Second, some isas have distributional properties of the indirectly conveyed force,
e.g. preverbal please in (13a). This discourse marker occurs in the preverbal position
of imperative sentences as in (14a), but not in interrogative sentences used with only
their literal force (14b).
(14) a. Please pass the salt.
b. #Is Mary please coming?
Not all isas share these distributional properties, leading some to posit a degree
of conventionalization for certain types of indirect speech act (Searle 1975, Morgan
1978). (15a) and (15b), for instance, both occur felicitously with please, whereas
(15c) and (15d), which have a similar semantic content to (15a) and (15b), do not.
(15) a. Can you please pass the salt?
b. Could you please pass the salt?
c. #Are you able to please pass the salt?
d. #Do you have the physical ability to please pass the salt?
Morgan (1978) maintains that the reasoning that links the sentences in (15a) and
(15b) to a request has been “short-circuited” (see also Horn and Bayer 1984). That
is, the implicature is no longer calculated online, the interpretation of (15a) as a
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request being available as a matter of linguistic convention. This conventionalization
blocks the use of (15c) and (15d) as indirect requests.
Asher and Lascarides (2001) propose modelling conventionalized isas with
complex types, a formal mechanism that has proven useful in lexical semantics for
analyzing the kind of copredications shown in (16) (Asher and Pustejovsky 2004,
Asher 2007). In (16b), for example, two properties are predicated of the book:
having a purple cover and being intelligible. These properties apply to different
sorts of objects. Having a purple cover, for instance, is a property of physical
objects, while being intelligible is a property of informational objects.
(16) a. Lunch was delicious, but took forever.
b. The book has a purple cover and is the most intelligible introduction
to category theory.
(16b) shows that books are both physical and informational objects, leading lexical
semanticists to assign them a complex type phys-obj•inf-obj. Formal mechanisms
are provided that allow the component types of a complex type to be manipulated
appropriately.8
Physical objects and informational objects are in some sense metaphysically
incompatible, as it is not clear what it means to be both an abstract entity and a
concrete object. In most common sense ontologies it is assumed that phys-obj u
inf-obj = ⊥. Similar observations apply to indirect speech acts. Questions and
requests denote incompatible semantic objects, say a set of propositions and an
action respectively (Asher and Lascarides 2003). On the basis of this similarity,
Asher and Lascarides (2001) argue that complex types are useful for modelling
isas as well. For example, note that the dialogue in (13) contains a copredication.
Preverbal please requires (13a) to be a request, while the answer in (13b) requires
8One still needs to provide a model for these complex types. See Asher (2007) for a thorough
discussion of this issue.
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it to be a question.
The grammar can exploit both of the constituent types of (13a) in computing
its rhetorical contribution to the discourse. This is accomplished through a rule of
Dot Exploitation. In particular, if it holds in the glue logic that ?(α, β, λ) and β is
assigned a complex type t1 • t2, then new speech act discourse referents γ1 and γ2 of
type t1 and t2 respectively are introduced. These new discourse referents are related
to the original speech act referent β by a relation O-Elab, or “dot elaboration”.
In the case of (13a), Dot Exploitation introduces two new speech act discourse
referents of type question and request. The first is available for the answer in
(13b) to attach to via the relation QAP (Question-Answer Pair). The second is
available to satisfy the selectional restrictions of please.
On the theory of isas argued for in Asher and Lascarides (2001), an ut-
terance β is interpreted as an isa when one can infer from the literal meaning of
β, background information, including linguistic and non-linguistic information, and
principles of rational and cooperative behavior that the speaker associates a sarg φ
with β that is not associated with β by the axioms IRG, QRG or RRG. In this sense,
Asher and Lascarides follow the proposal in Searle (1975) closely. These assump-
tions are encoded formally in Inferring Dot Types. R consists of the axioms
of cognitive modelling discussed in §2.4 (and others) and information about world
knowledge. C consists of conventionalized linguistic knowledge, including the axioms
of sdrt’s glue logic. These two sets of axioms provide Searle’s non-linguistic and
linguistic background information respectively.
• Inferring Dot Types:
Suppose for some γ that:
(a) R, C, ?(α, β, λ), Info(λ, β)|∼sarg (β, φ);
(b) β : t1,¬(Info(β) > sarg (β, φ));
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(c) γ : t2, (Info(γ) > sarg (γ, φ)).
Then:
(d) β : t1 • t2
Paraphrasing, Inferring Dot Types states that if an agent can infer from
the literal meaning of an utterance and from principles of rational and cooperative
behavior that the speaker has a particular goal in uttering a sentence (see (a))
which is not the goal normally associated with that sentence (see (b)) but which is
associated with a distinct sentence type (see (c)), then that agent can infer that the
speaker intends to convey an isa (see (d)).
Furthermore, similar Gricean-style reasoning must link the constituent types
of the complex type with some rhetorical relation. This requirement is formalized
in Coherence Constraint on Complex Types (Asher and Lascarides 2001).
• Coherence Constraint on Complex Speech Act Types:
Suppose that:
– ?(α, β, λ)
– β : t1 • t2
– O-Elab(β, γ1) ∧O-Elab(β, γ2)
– γ1 : t1 ∧ γ2 : t2
Then:
R, C, ?(α, γ1, λ), ?(γ1, γ2, λ′), Info(γ1, γ2)|∼R(γ1, γ2, λ′),
where λ′ labels an sdrs that results from attaching γ1 to α in the sdrs labeled
by λ.
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In short, if β is an instance of a complex speech act type t1 • t2, then the new labels
introduced by Dot Exploitation, γ1 and γ2 must be linked by a discourse relation
R.
With this background information in place, we can move on to the core of
the thesis. Chapter 3 addresses the interpretation of English tag questions, paying
particular attention to the role of intonation in determining discourse function.
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Chapter 3
Bias in Tag Questions
3.1 Introduction
The current chapter has two goals. First, I argue that English tag questions are
complex speech acts consisting of both an assertion and a question. This may seem
obvious. After all, tag questions are syntactically mixed sentence types, composed
of a declarative anchor paratactically related to a reduced interrogative clause, or
tag (Huddleston and Pullum 2002). As such, a similar complexity might be expected
at the speech act level. Quirk et al. (1985), for example, maintain that the mean-
ings of tag questions “like their forms, involve a statement and a question; each of
them, that is, asserts something, then invites the listener’s response to it ” (p. 811).
However, many investigators are reluctant to associate an outright assertion with
tag questions, opting instead to view tags as illocutionary force indicating devices
mapping a declarative clause to a polar question and relegating the proposition
conveyed by the anchor to some lesser role (Oehrle 1987, Culicover 1992, Bender
and Flickinger 1998). I provide evidence for the former position following the strat-
egy utilized in Sadock (1971, 1974), showing that tag questions have distributional
properties of both assertions and questions.
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Second, I develop an analysis of the association of final intonation on the
tag with discourse function. Many previous proposals make unrealistic assump-
tions about the role of intonation in interpretation. For example, Oehrle (1987) and
Kay (2002), in effect, treat intonation contours as functions from propositions to
illocutionary acts. These analyses, I argue, are both conceptually and empirically
unmotivated, the association of intonation with discourse function being more com-
plex than these authors assume. The interpretation of intonation is highly context
dependent and a range of discourse functions may be associated with any particular
tune. Any formal analysis should reflect this.
Briefly, I argue that the interpretation of a tag question depends on the
rhetorical relation that links the tag to the anchor. sdrt (introduced in Chapter
2) is an ideal framework on this account, as it provides a logic for inferring these
relations on the basis of lexical and compositional semantics, information about the
cognitive states of discourse participants and context. Intonation, I argue, conveys
information about the speaker’s beliefs. This information indirectly contributes
to the inference that a specific discourse relation links the anchor and the tag.
Furthermore, since this inference is defeasible, it can be overridden or blocked by
additional information.
Before continuing, it’s useful to provide some background on the relationship
between intonation and interpretation alluded to above. This relationship forms part
of most descriptions of tag questions (Quirk et al. 1985, Huddleston and Pullum
2002), in addition to being the focus of many formal analyses (Millar and Brown
1979, Rando 1980). The example in (1a) (from the web) is illustrative. Intuitively,
this tag question weakly asserts that bupkes is Yiddish and asks for confirmation
of this proposition from the addressee. On this reading, (1a) would normally be
pronounced with final rising intonation on the tag.1
1The example is from a post on a “blog” titled The post in which I use Yiddish.
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(1) a. You know folks I got bupkes. (Bupkes is Yiddish, isn’t it?)
b. He also gave me a stick of nicotine gum, which I thought was very odd
as he knows I don’t smoke. But then again, chewing gum isn’t smoking,
is it?
The example in (1b) (again taken from the internet) illustrates a second
reading. In this case, the tag question asserts the content of the anchor and asks for
acknowledgment from the addressee that the assertion has been “taken up”. The
tag in this case is naturally read with falling intonation. The speaker’s commitment
to the anchor in (1b) is stronger than in (1a), as little or no uncertainty about the
truth of the anchor is conveyed. (Indeed, it would be surprising if the speaker was
anything but certain that chewing gum isn’t smoking.)
Both of these readings have a complex discourse function: they assert some-
thing and ask for a response from the addressee (as Quirk et al. 1985 describe).
There is a third reading, however, which is not biased in this way. (2) (again taken
from the web) does not assert, either weakly or strongly, that Lorraine doesn’t have
a beehive hairdo. In fact, given the discourse context it is apparent that Lorraine has
many of the properties that might lead one to expect that she does have a beehive.
(2) is roughly equivalent, then, to the polar question Does Lorraine have a beehive
hairdo too? The expression I just gotta ask is a clear marker of this neutrality.
(2) Wait, I just gotta ask - Lorraine doesn’t have a beehive hairdo too, does
she??
Neutral readings of tag questions are associated with a negative anchor and a weak
rhythmic break between the anchor and tag (Ladd 1981, McCawley 1988, Huddle-
ston and Pullum 2002). Furthermore, as I argue below the negation in the anchor
receives a marked interpretation, a key component, I argue, in allowing the neutral
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reading. The examples in (1) and (2), then, suggest interesting correlations between
linguistic form, especially intonation, and interpretation. It is the overarching goal of
this chapter to investigate these correlations in detail, focusing in particular on how
intonation aligns with discourse function as modeled by the rhetorical connection of
an utterance to the antecedent discourse.
§3.2 provides background information on the form and function of tag ques-
tions, largely via a discussion of previous analyses. In §3.3, I investigate discourse
function more thoroughly, arguing in §3.3.1 that (at least some) tag questions are
complex speech acts. In §3.3.2, I take a closer look at the fine-grained interpreta-
tions of tag questions discussed above, paying particular attention to the aspects
of linguistic form that are correlated with these readings. In addition, I discuss a
small corpus study that mitigates against adopting the kind of “functional” analysis
of intonation mentioned above. Specifically, I show that there is not a one-to-one
correspondence between final intonation and discourse function.
§3.4 develops a formal model of how confirmation, acknowledgement and
neutral readings of tag questions are calculated. I posit two sdrt discourse re-
lations, Acknowledgementq and Confirmationq, to model these readings. Neutral
readings arise when tags attach within a dialogue with a discourse relation perti-
nent to an information-seeking question, e.g. Q-Elab, Elaborationq, etc. I argue
that intonation, particularly rising intonation, contributes information to sdrt’s
logic of cognitive modelling, thus providing information about the speaker’s beliefs
and intentions. Recognizing these beliefs and intentions is central to recovering the
communicative goals of the speaker. In particular, this reasoning is key (at least in
dialogic contexts) to inferring how the content of an utterance is rhetorically related
to the antecedent dialogue. Tag questions are a conventionalized means of managing
the content of the common ground by either requiring feedback from the hearer that
the communicative goal of the anchor has been achieved, settling the content of the
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common ground with respect to the anchor, or by requesting additional evidence
for the anchor if the speaker is uncertain of its truth. Since intonation contours are
often assumed to convey information about the relationship between the speaker or
hearer, the content of an utterance, and the common ground (Gussenhoven 1984,
Steedman 2000, a.o.), they serve an important role in recovering speaker intentions.
3.2 The Linguistic Form of Tag Questions
In this section, I discuss the important grammatical features of tag questions. §3.2.1
provides some background on the syntax and semantics of tag questions and §3.2.2
addresses their intonational properties.
3.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
Reversed polarity tag questions consist of a full declarative sentence, the anchor, in
a paratactic relation with a reduced interrogative clause, the tag.2 The tag itself
consists of an auxiliary verb followed by a personal pronoun. The structure of tag
questions is shown schematically in (3), where XP is a predicate of some type, i.e. a
verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc.
(3) [ NP Aux (XP) ], [ Aux Pro]
Early analyses attempted to derive the tag from the anchor via a series
of syntactic transformations. For example, the tag in (4) can be derived by (i)
2There are two varieties of tag question in English: the reversed-polarity tag question and the
constant polarity tag question. The latter are distinguished by the fact that the polarity of both
the anchor and the tag is positive, as in (i).
(i) Julie is here, is she?
I focus in this chapter solely on reversed polarity tag questions. Constant polarity tag questions
are rare in spoken American English. In 36 tag questions culled from the Santa Barbara Corpus of
Spoken American English, there were no instances of constant polarity tag questions.
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reversing the polarity of the anchor, (ii) forming an interrogative from the result
and (iii) eliding the verb phrase and pronominalizing the subject NP. An example
of this procedure is shown in (4) (following Huddleston and Pullum 2002).
(4) Jane is coming, isn’t she?
a. Jane is coming. (anchor)
b. Jane isn’t coming. (reverse polarity)
c. isn’t Jane coming? (form interrogative)
d. isn’t she? (reduce)
Transformational analyses face a number of problems, however. For instance,
applying the rules in (4) to the anchor in (5a) (from Huddleston and Pullum 2002)
produces an incorrect tag. The problem is that the “polarity” of the anchor is not
a purely syntactic property (one that is read off from the form of the auxiliary). In-
tuitively, determiners like few and the adverbs like hardly are semantically negative.
As a result, the tag should have a positive auxiliary.
(5) a. Few of them liked it, did they?
b. It’s hardly fair, is it?
The examples in (6) (from Oehrle 1987) show that a purely syntactic process
of pronominalization is insufficient in determining the form of the pronoun in the
tag. Instead, the pronoun is selected based on pragmatic information about the
intended referent. For example, in (6a) both she and he are possible depending on
whether the addressee’s cousin is female or male. Likewise, (6c) can take he or she
(rather than it) when the noun phrase the ham sandwich is used to refer to the
person who ordered the ham sandwich (following Nunberg 1977).
(6) a. Your cousin left, didn’t she/he.
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b. IBM uses too much silicon, don’t they/doesn’t it.
c. The ham sandwich in Booth 2 is attracting a lot of attention, isn’t
it/she/he.
Given the existence of these cases, it is now standardly assumed that tags
have a separate derivational history from anchors. Restrictions on the form of the
tag are captured by stating specific syntactic, semantic and pragmatic constraints
(rather than transformations). For example, the pronoun in the tag needs to be
coreferential with the matrix subject of the anchor (as shown by the examples in
(6)). This is a pragmatic constraint. Similarly, the auxiliary verbs in the anchor
and tag need to be compatible. Normally, this means that the auxiliary used in
the tag is the same as the one in the anchor (and the appropriate form of do if
the anchor contains no auxiliary). Oehrle (1987) argues that a these constraints
can be captured simply by requiring that the proposition conveyed by the anchor
be an element of the denotation of the tag (where the tag is interpreted as a full
interrogative clause). In other words, the anchor needs to be able to count as an
answer to the tag. I leave these issues aside as I am mostly concerned with the
interpretation of tag questions rather than with the nuances of their form.
A more pressing issue (given the goals of the current chapter) is the inter-
pretation of tag questions and their associated pragmatic function. There are two
schools of thought on this issue. On the analyses proposed by Culicover (1992) and
Oehrle (1987) tag questions denote polar questions, i.e. a set of propositions. Oehrle
(1987), for example, assumes that the denotation of a tag question is obtained by ap-
plying the denotation of the tag to the denotation of XP in (3). Culicover treats tags
as functions from propositions to polar questions. In effect, tags are illocutionary
force indicating devices (ifids), applying to a proposition to yield a question.
This type of analysis must account for the intuition that reversed-polarity tag
questions normally convey some degree of belief in the anchor. Oehrle, for example,
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assumes that the proposition expressed by the anchor is conventionally implicated.
This is a strong assumption; conventional implicatures are noncancelable and thus
issue in commitments. In addition, conventional implicature is a controversial class
of meaning.
The second school of thought on the interpretation of tag questions is the
one quoted in §3.1 from Quirk et al. (1985). On this view, the anchor denotes a
proposition, which the speaker asserts, and the tag denotes a polar question, whose
meaning is recovered by the mechanism for interpreting verb phrase ellipsis and
which the speaker asks. Advocates of this position include Sadock (1974) and Ladd
(1981).
Kay (2002) provides a recent analysis in this vein. One of the interesting
aspects his analysis is his account of the association of intonation with particular
discourse functions (as discussed in §3.1). Kay (like Oehrle 1987 and Culicover
1992), in effect, treats tags as ifids, as their primary interpretive effect is the appli-
cation of a illocutionary force operator to the proposition φ denoted by the anchor.
Specifically, rising tags introduce a force F3 that applies to φ yielding F3(φ). Falling
intonation introduces the illocutionary force F4.3 The anchor is still asserted, how-
ever. The force of the tag question as whole is a set containing the assertion of φ
and one of F3(φ) or F4(φ) depending on whether the tag ends in rising or falling
intonation.
What is notable about Kay’s analysis is the one-to-one association of final in-
tonation with illocutionary force. This assumption is common to many descriptions
of the association of final tune with the interpretation of tag questions (as alluded to
in the introduction). Oehrle (1987), for example, assumes that intonation contours
are functions from propositions to speech acts. I argue in §3.3.2 that this is an
unrealistic model of intonational meaning. Otherwise, I agree with Kay and others
3F3 and F4 correspond roughly to requests for confirmation and requests for acknowledgement
respectively.
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that tag questions are complex speech acts (based on the arguments from Sadock
1974 presented in §3.3.1). However, I argue that the interpretations associated with
intonation are the result of the rhetorical relation linking the tag to the anchor. This
relation is computed based on the compositional semantics of the anchor and the
tag and from the information provided by intonation about the speaker’s cognitive
state. But there is no direct link on such a model between intonation and discourse
function.
3.2.2 Intonation
As noted in the introduction and the previous section, intonation has an important
role in determining the discourse function of a tag question. Rising tags are normally
requests for confirmation; falling tags are requests for acknowledgement. Others
have noted a dependence on prosodic phrasing and interpretation. McCawley (1988)
and Huddleston and Pullum (2002), for example, observe that neutral requests
for information are associated with a weak juncture between the anchor and the
tag. Similarly, Ladd (1981) claims that the strength of this juncture affects the
interpretation of negation in the anchor. Given the importance of intonation in
understanding tag questions, I provide a brief introduction to the Tones and Break
Indices (ToBI) labeling scheme (Beckman and Elam 1997) to facilitate the discussion
below.4
Intonational patterns are acoustically changes in pitch, the physical correlate
of which are modulations in fundamental frequency F0. ToBI provides an abstract,
phonological representation of these changes based on the analysis of intonation in
Pierrehumbert (1980) and Beckman and Pierrehumbert (1986). Intonation contours
in ToBI are sequences of intonational events (i.e. F0 peaks, falls, etc.) modeled with
abstract high (H) and low (L) tonal targets. These tones are arranged according
4Chapter 12 of Kadmon (2001) provides a thorough introduction to intonation for those inter-
ested in semantics and pragmatics.
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Pitch accents L*, H*, L+H*, L*+H, H*+!H
Phrase accents L-, H-
Boundary tones L%, H%
Table 3.1: The elements of intonation contours in the ToBI annotation scheme
(Beckman and Elam 1997).
to a simple grammar. An intonational phrase, for example, contains at least one
intermediate phrase followed by one of the two boundary tones L% or H%. Inter-
mediate phrases in turn consist of one or more pitch accents followed by one of the
two phrase accents L- or H-. The complete inventory of tonal elements in ToBI is
shown in Table 3.1.
Pitch accents have received the most attention from formal semanticists. The
last pitch accent in an intermediate phrase, the nuclear pitch accent, marks focus
in English. Furthermore, the choice of pitch accent has been argued to mark the
discourse status of the expression it is aligned with. L accents, for instance, are said
to mark old information (Steedman 2000, Kadmon 2001). In the representation of
an intonation contour pitch accents are marked with asterisks and are distinguished
phonologically from other tones by the fact that they are aligned with stressed
syllables. In addition to the simple accents H and L, there are two bitonal accents
L+H. Both of these tones are phonetically realized as a rise from a low pitch to
a high pitch. The two accents L*+H and L+H* are distinguished by the timing
of the pitch peak. For the L+H* accent the F0 peak is aligned with the stressed
syllable. The L*+H accent, on the other hand, represents a low target aligned with
the stressed syllable followed by a rise to an F0 peak. This peak may itself occur in
the stressed syllable for long syllables or on later syllables. For example, in the pitch
track in Figure 3.1 (taken from the ToBI training materials) the low tone occurs on
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the first syllable of rigamarole, the stressed syllable, and the F0 peak (annotated
















Figure 3.1: Pitch track demonstrating the L*+H pitch accent.
Rising and falling intonation are represented by sequences of phrase accent
and boundary tone. Phrase accents occur sometime after the last pitch accent in
an intermediate phrase and “fill up” the space up to the boundary tone (Kadmon
2001). In Figure 3.1, for example, the L- phrase accent is evident from the rapid fall
after the F0 peak and level low pitch until the H% boundary tone. The sequences
L-H% and H-H% are both phonetically realized as a rise, specifically, a low rise
versus a high rise. L-L% represents a fall. The H-L% sequence is realized as a high
plateau.
Given the abstract ToBI representations and their phonetic realizations, the
unique tonal element associated with final rising intonation is an H% boundary
5The L*+H L-H% intonation contour in Figure 3.1, incidentally, is an instance of what Liberman
and Sag (1974) call the contradiction contour, which plays an important role in the analysis in
Chapter 5.
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tone. Any tune ending with a L% is phonetically realized as a non-rising contour.
Gunlogson (2003) (following Gussenhoven 1984) argues for an alternative analysis,
defining final tunes in terms of the direction of the pitch contour from the nuclear
pitch accent to the end of the intonational phrase. A rising contour corresponds to
non-falling pitch from the nuclear pitch accent to the end of the intonational phrase.
Gunlogson thus assumes a three-way distinction between rises, non-rises and fall-
rises. An H* L-H% tune on her anlaysis is an instance of the fall-rise contour.
Similarly, a L* H-L% tune is an instance of the rising contour. Consequently, there
is no unique tonal element correlated with rising intonation. I refrain from taking a
principled stance on these issues in the remainder of the thesis. For convenience, I
follow Steedman (2000, 2003) and others in assuming that final rises correspond to
tunes ending with an H% boundary tone.
As I mentioned at the outset of this section, prosodic phrasing has also been
argued to affect the interpretation of tag questions. Prosodic phrasing is marked
by the distribution of phrase accents and boundary tones in a tune. The difference
between full intonational phrases and intermediate phrases is related to the degree
of juncture at the phrase boundary. Weaker junctures correspond to intermediate
phrase boundaries. Intuitively, tag questions can be pronounced with varying de-
grees of juncture between the anchor and the tag. Along these lines, Ladd (1981)
distinguishes nuclear tags (which he annotates by placing a forward-slash (/) be-
tween the anchor and tag) from postnuclear tags (which he annotates with an equal
sign (=)).
Nuclear tags, according to Ladd, “have a separate nucleus or nuclear pitch
accent, generally preceeded in the rhythm of the sentence by a noticeable pause
or intonational boundary ” (p. 167). Postnuclear tags, on the other hand, “have
no separate nucleus, the pitch contour on the tag merely continuing the nuclear
contour begun at the preceding nucleus in the main sentence; generally, too, there
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is noticeably less of a pause or boundary before the tag ” (p. 167). Ladd goes on
to argue that this distinction is correlated with an interpretive difference, though
he is vague on the details of this effect. One clear reflex of the nuclear/postnuclear
distinction, however, is the ability of postnuclear tags to admit a neutral question
reading, which is absent for nuclear tags. McCawley (1988) and Huddleston and
Pullum (2002) make the same observation.
The description of postnuclear tags provided by Ladd suggests (within the
ToBI framework) the absence of a phrase accent or a boundary tone between the
anchor and the tag, in addition to the absence of a pitch accent on the auxiliary in
the tag. This is shown schematically in (7b). Nuclear tag questions, on the other
hand, are distinguished by a prosodic boundary at the juncture between the anchor
and the tag, represented here as either a full intonational phrase or an intermediate












isn’t here, is she ?
T-T%
The representation of postnuclear tags in (7b) is somewhat unintuitive. It
is difficult in my estimation not to perceive a pitch accent on the auxiliary verb
in the tag, and most descriptions, Quirk et al. (1985) e.g., assume a pitch accent
there. What Ladd might have in mind is the existence of a postnuclear pitch on the
tag’s auxiliary verb, as shown in (8a). The existence of postnuclear pitch accents,
however, is controversial and, furthermore, ruled out by the grammar of tunes in
ToBI. Alternatively, the perceived pitch accent on the auxiliary verb might be a
reflex of aligning the phrase accent with a lexically stressed syllable (Ladd 1996,
6Here and throughout the thesis I mark nuclear pitch accents by highlighting the accented lexical
item in small caps. Optional elements are written between parentheses.
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In the absence of instrumental and experimental studies, it is impossible to
decide between these options. However, I do not believe that one must decide in or-
der to address the interpretation of tag questions. It is sufficient to note that neutral
readings of tag questions (and some biased readings as well) have a weaker bound-
ary between the anchor and the tag than do nuclear tag questions.7 Therefore, for
the purposes of the discussion below, I recast the nuclear/postnuclear distinction
in terms of intonational phrasing as follows: nuclear tag questions have an into-
national phrase boundary between the anchor and the tag, while postnuclear tag
questions have an intermediate phrase boundary between the anchor and the tag.

















I develop an analysis below in which these prosodic differences conspire with
syntax and semantics to yield two speech act discourse referents or a single referent
which is assigned a complex speech act type. This is, in effect, a way of capturing
the observation that intonational phrasing influences discourse segmentation. In
either case, however, computing the discourse function of the tag relative to the
anchor proceeds in a similar fashion.
7Also, the interpretations available to nuclear tag questions are a subset of those available to
postnuclear tag questions. One can side step the issue then, and provide only analyses of postnuclear
tag questions (which would carry over naturally to nuclear tag questions).
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3.3 Tag Questions and Discourse Function
§3.2.1 introduced two issues regarding the interpretation of tag questions. The first
was related to the status of the anchor: given the presence of both declarative
and interrogative syntax and the normal mapping of these to interpretation, what
and how many discourse functions do tag questions serve? Are they questions, as
Oehrle (1987) and Culicover (1992) assume, or both, as Ladd (1981) and Quirk et al.
(1985) maintain? The second issue concerned the kinds of responses expected by tag
questions and how these readings are correlated with the phonological descriptions
in §3.2.2. §3.3.1 addresses the first issue; §3.3.2 covers the second.
3.3.1 Sentence Type and Discourse Function
I follow Sadock (1974) in my answer to the first of these questions. He argues
based on a number of diagnostics for illocutionary force that tag questions are both
assertions and questions. These diagnostics are predicated on the assumption that
certain discourse markers select utterances with specific illocutionary forces. The
sentence initial parenthetical expression after all, for example, occurs with sentences
that convey an assertion, but not with those that convey a neutral question. Thus
(10b) is felicitous, whereas (10c) is not.
(10) a. A: It’s o.k. if you don’t finish writing the paper today.
b. A: After all, your adviser is out of the country.
c. #A: After all, is your adviser out of the country?
Similarly, the discourse markers by any chance and tell me co-occur with
questions, but not assertions, as illustrated by the examples in (11) and (12).
(11) a. #John, by any chance, owns a car.
b. Does John, by any chance, own a car?
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(12) Tell me, {#John owns a car. / does John own a car? }
I elaborate on Sadock’s observations and assume that tell me and by any
chance distinguish between different types of question. Specifically, tell me, as a
request for a response, is consistent with a very general notion of questionhood,
viz. one that encompasses both biased and neutral readings. By any chance, on the
other hand, as an expression of epistemic uncertainty occurs only with information-
seeking questions. In this sense, it is very much like I just gotta ask as it occurs in
(2).
Nuclear Tag Questions.
Applying these diagnostics to rising and falling nuclear tag questions supports Ladd’s
(1981) contention that they are “double-barreled” speech acts (see also Quirk et al.
1985). That is, nuclear tag questions are both assertions and questions. The felicity
of after all in (13) and (14) provides evidence that the anchors in (13b) and (14b)
are asserted.8
(13) a. A: The conference should be exceptional this year.
b. A: After all, Jane is coming, / isn’t she.
(14) a. A: The conference might be sub-par this year.
b. A: After all, Jane isn’t coming, / is she.
(15a), on the other hand, shows that nuclear tag questions are still questions,
while (15b) shows that they are not neutral questions, since they fail the by any
chance test.
8In constructed examples, I adopt the orthographic convention of indicating a final fall with
a period (.) and a final rise with a question mark (?). The same convention is adopted in the
transcriptions of the sbcsae.
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(15) a. Tell me, Jane {is/isn’t} coming, / {isn’t/is} she.
b. #Jane {is/isn’t} coming, by any chance, / {isn’t/is} she.
The observation that nuclear tag questions are not neutral questions is ex-
pected given the implications of the diagnostics in (13) and (14). If the speaker
asserts the proposition conveyed by the anchor, it follows that the tag cannot be a
neutral request for information. This inference is captured in sdrt’s shallow logic
of cognitive modelling by the blocking of Question Related Goals by the more
specific default in Known Answers (described in Chapter 2). If the speaker sincerely
asserts the anchor, then normally they believe the proposition conveyed by the as-
sertion. Since this proposition is an answer to the tag, the normal goal of a question,
i.e. to know an answer, is blocked and the question has some other discourse function
(as described in §3.3.2).
Postnuclear Tag Questions.
These tests yield a more nuanced set of observations with respect to postnuclear tag
questions. Covering the simplest case first, postnuclear tag questions with a positive
anchor have the same range of discourse functions as nuclear tag questions according
to Sadock’s diagnostics. They are both assertions (16) and tell me questions (17),
but not neutral questions (18).
(16) a. A: Why is Nicholas so sure the conference will be dull?
b. A: After all, Jane is coming=isn’t she?
(17) Tell me, Jane {is/isn’t} coming={isn’t/is} she?
(18) #Jane is coming, by any chance=isn’t she?
The data with respect to postnuclear tag questions with a negative anchor
are more complex. There appears to be an ambiguity in the interpretation of the
52
negation. The two readings are disambiguated by the inclusion of a polarity-sensitive
lexical item in the anchor. Assume, without argument for now, that the negative
element in an anchor that contains an npi receives a standard, truth-functional
interpretation. On this reading, postnuclear tag questions are biased in the same
way as nuclear tag questions. That is, they are assertions and questions (though
not neutral questions), as established in (19b), (17) and (20a).
(19) a. A: Pascal’s not coming, so why is Nicholas so sure the conference will
be a success?
b. A: After all, Julie isn’t coming either = is she?
c. #A: After all, Julie isn’t coming too = is she?
(20) a. #Jane isn’t coming either,by any chance=is she?
b. Jane isn’t coming too, by any chance=is she?
When the anchor includes a ppi, the negation receives a “non-standard”
interpretation. On this reading, postnuclear tag questions are no longer biased
questions, but rather neutral, information-seeking questions as established in (20b).
That this really is a neutral question is supported by the fact that the anchor in
these cases no longer passes the assertion diagnostics, as shown in (19c).9
9The correlation between the type of polarity item in the anchor and the interpretation of the
negation is a more subtle matter than the discussion above lets on. In particular, while ppis in
negative anchors always appear to coerce a neutral interpretation, some npis also appear to be
consistent with this reading. Strong npis such as lift a finger, budge an inch, etc. only occur in
biased tag questions, while weak npis like any or ever occur in both neutral and biased tag questions.
The examples in (i) – (vi) (from the web) illustrate this ambiguity. The examples in (i), which
contain the positively sensitive determiner some, are neutral questions. The examples in (ii), which
contain the negatively sensitive any, are biased.
(i) a. Yo momma doesn’t have some kind of learning disability does she? Cause I didn’t
mean to come down so hard on her.
b. She doesn’t have some weird disease does she? Is it just from being outdoors?
(ii) a. Man, she doesn’t pull any punches, does she?
b. Gee, Manniston doesn’t accept any responsibility for anything does she?
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Ladd (1981) notes that the licensing of polarity items in nuclear tag ques-
tions is predictable from the morpho-syntactic and semantic properties of the anchor
alone: negative polarity items are licensed in negative anchors and positive polarity
items are licensed in positive anchors (and never vice versa). The same observa-
tion holds of positive-anchor postnuclear tag questions: ppis are licensed and npis
are not. As was just shown above, however, the expected distribution of polarity-
sensitive lexical items in negative-anchor postnuclear tag questions breaks down and
both npis and ppis are felicitous. It is not simply the case that both npis and ppis
are licensed, however, but that both occur in negative anchors of postnuclear tag
questions with a concomitant difference in interpretation.
Previous descriptions are vague on what this interpretive difference is. Ladd
(1981), McCawley (1988) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) note that the neutral
use of a tag question requires postnuclear prosody and a negative anchor. Sadock’s
The tag questions with any in (iii) and (iv), however, are neutral questions (an interpretation
supported by the fact that they receive relatively neutral responses.
(iii) a. She doesn’t owe you any money does she?
b. Well, no.
(iv) a. A: She doesn’t have any cats, does she?
b. B: None that I know of, Nardo. But just to be safe, we won’t be calling her to cat-sit
you guys, okay?
The weak npi ever has a similar distribution. The tag questions in (v) have a natural biased reading
(especially (vb), which has no plausible neutral reading supposing that the speaker really believes
that Adam is a “he” and is familiar with basic reproductive biology). The examples in (vi), on the
other hand, have neutral readings (at least according to my intuitions).
(v) a. Diehl hasn’t ever missed a start, has he? The guy is NEVER hurt (knock on wood).
b. Adam hasn’t ever been pregnant, has he?
(vi) a. Crookshanks hasn’t ever eyed Hedwig or Pigwideon has he? If not, that might support
the Arnold-isn’t-all-he-appears theory....
b. Joe O’Cearuill from Arsenal hasn’t ever declared for Ireland has he?
It is interesting to note that interrogative sentences that contain any and ever are also ambiguous
between biased and neutral interpretations which are correlated with an intonational difference (see
Chapter 5)
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diagnostics as applied above verify these observations, but little or no discussion of
the semantics of the negation in the neutral reading is offered. Ladd (1981) suggests
that postnuclear prosody affects the scope of negation. Neutral tag questions, Ladd
states, involve an “outside-negation” semantics, that is the negation is in some
sense outside of the proposition expressed by the anchor. McCawley (1988) also
assigns the negation in neutral tag questions a special status. Specifically, he argues
that it is “fake negation”, i.e. an “instance of n’t that doesn’t count as negative
for the purposes of syntactic rules that are sensitive to negation (p. 571).” He
offers no description of the semantics of “fake negation”, if it has a semantics at
all. Neither of these admittedly vague proposals explains why “outside-negation”
or “fake negation” allows a neutral reading.
I assume an analysis below in the spirit of Ladd’s, on which the negation in
neutral postnuclear tag questions is “outside” of the proposition in which it occurs.
This analysis is based on the similarities between Ladd’s description of outside-
negation and Horn’s (1989) description of so-called meta-linguistic negation as “in
the clause but not of it ” (p. 397). In fact, Ladd’s outside-negation has a num-
ber of important properties in common with metalinguistic negation. First, Horn
(1989) notes that metalinguistic negation neither licenses negative polarity items
nor prohibits positive polarity items. The version of (21) (from Horn 1989) that
includes the positively-sensitive determiner some is only felicitous when understood
as a denial or correction of the implicature associated with (21) that Chris did not
manage to solve all of the problems, as the continuation makes clear.
(21) Chris didn’t manage to solve {some/#any} of the problems, he managed to
solve all of them.
The version of (21) including any sounds contradictory, whereas the alternative does
not, suggesting that the negation in (21) is outside of the proposition expressed by
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the first clause (if the first clause conveys a proposition at all): rather than asserting
that Chris did not manage to solve some of the problems, the first half of (21) conveys
that it is in some sense “incorrect” to assert that Chris solved some of the problems.
The negation, then, does not form part of the material targeted for denial.
A second property of meta-linguistic negation is its inability to incorporate
prefixally (Horn 1989). For our purposes, this means that it is insufficient that the
anchor simply count as negative for a neutral reading to be possible. Rather, the
anchor must contain the right kind of negative element. For example, the negative
adverb never in (22) does not license ppis. Neither can it be understood as a neutral
question, despite the fact that the anchor counts as negative as evidenced by the
form of the tag in (22).
(22) Brian never ate {any/#some} vegetables, did he?
Given these similarities, I assume that outside-negation is metalinguistic.
Furthermore, I assume that the metalinguistic negation of a proposition φ, ∼ φ,
is equivalent to descriptive negation taking wide scope over an assertion operator,
i.e. ¬Assert(φ). This analysis is standard in three-valued logics with metalinguistic
negation and assertion operators (see Bochvar 1981 and also Beaver and Krahmer
2001). Note that this assumption directly captures the fact that the anchor of the
postnuclear tag question in (19c) is not asserted, as this is precisely what metalin-
guistic negation conveys.
3.3.2 Kinds of Questions
§3.3.1 drew a broad distinction between biased questions, i.e. those that assert some
proposition, and neutral questions. Sadock’s diagnostics established that nuclear
tag questions and some postnuclear tag questions consist of both an assertion and a
question, and are therefore biased on the characterization of bias adopted throughout
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the thesis. The remaining postnuclear tag questions do not involve an assertion and
are therefore neutral. In the current section, I discuss biased and neutral readings in
more detail, drawing a distinction within the class of biased tag questions correlated
with final tune and based on the speaker’s degree of belief in the anchor and his
intention in asking the question associated with the tag.
Two Kinds of Biased Tag Question
Tag questions convey a varying strength of bias depending on the direction of the
pitch contour on the tag. Falling intonation over the tag conveys a strong bias
toward the proposition expressed by the anchor, as in (1b). Rising intonation, on
the other hand, normally conveys some doubt or uncertainty on part of the speaker
regarding the truth of the anchor and, as a result, is associated with a weak bias, as
in (1a). Furthermore, the questions associated with falling and rising tag questions
have distinct discourse functions related to the strength of bias. As described in the
introduction, falling intonation tag questions ask for acknowledgement of the anchor
from the addressee, while rising intonation tag questions ask for confirmation (Rando
1980, Huddleston and Pullum 2002, inter alia).
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) note that acknowledgement readings are com-
mon when the anchor is uncontroversial given world knowledge and the contents of
the common ground. For instance, the tag questions in (23) and (24) (from the
Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken English) provide the speaker’s evaluation of or
commentary on a situation, and are therefore unlikely to be objected to by the ad-
dressee. In (23), for example, the interlocutors are responding to a loud noise in
the environment. From (23a) and (23b) it is clear that both interlocutors heard the
noise. The tag in (23c), therefore, simply seeks acknowledgement of the speaker’s
evaluation of the proximity of the noise to her house, which it receives in (23e).
(23) a. DAN: ...What the hell is that.
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b. JENNIFER: ... I don’t know.
c. ENV: [RUMBLING NOISE]
d. JENNIFER: ... That sounds like it was right in front of my house,
doesn’t it.
e. DAN: ..Yeah, it does.
The examples in (24) provide additional illustration. In each case, the anchor offers
the speaker’s evaluation of some relevant situation or state of affairs.
(24) a. It’s a royal mess, isn’t it.
b. I mean he was a pretty wild guy, wasn’t he.
c. I don’t know the half of it, do I.
d. ... Well that’s interesting, isn’t it.
It would be odd for an addressee to reply to any of the tag questions in (24) with
a short answer that disconfirms the anchor. If the addressee wanted to object to
the speaker’s evaluation, an indirect response is required, e.g., Well, its not THAT
messy.
While the main rhetorical function of a falling tag is for the addressee to
acknowledge the truth of the anchor, other, more subtle contextual inferences, are
often discernible. For example, the falling tag in (25a) (from Huddleston and Pullum
2002) can convey an implicit request for an explanation.
(25) a. You’re up early this morning, aren’t you.
b. I was right all along, wasn’t I.
Likewise, (25b) is not only a request for the addressee to acknowledge the truth of
the anchor, but for him or her to accept a proposition that they did not previously
accept. I leave these added implicatures aside below and instead focus on the core
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discourse function of falling tags, viz. request for acknowledgment.
In the formal analysis developed in §3.4, acknowledgment questions result
when the tag is related to the anchor with the sdrt relation Acknowledgementq.
This relation is defined in terms of the relation Acknowledgement , discussed in
Asher and Lascarides (2003). An utterance acknowledges another if it indicates that
the communicative goal of the utterance it targets has been accepted or achieved.
Acknowledgement questions are similar: Acknowledgementq relates two discourse
segments α and β just in case the answer to β entails that the communicative
goal of α has been accepted or achieved. The normal communicative goal of an
assertion is belief transfer, i.e. that the addressee add the proposition conveyed by
the assertion to his or her own set of beliefs.
Tag questions with rising intonation are also biased toward the truth of the
anchor. However, it is a weaker bias, as some doubt or uncertainty is expressed.
Consider the constructed dialogue in (26).
(26) a. A: Can Julie do it for us?
b. B: Julie isn’t here, / is she?
c. A: She snuck in this morning.
B answers (26a) by asserting that Julie is not present, but the final rise yields only
a weak assertion. Intuitively, the tag is a request for confirmation: the speaker has
a hunch that Julie is not in and requests evidence for or against this hunch. (27)
provides another example from the sbcsae. Note that Fran’s turn in (27a) suggests
that her building is not new, contrary to a prior belief held by Sean. His tag question
in (27c), then, is naturally understood as a request for confirmation of this belief,
in the face of apparent counterevidence.
(27) a. FRAN: ...the neighborhood’s probably the same, since it’s a district
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and they won’t let em tear anything down.
b. FRAN: You could find your way around except that –
c. SEAN: Your building’s new. Isn’t it?
d. FRAN: No. My building’s old.
On the basis of the examples in (26) and (27), I model confirmation questions
as requests for evidence (or counterevidence). On this reading, the anchor is only
weakly asserted, often because there is contextual evidence against it, and answers
to the tag are expected to add weight (or subtract weight as the case may be) to the
weakly asserted proposition. The response in (26c), for example, provides evidence
against the anchor, as does Fran’s response in (27d). I define an sdrt relation
Confirmationq in §3.4.2 that attempts to capture these intuitions.
This discussion might appear to suggest a one-to-one mapping between final
tune and the discourse function of tags. As already mentioned, this assumption
forms part of many descriptions and analyses of tag questions. Oehrle (1987) and
Kay (2002), for example, both assume some version of it. However, there is ample
reason to doubt that such a strict correlation exists. The ineffability of intonational
meaning, in particular, is reason enough to consider such a clear correlation between
intonation and interpretation to be untenable. Rising intonation on a declarative,
for instance, may indicate that the utterance is intended as a question (Gunlogson
2003) or that the speaker is uncertain about the truth of the proposition expressed
by the declarative (Šafářová 2005). It may also function as an indicator of polite-
ness (Brown and Levinson 1978) or a marker of “non-finality” (Pierrehumbert and
Hirschberg 1990). The main point is that the exact interpretive contribution of an
intonation contour is highly context dependent.
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that shows that it is incorrect to
assume that rising intonation is always correlated with requests for confirmation.
Table 3.2 reports the results of a small corpus study of reversed-polarity tag ques-
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acknowledgment confirmation neutral total
fall: 15 1 0 16
rise: 9 10 1 20
total 24 11 1 36
Table 3.2: The association of final tune and discourse function in English (reversed
polarity) tag questions.
tions in spontaneous speech. 36 tag questions in total were extracted from parts II
and IV of the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois et al.
2003, Du Bois and Englebretson 2005). Of these, 20 have final rising intonation.
Of these 20, only half were clearly requests for confirmation. Nearly as many are
categorized as acknowledgement questions, while one was a neutral tag question.
This data mitigates against an analysis that treats intonation as a function from
a semantic object to a specific illocutionary act, as Oehrle (1987) and Kay (2002)
assume. On the other hand, there does appear to be a correlation between falling
intonation and the use of tags as requests for acknowledgment. 15 out of 16 falling
intonation tag questions in the corpus were acknowledgement questions.
How are we to make sense of the data in Table 3.2? I believe that much of
it can be explained by assuming that falling intonation is the unmarked member of
an opposition in a closed system. Following Gunlogson (2003), I distinguish rising
from non-rising intonation. I assume that final rises contribute information about
the speaker’s cognitive state (as discussed in more detail below), while non-rising in-
tonation contributes no information beyond that normally conveyed by the utterance
it is associated with. I show in §3.4.1 that the acknowledgement reading of tag ques-
tions follows from the compositional semantics of the anchor and tag and the axioms
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of cognitive modelling. No further information about the speaker’s cognitive state
is necessary. In §3.4.2, I show how the information contributed by rising intonation
blocks the inference that the tag is related to the anchor with Acknowledgementq.
Thus falling intonation tag questions are requests for acknowledgement because of
the semantics of the anchor and tag. Rising intonation contributes additional in-
formation, leading to additional implicatures about the discourse function of the
tag.
Note that while rising intonation tag questions are not normally requests
for confirmation, requests for confirmation are normally rising intonation tag ques-
tions. I take this as evidence that information flows from the speaker’s intentions
to linguistic form, rather than vice versa. That is, if the speaker wants to convey a
confirmation question, then he should use rising intonation. However, he may still
convey an acknowledgement question with rising intonation, if he has some reason
for doing so, e.g. for the sake of politeness. Again, more details about this analysis
are provided in §3.4.
Neutral Tag Questions
As I argued in §3.3.1, tag questions sometimes function as neutral requests for
information. The dialogue in (28) provides the kind of discourse context where a
neutral reading is natural. (29) is a naturally occurring dialogue from the sbcsae.
Julie’s turn in (29c) is intuitively an neutral request for information.
(28) a. A: We need someone who has consulted for us before.
b. B: Julie isn’t here = is she?
(29) a. JULIE: And I sent in the Arab papers to be transferred to my name.
They haven’t been transferred since nineteen-seventy-seven. I don’t
know how many owners she’s had. But it hasn’t –
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b. GARY: Wow.
c. JULIE: You don’t remember the name of the people you bought her
from. Do you?
d. GARY: No, but then that’s not unusual.
While tag questions like (28) and (29) are neutral questions, there is often
a subtle contextual bias toward the positive answer. As Huddleston and Pullum
(2002) note, this subtle positive bias often has an “emotive” feel to it. For instance,
the examples in (30) are neutral in so far as the speaker does not commit himself to
a particular answer, yet convey a fear that the positive answer is true. Ladd (1981)
makes the same observation when he describes (31) as having a “worried anti-nuke”
reading.10
(30) a. It isn’t raining again, = is it?
b. It isn’t my turn already, = is it?
(31) They haven’t restarted TMI already = have they?
This emotive bias does not always convey a fear that the positive answer is true, as
in (28b), so an analysis must allow a range of speaker attitudes toward the positive
answer. The existence of this attitude is consistent with the current analysis of
neutral tag questions as containing metalinguistic negation in the anchor: conveying
that one is not asserting φ at the very least introduces φ as a topic under discussion
or suggests that φ is salient in some sense.
10Three Mile Island, or TMI, is a nuclear powerplant in Pennsylvania that suffered a partial core
meltdown in 1979.
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3.4 Computing Discourse Function
In the current section, I provide an analysis of English tag questions as outlined
above. Recall that I assume that the interpretations of tag questions correlated with
final intonation are best captured in terms of the rhetorical relation that links the tag
to the anchor. The discourse segment π associated with a nuclear tag question, for
instance, consists of two sub-segments πa and πt for the anchor and tag respectively.
The task at hand is to compute the relation R that links πt to πa based on the
grammatical features of both the anchor and tag, especially intonation. Postnuclear
tag questions, I assume, introduce a single label π that is assigned a complex speech
act type assertion • question. Computing the rhetorical connection between the
assertion and the question proceeds in the same way as with nuclear tag questions.
I begin by discussing acknowledgment questions. I argue that these can be
understood on basis of the semantics of tag questions alone, once a precise defini-
tion of acknowledgement questions is provided. I then proceed to show how the
contribution of a final rise blocks the default inference to acknowledgment. Finally,
I discuss how the neutral reading of tag questions is calculated.
3.4.1 Acknowledgement Questions
As discussed in §3.3.2, falling intonation nuclear tag questions and postnuclear tag
questions that do not contain a metalinguistic negation are by default understood as
requests for acknowledgement. On this reading, the expected answer to the tag en-
tails that the addressee has adopted the communicative goal, or sarg, of the anchor.
Acknowledgement questions result when the discourse relation Acknowledgementq
links the label associated with the tag to the label associated with the anchor. The
glue logic axiom used to infer Acknowledgementq is provided in (32). This axiom
also models the semantics of the relation.
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(32) Axiom on Acknowledgement Questions:
(?(α, β, λ) ∧ sarg(α, φ) ∧ Sanswer(β, p) ∧ (BH(α)(p) > BH(α)φ)) >
Acknowledgementq(α, β, λ)
(32) states that if a question β attaches to α within the discourse segment λ and
the answer to β defeasibly entails the sarg φ of α, then normally β attaches to α
with the relation Acknowledgementq.
In the absence of information to the contrary, tags are interpreted as requests
for acknowledgement, as the antecedent to (32) follows from the axioms of the logic of
cognitive modelling and the compositional semantics of the anchor and tag alone. In
particular, there is no need to appeal to extra-linguistic information. Furthermore,
I assume that falling intonation contributes no information to interpretation.
To illustrate the mechanics of the analysis, I restrict my attention to tag
questions occurring in veridical discourse contexts. Thus, if τ is the sdrs for the
discourse at the point where the tag is interpreted, and Ka is the content of the
anchor, then τ entails Ka. The constructed dialogue in (33) provides an example of
the kind of discourse context I have in mind.
(33) a. A: (π0) Don’t worry about the meeting.
b. A: (π1) After all, Jane will be there, / (π2) won’t she.
I assume here that (33b) is a nuclear tag question (though as I argue below
this assumption is not essential). As a result, syntactic, semantic and phonological
information indicate the presence of two speech act referents π1 and π2 for the anchor
and tag respectively. π1 attaches to π0 with a veridical relation, viz. Explanation∗.11
In other words, π1 explains why A wants to see to it that the addressee (call her B)
not worry about the outcome of the meeting, viz. because Jane will be there (thus
11Explanation∗ is a “meta-talk” relation, which relates α and β if β explains why S(α) has the
sarg of α (Asher and Lascarides 2003).
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ensuring success). Furthermore, I assume that π1 occurs within a veridical segment
of the discourse. That is, the smallest discourse segment that contains π1 is not an
argument to a nonveridical discourse relation like Consequence or Alternation.
With these background assumptions in place, what needs to be established
is that the instance of Axiom on Acknowledgement Questions in (34) follows from
the meaning of the tag question (as discussed in §3.2.1).
(34) a. (?(π1, π2, π) ∧
b. sarg(π1,BB(pπ1)) ∧
c. Sanswer(π2, pπ1) ∧
d. (BB(pπ1) > BBBB(pπ1))) >
e. AcknowledgementQ(π1, π2, π)
(34) follows from (32) by substituting π1, π2 and π for α, β and λ respectively, and
substituting BB(pπ1) and pπ1 for φ and p respectively. In plain English, suppose
that:
• the tag (labeled π2) attaches to the anchor (labeled π1) with some unspecified
discourse relation [(34a)];
• the speech act related goal of π1 is that B believe the proposition it conveys,
i.e. pπ1 [(34b)];
• the proposition pπ1 is an answer to π2 [(34c)]; and
• believing the answer to π2 defeasibly entails believing that the sarg of π1 has
been achieved [(34d)].
Then it defeasibly follows that:
• the tag is related to the anchor with Acknowledgementq [(34e)].
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Establishing the validity of (34) is a straightforward task. (34a), for example,
follows from the anaphoric dependence between the tag and the anchor described
in §3.2.1. The tag must attach to LAST , i.e. the anchor, given sdrt’s assump-
tions about anaphoric accessibility. (34b) is the sarg associated with declarative
sentences by the axiom Indicative Related Goals. Simply put, declarative sen-
tences that attach to the discourse context with a right-veridical relation, such as
Explanation∗, normally have as a goal that the addressee believe the proposition
conveyed by that sentence.
(34c) follows from the meaning of the anchor and tag as described in §3.2.1.
That is, given how the anaphoric elements of the tag are resolved, the anchor will by
definition be an answer to the tag. One can go a step further and note that B (the
interpreter) can infer that A believes that pπ1 is the true answer to π2. First, since A
asserts π1, B infers from Sincerity that BA(pπ1). Second, since the interpretation
of tag questions is a matter of linguistic competence, it is mutually believed by A
and B that Sanswer(π2, pπ1). As a result, B believes that A believes that pπ1 is
the true answer to π2. This is important because we are trying to show that B can
infer that A believes the antecedent to the instance of Axiom on Acknowledgement
Questions in (34).
Finally, (34d) is simply a theorem of the logic of cognitive modelling. The
belief operators BA,BB, . . . are, at least, K45 modalities. The formula in (34d) is an
instance of the 4 axiom (positive introspection): if an agent believes that φ is the
case, then they believe that they believe φ is the case.
In the absence of more specific information, then, B infers that π2 is linked to
π1 with Acknowledgementq. No deep reasoning about cognitive states was required
– each of the inferences above being based on the form of A’s utterances and the
assumption that the linguistic competence required to compute the denotation of
the anchor and tag is mutually believed by A and B. Nor was any situation specific
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information or general world knowledge necessary.
The derivation proceeds in a similar fashion for postnuclear falling intonation
tag questions. In these cases, I assume that the label associated with the tag question
as a whole, say π1, is assigned a complex speech act type assertion •question by
the grammar. It is assumed that glue logic formula of the form ?(π0, π1, π) require
π1 to have a simple type. Because π1 is assigned a complex type, a type clash
emerges. This clash is resolved with the rule Dot Exploitation, which introduces
two new labels linked back the original label π1 via the relation O-Elab , or “dot
elaboration”:
O-Elab(π1, πa) ∧O-Elab(π1, πt)
πa : assertion provides the contribution of the anchor and πt : question pro-
vides the contribution of the tag. The coherence constraint on complex types (see
Chapter 2) requires that a rhetorical link between πa and πt be computed. The
same reasoning that was used to infer Acknowledgementq in the case of nuclear tag
questions applies in the postnuclear case, as well.
This account of the interpretation of falling intonation tag questions captures
their strong bias. Because Acknowledgementq links π1 to π2 in (33b), an answer that
is inconsistent with the proposition conveyed by the anchor does not count as an
answer to the tag, in the extended discourse based sense of answerhood, despite the
fact that this proposition is semantically an answer. This follows because such an
answer does not entail that the sarg of the anchor has been achieved. This does
not imply that a positive response is impossible, but it will have to correct A’s belief
that the anchor is true.
3.4.2 Confirmation Questions
The previous section argues that tags are by default linked to anchors with the
relation Acknowledgementq. I now show how the meaning contribution of rising
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intonation blocks this interpretation. Furthermore, rising intonation on the tag
results in a weak assertion of the anchor. This weak assertion is necessary, I argue,
for interpreting tag questions as requests for confirmation.
Final Rise Blocks Acknowledgmentq
In order to show that rising intonation blocks the default inference that tags are
related to their anchors with the relation Acknowledgmentq, I must first say what
information rising intonation contributes to the interpretation of an utterance. I
propose here a modification of the analysis of final rises in Nilsenová (2006) (see
also Šafářová 2005). Nilsenová argues that final rises contribute an expression of
epistemic uncertainty, an idea she formalizes using the diamond operator from Velt-
man’s update semantics (Veltman 1996). On this analysis, final rises contribute a
propositional operator to the interpretation of an utterance. In other words, the ex-
pression of epistemic uncertainty contributed by rises is part of the semantic content
of the utterance. While I agree with Nilsenová that final rises express uncertainty, I
disagree with her on where this information should be incorporated. I assume that
intonation contributes information about the speaker’s attitude toward some propo-
sition and its relation to the common ground with respect to the present situation,
rather than about the state of the world. This analysis is based on Faller’s (2006)
analysis of the evidential system in Cuzco Quechua. She argues that evidential mor-
phemes provide information about the speaker’s cognitive state, rather than about
semantic content. This analysis closely resembles Vanderveken’s (1990) suggestion
that intonation provides information about the strength of the sincerity condition
associated with a given illocutionary act. Thus, rising intonation contributes infor-
mation to the logic of cognitive modelling, as encoded by the the sincerity axiom in
(35).12
12Recall from chapter 2 that the core proposition of an utterance is that proposition which remains
after removing any indicators of sentence mood.
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(35) Sincerity (Final Rise):
rise(α) > BS(α)(♦core proposition(pα))
Sincerity (Final Rise) states that if an utterance α has rising intonation, then
S(α) normally believes that the proposition pα is epistemically possible. ♦φ is true
at a world w iff φ is true in at least one of the speaker’s belief alternatives:
• [[♦φ]]M,f (w) = 1 iff there is a w′ such that wR♦w′, [[φ]]M,f (w′) = 1
With these assumptions in place, it is possible to show that rising intonation
blocks the default interpretation of the tag. Consider the nuclear tag question in
(36). The anchor provides an answer to the wh-question in (36a). As a result, the
right-veridical relation QAP (Question-Answer Pair) relates π1 to π0.
(36) a. B: (π0) Who is available to review this article?
b. A: (π1) Jane is available, / (π2) isn’t she?
(37) shows the sdrs for the dialogue in (36) at the point where the rhetorical
contribution of the tag needs to be computed. (37) contains the information that
the tag π2 is related to the anchor π1, though exactly how they are related is left
underspecified. In addition, (37) introduces a condition on the label π2, viz. that it
has rising intonation. This information makes its contribution to the interpretation
of the dialogue indirectly via cognitive modelling. Note that the core proposition
of the tag π2 is the negation of the drs Kπ1 of the anchor (or more precisely, an




π0 : Kπ0 π1 : Kπ1
QAP(π0, π1)
π2 : Q(¬Kπ1) rise(π2)
?(π1, π2)
How does rising intonation on the tag in (36b) block the instance of Axiom
on Acknowledgement Questions in (34). It is useful in answering this question to
discuss the interpretation of the anchor and the tag separately. Lemma 3.4.1, for
example, establishes A’s intention behind the anchor. This result follows directly
from IRG and SARGs to Intentions. Most importantly, since QAP(π0, π1) and
veridical(QAP), the sarg of π1 is that the addressee believe the proposition pπ1 .
(Γ contains the axioms of the logic of cognitive modelling.) In plain English, Lemma
3.4.1 establishes that A intends to see to it that B believe that Jane is available to
review the article.
Lemma 3.4.1. Γ, Info(τ),Done(Say(π1))|∼IA(δBB(pπ1))
Proof:
1. sarg(π1,BB(pπ1)) IRG
2. IA(δBB(pπ1)) 1; SARGs to Intentions
Lemma 3.4.2 establishes that A intends to see to it that B believe that Jane
is not available. This follows from the contribution of the final rise as assumed in
Sincerity (Final Rise) and the fact that the consequences of one’s intentions
are also intended (as specified by Intentions and Defaults from Chapter 2). In
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other words, a consequence of saying π2 with rising intonation is that B believes
that possibly not pπ1 . Therefore A intended for B to believe this.
Lemma 3.4.2. Γ, Info(τ),Done(Say(π2)),rise(π2)|∼IA(δBB(♦¬pπ1))
Proof
1. BA(♦¬pπ1) Sincerity (Final Rise)
2. BB(♦¬pπ1) 1; Competence
3. IA(Say(π2)) > IA(δBB(♦¬pπ1)) 2; Intentions and Defaults
4. IA(Say(π2)) Rationality of Action
5. IA(δBB(♦¬pπ1)) 3; 4; DMP
Lemmas 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are incompatible. Because the propositions pπ1 and
♦¬pπ1 are inconsistent, the speaker cannot rationally expect the addressee to include
both in his or her set of beliefs. Inconsistent intentions are excluded formally by the
axiom Admissable Intentions (Cohen and Levesque 1990), which states that an
agent can not simultaneously intend two inconsistent actions.
• Admissible Intentions:
(IA(a) ∧ BA(Done(a) > ¬Done(b)) > ¬IA(b)
The effect of Admissable Intentions is to block the inferences in Lemmas
3.4.1 and 3.4.2. This blocking effect results from an inference pattern in the non-
monotonic logic that underlies |∼known as the Nixon Diamond (Reiter 1987, Asher
and Morreau 1991). Nixon Diamond states that if the antecedents of two conflicting
defaults hold and neither is more specific than the other, then the consequent of
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neither default follows.13 Schematically:
A > B,C > ¬B,A,C |∼/ B
A > B,C > ¬B,A,C |∼/ ¬B
This appears to be the situation that holds with respect to 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. All of the
premises of the two derivations hold, neither set of premises is more specific than the
other and Admissable Intentions ensures that the consequences are inconsistent.
So in the absence of more specific information one cannot infer that the speaker
has either of the intentions derived above. Most importantly, if we cannot infer
that the speaker intends for B to believe pπ1 then we cannot infer that (34b) holds.
As a result, it does not immediately follow that the tag functions as a request for
acknowledgement.
Having blocked the default interpretation of the tag, I now need to address
how tags come to be interpreted as requests for confirmation. In addition, I need
to explain how rising intonation tag questions can still be understood as acknowl-
edgement questions. Recall from Table 3.2 that roughly half of rising intonation tag
questions were interpreted in this way. The contribution of rising intonation plays
an important role in both cases.
Rising Intonation, Confirmationq, and Politeness
I begin by discussing the interpretation of tag questions as confirmation questions.
In §3.3.2, I argued that confirmation questions weakly assert the proposition con-
veyed by the anchor. This weak assertion follows from the contribution to cognitive
modelling of rising intonation. In the dialogue in (36), for example, B infers from the
13For example, from the premises that Republicans are normally nonpacifists, Quakers are nor-
mally pacifists, Dick is a republican and Dick is a Quaker, we cannot infer either that Dick is a
nonpacifist or that Dick is a pacifist.
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speaker’s use of a final rise on the tag that BS(π2)(♦¬pπ1) via Sincerity (Final
Rise). Further scalar reasoning results in the implicature that BS(π2)(¬¬pπ1),
which is equivalent to BS(π2)(♦pπ1). In other words, if the speaker believes only
that it is possible that Jane is not available, then she is not certain that she is not
available. Equivalently, the speaker believes that it is possible that Jane is available.
It is this implicature, I argue, that produces the weak assertion of the anchor. So
although the anchor yields a commitment to the proposition conveyed by the an-
chor (through the default alignment of declarative sentences with assertions), it is
a weakened commitment.
This weak assertion is important for inferring Confirmationq. The intuition
is that the answer to a confirmation question should somehow affect the probability
that the speaker assigns to some antecedent proposition, either by increasing or
decreasing the probability that the anchor is true. In other words, an answer to a
confirmation question should be in some sense relevant to the proposition to which
the question is attached. A consequence of this analysis, is that the probability of
the proposition to which a confirmation question is attached should never be 1 or 0,
or at the very least the person seeking confirmation should not present it as if he were
certain of its truth or falsity. If the speaker is certain that the targeted proposition
is true, there is no reason to seek confirmation. Following Carnap (1950), I define a
notion of relevance in a discourse τ :14
• relevantτ (pα, pβ) iff either Pτ (pα/pβ) > Pτ (pα) or Pτ (pα/pβ) < Pτ (pα).
In other words, pβ is relevant to pα if the probability of pα given pβ is either greater
than or less than the prior probability of pα. With this auxiliary notion in hand, I
define the glue logic axiom for inferring Confirmationq in (38).
(38) Axiom on Confirmation Questions:
14There other measures of relevance which may be useful to investigate, see van Rooy (2004) for
a detailed discussion.
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(?(α, β, λ) ∧ Sanswer(β, p) ∧ relevant>(pα, p)) > Confirmationq(α, β, λ)
Since the anchor in (36b) in effect only asserts that it is possible that Jane is available
(given the scalar reasoning described above), direct answers to the polar question
denoted by the tag, viz. that Jane is available or that Jane is not available, will both
affect the probability of the anchor, bumping it up to 1 or down to 0. The final
rise plays a pivotal role in this inference. First, it blocks the default inference to
Acknowledgementq. Second, it produces a weak assertion of the anchor, which was
crucial to inferring Confirmationq. In sum, then, a rising intonation tag question
weakly asserts the anchor – the speaker expects that the anchor is true but has some
doubt – and asks the addressee for possible evidence or counterevidence.
However, not all rising intonation tag questions are requests for confirmation.
Recall that nearly half of the rising tag questions in Table 3.2 were acknowledge-
ment questions. How do we account for these uses? In discourse contexts where the
speaker is in a position of authority the addressee may interpret rising intonation
differently, e.g. as a negative politeness strategy. In the analysis of politeness in
Brown and Levinson (1978), asserting a proposition φ is an intrinsically face threat-
ening act (FTA), especially regarding negative face, as it forces the addressee to
either accept or reject the assertion, thereby threatening the speaker’s positive face.
In other words, an assertion imposes some future action on the addressee. This is
why falling intonation tag questions can sometimes sound rude or even have the
force of a command, as in (39).15
(39) You will be at the lecture, won’t you.
Acknowledgement questions as analyzed above are no more than an imposition
upon the addressee by the speaker to accept the proposition conveyed by the anchor.
Given this analysis, (39) commits the the addressee to a future action, viz. attending
15This example was brought to my attention by an audience member at Sinn und Bedeutung 11.
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the lecture, thereby threatening his negative face, i.e. his desire not to be imposed
upon (Brown and Levinson 1978).
As described above, by using rising intonation on the tag the speaker conveys
only a weak belief in the truth of the anchor. Thus the speaker suggests that some
of his belief alternatives are φ worlds and some are ¬φ worlds. As noted above, if
it is reasonable to assume that the speaker is an authority with respect to φ, the
addressee may interpret the weak assertion as a negative politeness strategy. For
example, the speaker does not want to force the addressee to accept a proposition
that he or she may not be prepared to accept. He therefore conveys that it is an
open issue whether this proposition is true or false, thereby allowing the addressee
to reject the proposition (if he wants) while minimizing the perceived loss of positive
face to the speaker. The upshot of this discussion is that if the addressee interprets
the rising intonation as a politeness strategy, he may assume that the speaker’s
intention in uttering the anchor is the one in Lemma 3.4.1. This in turn opens
up the possibility that the tag is interpreted as a request for acknowledgement as
described in 3.4.1.
Anecdotal evidence for this comes from an examination of a subset of the
rising intonation tag questions from Table 3.2. 6 of the 12 rising tag questions from
part II of the sbcsae were categorized as acknowledgement questions. In five of
these cases, the dialogue context is a sermon or lecture, i.e. a situation where the
speaker occupies a position of authority. In the six rising tag questions classified as
confirmation questions, this asymmetric power relationship is less evident. For ex-
ample, three of the six cases involve task related dialogues in which the participants
are acting cooperatively to achieve a common goal. A fourth case involves a face
to face conversation in a family setting where the addressee is the speaker’s father.
Hence, the power structure is the reverse of that in the sermon and lecture contexts.
The analysis presented above improves on many existing analyses of the
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correlation between final tune and the interpretation of tags. As mentioned in
§3.3.2, most of these analyses assume a one-one mapping between final tune and
discourse function. I argued above that this assumption is unrealistic. In the current
section, I presented what I hope is a more realistic analysis on which rising intonation
contributes default information about the speaker’s cognitive state. Depending on
how the interpreter uses this information, rising intonation tag questions may be
understood either as requests for acknowledgement or requests for confirmation.
3.4.3 Neutral Tag Questions
Finally, §3.3.2 discussed tag questions that have a neutral reading. That is, in
uttering such a tag question the speaker does not commit herself (to any degree) to
the proposition conveyed by the anchor. (40b) provides an illustrative example. A
(on the intended reading) does not commit herself to the proposition that Jane is
here in uttering (40b) as a response to (40a). Intuitively, (40b) attaches to (40a) with
the relation Q-Elab. Q-Elab(α, β) holds just in case the answer γ to β elaborates
a plan for achieving S(α)’s sarg of α. B’s sarg in uttering π0 is to know who is
available to review the article, as specified by QRG, and both positive and negative
answers to the tag question provide this information: a positive answer means Jane
is available to review and a negative answer that she is not.
(40) a. B: We need someone to review this article! (π0) Who is available?
b. A: (π1) Jane isn’t here,= (π2) is she?
§3.3.1 argued that neutral interpretations are only possible when the tag
question has (i) postnuclear phrasing and (ii) a meta-linguistic negation operator
in the anchor. How do these grammatical features conspire to admit the neutral
reading? First, I assume that meta-linguistic negation is an illocutionary, rather
than a propositional, operator. Specifically, I assume that it places a condition on
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labels, much like rising intonation. I take metalinguistic negation to indicate that
the speaker does not assert the proposition in its scope, as captured by the axiom
in (41).
(41) metalinguistic-negation(α) > ¬(α : assertion)
The axiom in (41) constrains how the speech act discourse referent to which it
applies attaches to the antecedent discourse; specifically, it rules out attachment
with a discourse relation that is pertinent to an assertion, i.e. any right-veridical
relation. Relations associated with questions, for example Q-Elab, Explanationq,
etc., are not right-veridical and are therefore consistent with (41). Alternatively,
one can think of the contribution of meta-linguistic negation in terms of cognitive
modelling. If a discourse segment does not attach with a right-veridical relation then
it does not necessarily follow that the speaker believes its propositional content. In
the case of tag questions, this means that Known Answers will not block the sarg
of questions from QRG, viz. that the speaker know an answer to his question.
What is the relationship between intonational phrasing and neutral interpre-
tations; why can’t nuclear tag questions have a neutral interpretation? The answer,
I maintain, is related to the role of intonational phrasing in introducing discourse
segments. Nuclear phrasing in tag questions forces two speech act discourse refer-
ents: one for the anchor and one for the tag. This segmentation is reinforced by the
syntactic and semantic assumptions in §3.2. Postnuclear tag questions, on the other
hand, are instantiations of the complex speech act type assertion • question.
The component types of the complex type are exploited whenever there is a type
clash. The glue logic predication ?(α, β, λ), for example, assumes that β has a sim-
ple type. In the absence of conflicting information, postnuclear tag questions are
interpreted in the same way as nuclear tag questions, i.e. either as acknowledgement
or confirmation questions. Neutral uses, however, arise when the anchor contains
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a metalinguistic negation, which cancels the assertion per the constraint in (41).
Thus, postnuclear phrasing and the presence of a metalinguistic negation operator
conspire to admit the neutral reading exemplified by (40b).
3.5 Conclusion
The discussion above argued (i) that tag questions are complex speech acts and
(ii) that the interpretation of tag questions follows from the rhetorical connection
between tags and anchors. The first point is not new and I provided evidence
for it following Sadock (1974). The second point, as far as I can tell, has not been
articulated before (at least not precisely). Nonetheless, it is a particularly efficacious
characterization, I believe, of the interpretation of tag questions, especially when
presented within sdrt.
There are two reasons sdrt is useful in the analysis of tag questions. First,
it provides a formal logic for inferring the rhetorical relations between utterances
on the basis of their lexical and compositional semantics, the cognitive states of
discourse participants and world knowledge. Second, these inferences are defeasible.
Given these properties, it’s possible to develop a linguistically realistic model of
the contribution of intonation to interpretation. I do not claim to have developed
a complete model here, but I believe that I have gone some way towards at least
demonstrating the feasibility of such a model. The analysis of intonation proposed
above does not state hard and fast correlations between certain intonation contours
and specific discourse functions (contra the analyses in Oehrle 1987 or Kay 2002).
Rather, I argued that rising intonation contributes information about the speaker’s
beliefs. This information in turn contributes information to the glue logic, indirectly
determining the discourse function of a given utterance. Although there may be
a “core” discourse function associated with rising intonation tags, e.g. requests for
confirmation (which is the discourse function commonly assumed), distinct readings
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are available (as demonstrated by the data presented in Table 3.2). It is crucial then
that the inference that rising intonation tags function as requests for confirmation
is defeasible rather than being a monotonic inference (as in the analysis mentioned
previously).
In short, in the model of intonational meaning suggested here, the meaning
of tunes provides information that (in a specific discourse context) contributes to
an implicature that the utterance with which the tune is associated makes a specific
rhetorical contribution to the dialogue. This implicature, given the nature of the glue
logic, is context dependent (which is modeled by the defeasibility of the inference).
Again, while the analysis is certainly not complete, it at least shows the feasibility
of the approach. Furthermore, tag questions are an ideal place to develop and
test theories of intonation, given the intuitive correlation between final tune and
discourse function. However, as demonstrated by the data in Table 3.2, one must
temper these intuitions with empirical data.
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Chapter 4
Bias in Negative Polar
Questions
4.1 Introduction
Negative polar questions (NPQs) like (1) are ambiguous between what Romero and
Han (2004) refer to as φ and ¬φ readings (see also Ladd 1981). Briefly, On the
φ reading, an NPQ is “about” the proposition that Jane is coming and on the ¬φ
reading it is “about” the proposition that Jane is not coming.
(1) Isn’t Jane coming?
In addition to the φ/¬φ ambiguity, NPQs convey at least two other speaker biases.
Both interpretations, for instance, convey a positive bias suggesting that the speaker
holds a prior attitude toward the proposition that Jane is coming. Furthermore,
the ¬φ-reading appears to require evidence in the discourse context against the
proposition that Jane is coming, a negative, contextual bias.
One may look upon these facts as either pragmatic or semantic phenomena.
van Rooy and Šafářová (2003), for example, provide a pragmatic account in which
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the φ/¬φ-ambiguity and other biases are explained on the basis of the speaker’s
beliefs and preferences. Alternatively, Romero and Han (2004) provide a semantic
account of NPQs. They introduce a covert modal operator into the logical form of
NPQs which can have either wide or narrow scope relative to negation. The other
biases are analyzed as conversational implicatures following from pragmatic princi-
ples given the semantic contribution of the operator. I argue in this chapter for an
alternative, which is more pragmatic than semantic, yet posits a conventionalized
semantic component to φ NPQs. Previous analyses have not, to my knowledge,
acknowledged this meaning component. Specifically, I argue that φ NPQs are as-
signed a conventionalized complex speech act type assertion • question by the
grammar (Asher and Lascarides 2001, 2003). ¬φ NPQs, on the other hand, have the
simple type question. The explanatory value of this assumption is two-fold. First,
it accounts for the use of φ NPQs as suggestions and denials, types of assertion
(Vanderveken 1990). Second, it captures an asymmetry between the biases inherent
to φ NPQS and ¬φ NPQs. This assumption is not only justified by its explanatory
value, but by a number of supporting empirical observations.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss data that (i) illustrate the
φ/¬φ ambiguity, (ii) establish contextual restrictions on the use of NPQs (Büring
and Gunlogson 2000), and (iii) distinguish the positive bias of φ NPQs from the
positive bias of ¬φ NPQs. The latter point is especially significant. Any attempt
to derive the positive biases of φ and ¬φ NPQs via the same cognitive or linguistic
mechanisms misses an important empirical point. Next, I provide a discussion of
previous analyses of NPQs. Finally, I develop an analysis of the discourse function of
NPQs in sdrt. The correct level of analysis of NPQs, I hope to show, is discourse
logical form, rather than the logical form of individual clauses, or simple models
of the speaker’s beliefs and preferences. Computing the contribution of an utter-
ance to discourse logical form is a pragmatic process, in so far as interpreters apply
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extra-linguistic information (in addition to linguistic information) to understanding
multi-sentence discourse and dialogue. The analysis below, therefore, is pragmatic.
However, I posit a conventionalized semantic distinction between φ NPQs and ¬φ
NPQs, as described above. ¬φ NPQs and positive polar questions, on the other
hand, are equivalent, as predicted by most extant theories of the semantics of inter-
rogative sentences (Hamblin 1973, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). The contextual
distribution of ¬φ NPQs and PPQs is explained in terms of markedness, as van
Rooy and Šafářová (2003) in effect argue.
4.2 Kinds of Bias in Negative Questions
4.2.1 A Quick Survey of the Terrain
Ladd (1981) illustrates the φ/¬φ ambiguity with the question in (2).
(2) Didn’t he even vote for Reagan?
First, consider the context in (3). The intuition is that (3c) has a negative bias
which may be broadly characterized as epistemic (though see below). The discourse
context preceding (3c) suggests that Dick did not vote for Reagan, given his recent
political disillusionment. At the same time, (3c) conveys a kind of contrast. One has
the impression that A previously believed that Dick voted for Reagan (or assigned a
high degree of likelihood to this proposition). Huddleston and Pullum (2002) refer
to this as a positive epistemic bias, but note that it may also be deontic – relating to
what the speaker feels ought to be the case given some system of norms – or bouletic
– relating to the speaker’s desires. It is possible, for example, though perhaps not
very natural, to read (3c) as conveying that the speaker feels Dick ought to have
voted for Reagan or that he wanted Dick to vote for Reagan.
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(3) [A and B are staunch Republicans.]
a. A: What’s Dick been up to these day’s? I haven’t seen him at the Club
for ages.
b. B: He says he’s disillusioned with two-party-politics; he’s joined Common
Cause, gave a lot of money to the Citizens’ Party,...
c. A: Didn’t he even vote for Reagan?
d. B: Not as far as I know.
As Huddleston and Pullum (2002) observe, these conflicting positive and negative
biases convey a contrast between what now appears to be the case (given linguistic
and situational evidence) and some prior speaker attitude toward a positive propo-
sition (p. 884).
Next, consider the context in (4). The same surface string – shown in (4b) –
conveys a positive epistemic bias: the speaker believes that John voted for Reagan
without a concomitant negative bias, though there is reason to believe that it is
unlikely that John voted for Reagan given the (bracketed) non-linguistic context.
(4) [A and B are former left-wing activists discussing the recent activities of a
colleague.]
a. A: Did you hear John’s decided to go to business school?
b. B: Yeah – I can’t believe how much he’s changed these days – didn’t he
even vote for Reagan?
c. A: That’s what somebody told me.
Based on the observations in (3) and (4), Ladd (1981) argues that negative
polar questions are syntactically ambiguous. In (3), for example, the negation is
part of the descriptive content of the proposition being questioned. That is, the
speaker is attempting to ground the information that Dick did not vote for Rea-
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gan. Ladd dubs these inside-negation polar questions (INPQs). He refers to (4) as
an outside-negation polar question (ONPQ), because the negation is “outside” of
the proposition being checked, i.e. that John voted for Reagan. Ladd views the
ambiguity as a genuine scope ambiguity involving negation, but does not provide
any more detail. More recently, Romero and Han (2004) flesh out Ladd’s intuition,
positing a hidden operator with respect to which negation can take either wide or
narrow scope.
Much of the evidence for a syntactic ambiguity comes from the licensing of
polarity-sensitive lexical items in negative questions. Ladd (1981) (and Borkin 1971
before him) observes that including an npi in a NPQ forces an INPQ reading (5).
Including a ppi forces the ONPQ reading (6). As a result, polarity items can be
used to force a specific interpretation in a given context.
(5) a. Didn’t Kim read the report either?
b. Aren’t there any vegetarian restaurants around here?
c. Aren’t you at all hungry?
(6) a. Didn’t Kim read the report too?
b. Aren’t there some vegetarian restaurants around here?
c. Aren’t you rather hungry?
In German, the outside-negation/inside-negation distinction has a morpho-
syntactic reflex (Büring and Gunlogson 2000). The sentential negation nicht and
the indefinite article ein normally form an amalgamation kein (‘no’) (unless ein is
stressed). Büring and Gunlogson argue that polar questions are the only context in
which both kein and nicht ein occur. When nicht ein occurs the question receives an





























































(5), (6) and (7) suggest that there are formal correlates of the outside-negation/inside-
negation distinction and arguably mitigate against a purely pragmatic analysis of
the ambiguity. This has not prevented people from attempting pragmatic analyses,
however. van Rooy and Šafářová (2003), for example, provide a sophisticated prag-
matic account of negative polar questions (see below). In the discussion below, I
use polarity items to coerce INPQ and ONPQ readings in order to probe the formal
properties of the various biases described above.
4.2.2 Contextual Bias
I mentioned above that inside-negation polar questions convey an implicit contrast
between positive and negative biases (Huddleston and Pullum 2002). The negative
bias in INPQs was described as epistemic, and was argued to contrast with a posi-
tive bias. However, I will now argue that this negative bias is best understood as a
contextual restriction on the use of polar questions based on their surface syntactic
form. Büring and Gunlogson (2000) catalog these restrictions in detail, classifying
contexts in terms of the existence or non-existence of compelling contextual evidence
for or against a proposition φ. Contextual evidence, according to Büring and Gun-
logson, is information that is mutually available to the discourse participants either
by virtue of forming part of the linguistic context or part of the immediate non-
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linguistic situation. Evidence for φ is compelling if it is reasonable to infer from it
that φ.
Büring and Gunlogson leave the notion of compelling contextual evidence
rather vague. A natural characterization in an sdrt setting is to assume that there
is compelling evidence for φ in a discourse context, understood as an sdrs τ , just in
case τ together with set of reasonable background assumptions Γ defeasibly entails
φ. In addition, one needs to include situational information in the discourse context,
as direct or indirect perceptual evidence for φ is also compelling contextual evidence
for φ (Büring and Gunlogson 2000).
With this notion compelling contextual evidence (or some other suitable
alternative), one can characterize discourse contexts in terms of whether or not
they are biased toward or against a proposition φ, or whether they are neutral with
regard to φ, as follows:
• Biased Contexts:
A discourse context σ is biased toward a proposition φ iff there is compelling
contextual evidence for φ; σ is biased against φ iff there is compelling contex-
tual evidence for ¬φ.
• Neutral Contexts:
A context σ is neutral with respect to a proposition φ iff there is no compelling
evidence in the discourse context either for or against φ.
The discourse context in (9), especially as given by A’s utterance in (9a), is neutral
with respect to the proposition that Jane is coming. A discourse participant can infer
many things from (9a), e.g. that George, Mary and Sue are all good syntacticians,
but they will not normally infer that Jane is attending the workshop, nor that she is
not attending. (9b) and (9c) show that PPQs and ONPQs are felicitous in neutral
contexts, while (9d) suggests that INPQs are not.
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(9) a. A: Many good syntacticians are attending the workshop: George, Mary,
Sue. . .
b. B: Is Jane coming?
c. B: Isn’t Jane coming too?
d. #B: Isn’t Jane coming either?
One might argue that (9d) is infelicitous for other reasons, viz. that there is no
suitable antecedent for the presupposition triggered by either that someone besides
Jane is not coming. In other cases, the use of an INPQ might trigger an implicature
that satisfies the required contextual bias. Consider (10), which to be felicitous
requires one to assume that George, Mary and Sue are not MIT syntacticians and
that A’s list is more or less exhaustive.
(10) B: Aren’t any of the MIT syntacticians coming?
The discourse context set up by (11a), a neutral information question, is immune to
these objections. The INPQ in (11b) is clearly infelicitous in this context, whereas
the ONPQ in (11c) is not. (11c) functions as a hedged (partial) answer to (11b),
depending on one’s semantics for wh-questions.
(11) a. A: Who is coming to the workshop?
b. #B: Aren’t any of the MIT syntacticians coming?
c. B: Aren’t some of the MIT syntacticians coming?
The discourse context in (12) is biased against the proposition that Jane is
coming, assuming that it is common knowledge that Jane is a syntactician. Both
ONPQs (12c) and INPQs (12d) are felicitous, whereas PPQs (12b) are marked. One
might argue that (12b) is relevant for some other reason. For example, although
Jane is not a practicing syntactician, she is familiar enough with syntactic theory
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to contribute, or perhaps B is simply changing the topic. (12c) and (12d), on the
other hand, strongly suggest that Jane is a syntactician.
(12) a. A: Sue isn’t attending the workshop, so there will be no syntacticians
there.
b. ??B: Is Jane coming?
c. B: Isn’t Jane coming too?
d. B: Isn’t Jane coming either?
The infelicity of positive polar questions in contexts biased against a proposi-
tion is clearly evident in contexts like (13), where there is situational evidence against
the relevant proposition. The context in (13) is biased against the proposition that
it is raining given the evidence provided by the Hawaiian shirt and sunglasses.1 The
PPQ (13b) is infelicitous in the presence of such evidence, whereas the NPQ in (13c)
is fine.
(13) [A is sitting in a windowless office. B enters wearing a Hawaiian shirt and
sunglasses.]
a. A: Why are you wearing that?
b. #A: Is it raining outside?
c. A: Isn’t it raining outside?
In (14), the context is biased toward the proposition that it is raining and the PPQ
in (14a) is felicitous, while the NPQ in (14b) is not.
(14) [A is sitting in a windowless office. B enters wearing a wet raincoat.]
a. A: Is it raining?
1For example, B has direct perceptual evidence that A is wearing sunglasses, and believes that









Table 4.1: The contextual distribution of polar questions.
b. #A: Isn’t it raining?
Table 4.1 summarizes the preceding discussion. The point to stress is that
the negative bias inherent to INPQs is not epistemic in the same way that the
positive bias associated with NPQs is, i.e. related to the speaker’s beliefs. Rather,
this negative bias reflects characteristics of the discourse context and the observation
that INPQs are only licensed in contexts containing negative evidence. In fact, it is
a mistake to say that in these contexts the speaker believes that ¬φ, for, as I argue
below, it is precisely the point of an INPQ to confirm that ¬φ before adding it to
one’s beliefs.
Finally, inside-negation polar questions and positive polar questions appear
to be in complementary distribution, i.e. they are never both felicitous in the same
discourse context. ONPQs and PPQs are in overlapping distribution, since both
occur in neutral contexts. These observations suggest that INPQs and PPQs are
the same kind of beast, while ONPQs are distinct from both INPQs and PPQs.
Indeed, it is precisely this fact that is most troublesome for previous approaches to
NPQs. This is especially apparent when we come to discuss the analysis in Romero
and Han (2004). I show in the next section that the positive biases of ONPQs and
INPQs can be distinguished on the basis of certain linguistic tests.
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4.2.3 Two Kinds of Positive Bias
Inside-negation and outside-negation polar questions each convey a positive bias.
However, these positive biases need to be distinguished formally, a point which has
not been appreciated in previous analyses. The positive biases diverge in two ways:
(i) INPQs can have an epistemic, deontic or bouletic bias, while ONPQs are only
epistemically biased, and (ii) the biases in INPQs and ONPQs are distinct kinds of
meaning. Whereas the bias in INPQs is a arguably some type of implicature, the
bias in ONPQs is an entailment, reflecting a speaker commitment which functions
as a weak assertion.
As just noted, INPQs may have an epistemic, deontic or bouletic bias. De-
ontic and bouletic biases are common when the subject of the question is a second
person pronoun or when certain predicates occur in the sentence, e.g. ashamed,
afraid, and like, enjoy, etc. Huddleston and Pullum (2002) discuss the examples in
(15). (15a) intuitively conveys that according to prevailing social norms, the ad-
dressees ought to be ashamed of themselves. (15b) conveys that the speaker wants
the addressee to like it.
(15) a. Aren’t you ashamed of yourselves.
b. Don’t you like it.
The web example in (16) provides a clear example of an inside-negation polar
question that carries a bouletic bias. Note that it includes the negative polarity item
at all, which forces the INPQ reading. The bouletic bias is preferred in the context,
as it provides the best explanation for Harry’s disappointment. Having previously
believed that Hermione enjoyed “it” in the face of countervailing evidence is hardly
reason to be disappointed. At the very least, it is not as relevant as his having
wanted her to enjoy it (and learning that she didn’t).
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(16) a. “Didn’t you enjoy it at all, Hermione?” Harry asked, feeling a little
disappointed.
b. Hermione took a deep breath. “Well,” she said, shrugging. “I really
don’t like to be up so high, but it was nice to spend the time with all
of you.”2
Replacing at all with a positive polarity item, such as rather, as in (17), reduces the
felicity of the discourse when continued with the description of Harry’s disappoint-
ment, as a bouletic bias appears to be ruled out on the ONPQ reading.3
(17) #“Didn’t you rather enjoy it, Hermione?” Harry asked, feeling a little disap-
pointed.
Furthermore, the positive biases of ONPQs and INPQs have distinct cogni-
tive sources. Specifically, ONPQs by convention assert a positive proposition, while
INPQs only implicate one. This fact can be established using Sadock’s diagnos-
tics for illocutionary force, as in the discussion of tag questions from Chapter 3.
Recall that Sadock’s diagnostics appeal to the co-occurrence restrictions that hold
between certain discourse markers and illocutionary force. Sentence initial after all,
for instance, occurs with assertions. Similarly, initial tell me, and the parenthetical
expression by any chance co-occur with questions. I add here a second assertion
diagnostic proposed by Sadock: sentence initial yet. Sadock (1974) notes that ut-
terances prefixed with yet can follow assertions, as in (18b), but not true questions,
as in (19b).
(18) a. A: John is always late for work.
2http://www.phoenixsong.net/fanfiction/story/4079/
3An additional factor is that ONPQs assert a positive proposition. The oddity of (17), then,
might be explained in terms of the oddity of asserting that You rather enjoyed it. Presumably, an
addressee is aware of his or her own cognitive state, since she has direct access to them and the
speaker does not.
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b. A: Yet, he continues to be promoted.
(19) a. Is John always late for work?
b. #Yet, he continues to be promoted.
When applied to negative polar questions, Sadock’s diagnostics show that
ONPQs convey an assertion and a question, while inside-negation polar questions
are simply questions. (20b), for instance, can be preceded by after all on the ONPQ
reading (coerced by including the ppi some), but not on the INPQ reading (coerced
by including the npi any).
(20) a. A: Sue isn’t coming, so there’ll be no syntacticians there.
b. B: What do you mean? After all, aren’t {some/#any} of the MIT
syntacticians coming?
Both readings of (20b) are felicitous in the discourse context established by (20a)
if after all is omitted. Thus, it really is the presence of the discourse marker that
produces the infelicity of the INPQ reading of (20b).
Similarly, the assertion in (21b) containing the discourse marker yet can
follow the negative question in (21a) on the ONPQ interpretation, but not on the
INPQ interpretation.
(21) a. A: Aren’t {some/#any} of the MIT syntacticians coming?
b. A: Yet, Mary claims there will be no syntacticians there.
As before, if yet is omitted from (21b), then either the ONPQ or INPQ reading
are felicitous. Intuitively, yet signals a contrast between the utterance to which
it is prefixed and some information in the prior discourse context. The data in
(21) suggest that the prior expectation inherent to INPQs is unable to supply the
necessary contrasting information, while the positive bias in ONPQs is.
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One final piece of evidence comes from examples like (22), where an ONPQ
appears as the complement to the parenthetical use of a speech-act verb like suggest.4
(22) is direct evidence that ONPQs can be used as suggestions, a type of assertion
(Vanderveken 1990). INPQs do not felicitously occur in the same context.
(22) “Aren’t {some/#any} of the MIT syntacticians coming?”, suggested Mary.
The data in (20) – (22) provide evidence that ONPQs are associated with
an assertion, licensing discourse markers like after all and yet. INPQs, on the other
hand, do not convey an assertion. The results obtained through Sadock’s diagnostics
are important, as they formally distinguish the positive epistemic bias in ONPQs
from the positive epistemic bias in INPQs. This conclusion can be extended to
the non-epistemic biases in inside-negation polar questions. After all, for example,
does not felicitously occur with deontically biased (23b), even though it does occur
felicitously with the paraphrase suggested by Huddleston and Pullum (2002) in
(23c), which shows that in principle an assertion with the content of the purported
bias(es) can serve the discourse function specified by after all.
(23) a. A: I can’t believe you did that. You’re a horrible person!
b. #A: After all, aren’t you ashamed of yourself.
c. A: After all, you ought to be ashamed of yourself. (But apparently you
aren’t).
The ONPQ reading of (23b) is infelicitous in the context provided, as well. However,
the infelicity is unrelated to the formal nature of the bias. Rather, the proposition
that you are ashamed of yourself does not support the evidential requirements of the
discourse marker after all. The proposition that one is ashamed of himself does not
4This example is due to David Beaver, p.c.
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provide evidence for the proposition that one is a horrible person. On the contrary,
to the extent that it shows that one has a conscience, it provides evidence that one
is not horrible, as shown in (24b).
(24) a. A: Take it easy on yourself! You’re not such a bad person.
b. A: You did a horrible thing, but, after all, aren’t you {rather /#at all
} ashamed of yourself.
INPQs and ONPQs are still questions according to Sadock’s diagnostics.
Both ONPQs and INPQs can be responded to with a simple answer particle, i.e. yes
or no, and both co-occur with the discourse marker tell me, which tests for questions
(see the discussion in Chapter 3).
(25) Tell me, isn’t Jane coming {too/either}?
According to Sadock’s tests, then, ONPQs are both questions and assertions.
More to the point, they are simultaneously assertions and questions, as shown by
examples like (26). Tell me requires its argument – the negative interrogative in
(26a) – to be typed question, while yet in (26b) requires it to be typed assertion.
(26) a. A: Tell me, isn’t Jane coming too?
b. A: Yet, Mary claims there will be no syntacticians there.
(26) can not be explained by positing a simple ambiguity. That is, it is not sufficient
to claim that ONPQs are sometimes assertions and sometimes questions. In order
for the typing constraints of tell me and yet to be satisfied in (26), (26a) must be
typed both assertion and question. As with postnuclear tag questions, I assign
ONPQs the complex speech act type assertion • question. The grammar can
then exploit both of these types in interpreting a discourse like (26).
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4.3 A Decision-Theoretic Approach to NPQs
van Rooy and Šafářová (2003) develop an account of the use of polar questions
in which the speaker’s beliefs and preferences determine the form of the question.
They provide a formalization of this analysis in a version Bayesian decision theory
(Jeffrey 1965).5 Briefly, a speaker bases his or her polar question on the answer that
has the highest estimated utility relative to his or her beliefs and desires. Beliefs are
modeled by a probability function P and desires by a utility function U . Given a
belief-desire state 〈P,U〉, the utility of an answer q is computed as follows:
UV (q) = EU (Pq, U)− EU (P,U),
where Pq is the probability function P conditioned on the proposition q (Jeffrey
1965), i.e. Pq(w) is the probability of the world w given the proposition q. EU (P,U)
is the expected utility of the belief-desire state 〈P,U〉. The expected utility of a





EU measures the degree to which an agent prefers to be in a particular belief-desire
state 〈P,U〉.
The decision theoretic analysis is very general, as the utility of an answer q
ultimately depends on the nature of the utility function U . There are numerous cri-
teria by which an agent might judge information useful. van Rooy and Šafářová focus
on two specific cases. First, the utility of a world w might depend on whether some
goal proposition g is true in that world, i.e. U(w) = 1, iff w ∈ g, and 0 otherwise.
In this case, the utility of an answer q amounts to how q influences the probability
5van Rooy and Šafářová (2003) discuss alternative questions, as well. I ignore these here, as it
does not bear on our present concerns.
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of the goal g, i.e., P (g/q)−P (g). The answer q is useful to the extent that g is more
or less likely given q.
The second case that van Rooy and Šafářová consider is related to the in-
formativity of a proposition (see also Han 2002). If an agent simply wants to know
what the world is like, U(w) = logP (w) (van Rooy 2004). Under this assumption,
the utility of an answer q is equivalent to the reduction in entropy of the partition
W due to learning q, i.e. E(W )− Eq(W ), where:
E(W ) = −
∑
w∈W
P (w)× log2 P (w)
According to van Rooy and Šafářová (2003), in natural circumstances the reduction
in entropy upon learning q reduces to the surprisal value of q, i.e. inf q = − log2 P (q)
(Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953). The important feature of this measure is that as the
probability of a proposition decreases its surprisal value increases. The intuition is
that if one considers a proposition q unlikely, learning that q is more informative
than if one already assigns q a high probability.
Against this decision theoretic backdrop, van Rooy and Šafářová (2003) argue
that whether an agent uses a PPQ or an NPQ depends on which answer has the
highest expected utility for the speaker. Important to this analysis is the assumption
that PPQs and NPQs are semantically equivalent. Positive polar questions are used
when the utility of the positive answer is greater than the utility of the negative
answer and vice versa for negative polar questions, as summarized in the bullets
below.
• PPQs: UV (q) > UV (¬q)
• NPQs: UV (¬q) > UV (q)
Focusing our attention on utility as informativity, this assumption immedi-
ately derives the positive bias inherent to NPQs, since inf ¬q > inf q just in case
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P (q) > P (¬q), according to the speaker’s probability function. However, the anal-
ysis also predicts that PPQs are negatively biased. van Rooy and Šafářová counter
that negative statements are by default less informative than positive statements.
Consider the roll of a fair die. The probability that it comes up 1 is 1/6, while the
probability that it does not come up 1, is 5/6.6 Thus, negative statements are only
used when the default assumption is over-ruled, triggering an implicature that the
positive statement was/is considered by the speaker to be more likely than the neg-
ative one. The argument extends to positive polar questions, which are by default
formulated in terms of the positive answer.
There are cases where utility is relevant for PPQs, viz. in situations where
the speaker is reluctant to accept some new information q, perhaps because the
probability the agent assigns to q is quite low. The important point with respect to
grounding questions, van Rooy and Šafářová note, is that the utility of the positive
proposition is calculated with respect to the speaker’s belief-desire state before the
new information has been grounded, i.e., utility is calculated relative to 〈P,U〉 rather
than some subsequent belief-desire state. The mini-dialogue in (27) provides an
example. A’s turn in (27a) biases the context toward the proposition that John was
in Hawaii, i.e. there is compelling contextual evidence for this proposition in the
terminology of the previous section.
(27) a. A: John is back from Hawaii.
b. B: Was John in Hawaii?
B formulates the polar question in (27b) with respect to his belief-desire state prior
to updating it with the information in (27a), indicating that adding the information
that John was in Hawaii to his set of beliefs would require significant revision because
he previously assigned this proposition a low subjective probability. Thus A infers
6This reasoning, of course, does not hold for pairs of propositions such as It is even and It is
not even.
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that the speaker previously did not believe, or expect, that John was in Hawaii. A
can reasonably be expected, then, to back up the assertion in (27a) with additional
evidence.
Inside-negation polar questions are also grounding questions, according to
van Rooy and Šafářová (2003). In their case, however, the new information is a
negative proposition and the utility of each answer is still computed with respect to
the agents initial belief-desire state, i.e. one that does not take this new information
into account. (28), for example, can be uttered as a response to (27a), which provides
evidence that John was not in Fiji (assuming that he can not be in two places at
once).
(28) B: Didn’t John go to Fiji?
As before, B uses an INPQ because the negative answer is more informative with
respect to his initial belief-desire state 〈P,U〉 than the positive answer, i.e. the
proposition that John was in Fiji is assigned a relatively high probability and the
INPQ indicates that B is reluctant to ground the information in (27a) without
additional evidence.
On van Rooy and Šafářová’s 2003 analysis, it is meaningless to talk of
inside-negation vs. outside-negation polar questions, as they throw this distinction
away. For them, INPQs and ONPQs are formally, that is semantically and morpho-
syntactically, indistinguishable. The difference, van Rooy and Šafářová argue, lies
in which belief-desire state is used to compute the relative utility of the possible
answers. Whereas, INPQs rely on a prior belief-desire state, ONPQs rely on the
current belief desire state. The interpretation of (28) as an ONPQ conveys that
the speaker still considers it more likely that John went to Fiji than that he did
not, even in the presence of the counterevidence in (27a). To the extent that the
proposition that John went to Hawaii implies that he did not go to Fiji, the use
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of an ONPQ conveys that the agent does not accept the statement in (27a). The
use of an ONPQ in a neutral context would suggest that the agent expects that the
positive answer is the true one.
The decision theoretic analysis presented by van Rooy and Šafářová (2003) is
appealing, but it raises several questions. First, its account of positive bias in NPQs
is, mathematically speaking, rather weak. The requirement that UV (¬q) > UV q is
equivalent to the requirement that P (q) > .5. In other words, an agent only needs
to assign slightly more probability mass to the positive answer than to the negative
one in order to felicitously use an NPQ. This hardly seems to model intuitions about
the positive bias of negative questions. This complaint is not insurmountable, of
course. For example, one might instead enforce the constraint that:
[UV (¬q)−UV (q)] > d,
where d is some contextually supplied threshold for belief. Equivalently, P (q) > d,
say .75, or whatever probability one needs to assign to a proposition to say that an
agent believes it.
More problematic for the decision theoretic approach is the data from §4.2.3,
which showed that the positive bias of ONPQs is asserted, while the positive bias
of INPQs is not. This suggests, I argued, that the two positive biases need to be
distinguished formally. van Rooy and Šafářová’s analysis does not do this, as far as
I can tell, as the reasoning that leads to the positive bias is the same in both cases.
In either case, bias appears to be a conversational implicature based on the form of
the speaker’s utterance and other conversational principles, in this case a version of
the Maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975).
A related point is that according to van Rooy and Šafářová there is no seman-
tic or morpho-syntactic difference between outside-negation and inside-negation po-
lar questions. This assumption butts up against the observations about the licensing
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of polarity items presented briefly in (5) and (6), and the morpho-syntactic evidence
from German in (7). With respect to the German data, van Rooy and Šafářová re-
ject Büring and Gunlogson’s (2000) judgments. Regarding polarity items, van Rooy
and Šafářová do not explain why ppis force an ONPQ reading, while npis force an
INPQ reading. Given that the difference between ONPQs and INPQs for van Rooy
and Šafářová amounts to the choice of belief-desire state, it is difficult to see how
they could provide an explanation. They might simply claim that polarity items
of either stripe are licensed in interrogative sentences independent of any morpho-
syntactic facts. npis, for example, are licensed in questions regardless of whether
there is an overt marker of negation (Ladusaw 1979, Krifka 1995, van Rooy 2003).
Even leaving the “licensing question” aside, some account of the disambiguating role
of polarity items is called for. In the next section, I discuss an account of negative
polar questions that addresses both the licensing of polarity items and their role in
the outside-negation/inside-negation distinction.
4.4 A Semantic Approach to NPQs
Romero and Han (2004) present a semantic analysis of negative interrogative ques-
tions. They assume the existence of a hidden operator in NPQs that can take either
wide or narrow scope with respect to negation. The outside-negation, or φ, reading
results when this operator takes scope over negation – as in (29a)– and the inside-
negation, or ¬φ, reading results when the operator scopes under negation – as in
(29b).
(29) a. [CP Q not [ Op [IP Jane is coming ] ] ]
b. [CP Q Op [ not [IP Jane is coming ] ] ]
Romero and Han argue that a positive epistemic bias follows as a conversational
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implicature from the presence of this operator and pragmatic reasoning. §4.4.1
provides an overview of Romero and Han’s account and §4.4.2 provides an evaluation
of this approach.
4.4.1 Basics of the verum Approach
The schematic logical forms in (29) illustrate the intuition behind the analysis in
Romero and Han (2004). Negative polar questions contain a hidden operator that
interacts with negation to yield a semantic ambiguity. On this analysis, NPQs are
not equivalent to PPQs, as assumed on many accounts of interrogative semantics
(Hamblin 1973, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). Based on the similarity of the bias
in questions such as (30a) with that of NPQs, Romero and Han identify Op in (29)
with the semantic operator introduced by the epistemic adverb really. In (30a),
the speaker is reluctant to ground the information that Jane is coming due to a
prior belief that she was not coming. The same observation holds of questions with
polarity focus, as in (30b).
(30) a. Is Jane really coming?
b. [Is]F Jane coming?
Following Höhle (1992), Romero and Han equate the semantic contribution of
really with the operator verum, whose denotation is given in (31): Epix(w) are the
epistemic alternatives for the agent x in the world w. Convx(w′) are the worlds where
the conversational goals of x in w′ are met, the default goal being to accumulate
information about the world (cf. Stalnaker 1978 and Roberts 1996). CGw′′ is the
set of propositions representing the shared beliefs of the discourse participants in
w′′, i.e. the common ground (Stalnaker 1978).
(31) [[verum]]g[x/i] = λp〈s,t〉λw.∀w′ ∈ Epix(w)[∀w′′ ∈ Convx(w′)[p ∈ CGw′′ ]]
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In plain English, verum φ is true at a world w iff an anaphorically determined
discourse participant x (normally the sum of the speaker and addressee) is certain
that in all of the worlds in which the conversational goals of x are met the proposi-
tion φ is part of the common ground. Romero and Han (2004) gloss this meaning
as FOR-SURE-CGxφ. They assume that preposed, negated auxiliaries introduce
verum into the logical form of negative polar questions.
Once verum is introduced into the logical form of NPQs, Ladd’s ambiguity
(or equivalently the φ/¬φ ambiguity) is naturally analyzed as a scope ambiguity
between verum and negation. The outside-negation reading results when negation
outscopes verum. The logical form and resulting partition are shown in (32a) and
(32b).
(32) a. [[ [CP Q not [ verum [IP Jane is coming ] ] ] ]] =
b. { FOR-SURE-CGx Jane is coming,
¬FOR-SURE-CGx Jane is coming }
The question in this case addresses x’s degree of certainty about whether or not the
proposition that Jane is coming should be added to the common ground, deriving
the so-called φ reading. The inside-negation reading results when verum outscopes
negation, as shown in (33a). In this case, the question addresses x’s degree of
certainty about whether or not the proposition that Jane is not coming is in the
common ground, as indicated by the partition in (33b).
(33) a. [[ [CP Q verum [ not [IP Jane is coming ] ] ] ]] =
b. { FOR-SURE-CGx¬ Jane is coming,
¬FOR-SURE-CGx¬ Jane is coming }
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The partition in (33b) captures the intuition discussed in the introduction that
inside-negation PQs are “about” the proposition that Jane is not coming.
Based on this account of Ladd’s ambiguity, Romero and Han (2004) claim an
additional virtue for the verum approach, viz. that it accounts for the distribution
of polarity items in NPQs. Recall that ppis only occur in ONPQs and npis only
occur in INPQs. Romero and Han, following Linebarger (1987), argue that npis are
licensed in the immediate scope of negation. Consequently, no logical operators can
intervene between an npi and its licenser. ppis, on the other hand, are not licensed
in the immediate scope of negation.
The immediate scope constraint, Romero and Han argue, accounts straight-
away for the distribution of polarity items in NPQs. In the INPQ logical form
in (34a), for example, the npi either and the ppi too are in the immediate scope
of negation. As a result, the npi is licensed, while the ppi is not. In the ONPQ
logical form in (34a), on the other hand, verum intervenes between the npi and the
negation. As a result, it is not licensed.7
(34) a. [ Q verum [ ¬ Jane is coming {either/*too} ] ]
b. [ Q ¬ [ verum Jane is coming {*either/too} ] ]
Romero and Han (2004) analyze the positive bias in NPQs as a conversational
implicature derivable from the compositional semantic meaning of the question and
pragmatic reasoning. According to (31), verum is an epistemic modal that embeds
a “meta-conversational” modal , i.e., one that refers to the conversational goals of
7I leave further discussion of the licensing of polarity items in NPQs aside for the time being.
See Reese (2006b) for some critical evaluation of Romero and Han’s (2004) approach. I note here,
however, that the question of the licensing of npis in NPQs is in some respects a non-issue, as npis
are licensed in questions regardless of the presence of a licensing negative element (Borkin 1971,
Ladusaw 1979, Krifka 1995, a.o.). This not true of npis like either, which have stricter licensing
conditions than npis like any and ever and idiomatic npis like lift a finger. But again, this is a side
issue, as all of these npis coerce an outside-negation reading. What is more telling, I believe, is the
association of ppis with ONPQs. I return to this issue below.
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the discourse participants and the content of the common ground. Romero and
Han assume that the felicitous use of a meta-conversational move is governed by the
economy principle in (35).
(35) Principle of Economy:
Do not use a meta-conversational move unless necessary (to resolve epis-
temic conflicts or to ensure Quality) (Romero and Han 2004, p. 629).
Quality here refers to the second part of Grice’s Maxim of Quality: do not say
that for which you lack adequate evidence (Grice 1975). For Romero and Han
(2004), adequate evidence must be at least indirect evidence. As NPQs are meta-
conversational moves by definition – given the presence of verum at logical form,
they are subject to the economy principle above. Assuming that the speaker is
cooperative and obeys (35), it follows either that the he has a prior belief that φ
which is inconsistent with the addressee’s beliefs or believes φ but lacks evidence for
it, i.e. the speaker is trying to avoid a violation of Quality.
This establishes the presence of an epistemic bias, but does not in itself
determine the polarity of the bias. Romero and Han argue that the positive bias of
NPQs follows from the intention behind the question, as determined by the cell of
the partition introduced by the question that the speaker chooses to “pronounce”.
Their computation of the polarity of the bias, therefore, is very much like the analysis
proposed by van Rooy and Šafářová (2003). Since Romero and Han themselves note
that van Rooy and Šafářová’s account is consistent with their notion of “intent”, I
fore-go a detailed discussion here. Romero and Han argue, however, that verum is
still necessary in order to account for Ladd’s ambiguity. In the next section, I show
that while on the face of it the verum account provides a neat solution to Ladd’s
ambiguity, it faces certain empirical problems.
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4.4.2 Evaluation of the verum Approach
Summarizing, Romero and Han (2004) assume a semantic distinction between NPQs
and PPQs: NPQs contain a covert epistemic modal verum. verum questions
conversationally implicate that the speaker has a positive epistemic bias and Ladd’s
ambiguity is treated as a genuine scope ambiguity between verum and negation.
Their analysis is perhaps the most detailed investigation of NPQs to date and merits
serious consideration. Nonetheless, the analysis has several shortcomings. The
current section provides a critical evaluation of the verum approach, arguing that
there is little empirical support that NPQs mean what Romero and Han claim they
mean.
The verum approach assumes that positive and negative polar questions
have different compositional semantic meanings. That is, NPQs and PPQs are
associated with distinct mathematical objects. Most theories of the semantics of
interrogative sentences operate under the assumption that to know the meaning of
a question is to know what propositions are complete answers to it (Hamblin 1958,
a.o.). For example, since simple yes and no answers to (36a) convey the propositions
that Jane is coming and that Jane is not coming respectively, the meaning of (36a)
is taken to be the set of propositions in (37).
(36) a. A: Is Jane coming?
b. B: Yes, she is. ( = Jane is coming.)
c. B: No, she isn’t. ( = Jane is not coming.)
(37) {λw[Jane is coming in w], λw[¬Jane is coming in w]}
Suppose that the speaker asks a question like (38a), which includes some type of
weak epistemic necessity modal.8 Simple yes and no answers intuitively convey the
8The exact nature of the modal operator is not important for present purposes. What is impor-
tant is that it occurs overtly in the interrogative sentence.
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propositions in (38b) and (38c) respectively. Therefore, the meaning of (38a) is the
set of propositions in (39).
(38) a. Q: Is it certain that Jane is not coming?
b. A: Yes. (= It is certain that Jane is not coming.)
c. A: No. (= Is is not certain that Jane is not coming.)
(39) {λw[¬ Jane is coming in w], λw[¬¬ Jane is coming in w]}
Similar comments can be made about the question in (40a), in which a positive
proposition occurs in the scope of the modal operator. The denotation of the ques-
tion is shown in (41).
(40) a. Q: Is it certain that Jane is coming?
b. A: Yes. (= It is certain that Jane is coming.)
c. A: No. (= Is is not certain that Jane is coming.)
(41) {λw[ Jane is coming in w], λw[¬ Jane is coming in w]}
The denotations in (39) and (41) are similar to the denotations that Romero
and Han (2004) assign to INPQs and ONPQs respectively, simply replace  with
FOR-SURE-CGx.9 However, the direct answers to an NPQ like (42b) do not cor-
respond in any sense to the partitions in (39) and (41). Rather, a simple positive
answer to either an ONPQ or INPQ intuitively conveys the proposition that Jane
is coming. This result is congruent with the positive cell of the partition in (32b),
9In Romero and Han’s notation,  is assigned the denotation in (i).
(i) [[]]g[x/i] = λp〈s,t〉λw.∀w′ ∈ Epix(w)[p(w′) = 1]
The difference between (i) and the definition for verum in (31), then, is that the latter embeds
a further modal operator. Otherwise, both are at their core epistemic modals. Based on this
similarity, I assume that the comparison that follows between the examples in (38) and (40) and
Verum questions is a valid one.
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but it is inconsistent with the positive cell for INPQs in (43c). Direct negative an-
swers are even more problematic, as shown in (44). A negative response intuitively
conveys that Jane is not coming, not that the respondent is uncertain that Jane is
coming (44b), nor that he is uncertain that Jane is not coming (44c).
(42) a. A: Sue just canceled, so now no syntacticians are coming.
b. B: Isn’t Jane coming { too/either }?
(43) A: Yes. (But she doesn’t do syntax anymore.)
a. = Jane is coming
b. ≈ FOR-SURE-CGx Jane is coming
c. 6= FOR-SURE-CGx¬ Jane is coming
(44) A: No.
a. = ¬Jane is coming
b. 6= ¬ FOR-SURE-CGx Jane is coming
c. 6= ¬ FOR-SURE-CGx¬ Jane is coming
The data in (43a) and (44a) suggest that the meaning of an NPQ is more like the
denotation in (37), then either (39) or (41). In other words, there is no evidence of a
covert modal operator in negative questions. Positive and negative polar questions
appear to be equivalent, as predicted by many existing analysis of the semantics of
polar questions.
Further evidence for the equivalence of NPQs and PPQs comes from exam-
ples like those in (45). The web example in (45a) embeds a negative polar question
in the scope of wonder. The resulting sentence is intuitively equivalent to the con-
structed variant in (45b) that embeds the corresponding positive polar question.
Both examples in (45) state that the speaker wonders whether Kate is addicted to
an unhealthy level of unrest.
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(45) a. Kate felt bored with Dan because he failed to “challenge” her. A little
excitement is healthy in a relationship, but I wonder whether she isn’t
addicted to an unhealthy level of unrest?
b. Kate felt bored with Dan because he failed to “challenge” her. A little
excitement is healthy in a relationship, but I wonder whether she is
addicted to an unhealthy level of unrest?
These observations are unexpected if NPQs and PPQs denote distinct mathematical
objects. Furthermore, coercing INPQ and ONPQ readings by including a polarity
item does not influence these judgments.
(46) Kate felt bored with Dan because he failed to “challenge” her. A little
excitement is healthy in a relationship, but I wonder whether she isn’t {at
all/rather} addicted to an unhealthy level of unrest?
Again, both versions of (46) are intuitively equivalent (modulo the meanings of at
all and rather).
Romero (2005) responds to these criticisms by suggesting that verum con-
tributes expressive rather than truth conditional content. Expressive content pro-
vides the speaker’s commentary on the truth conditional contribution of an utterance
(Potts 2005). Because verum is an epistemic modal according to (31), it is helpful
to consider recent work on epistemic modality in evaluating Romero’s proposed fix.
What she appears to have in mind is related to the observation in (47) that the pre-
jacent proposition in (47b), i.e., the proposition in the scope of the epistemic modal
must, is offered as the answer to the question (47a), while the modal statement itself
signals that the speaker’s estimation that the answer is right or indicates that he
only has indirect evidence for it (von Fintel and Gillies 2007).
(47) a. Why isn’t Louise coming to our meetings these days?
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b. She must be too busy with her dissertation.
Similarly, verum – as an epistemic modal itself – comments on the truth conditional
content of an utterance, rather than contributing directly to truth conditions. As
a result, according to Romero (2005), positive answers to verum questions affirm
the prejacent, while negative answers negate the prejacent; verum comments on
the answer, saying that it is certain given current conversational goals that the
proposition in it’s scope should be added to the common ground. Romero provides
no formal details. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate the proposed solution. This
does not mean that a solution is impossible, but the onus is on Romero to provide
one.
I note here a few obstacles that the proposed solution faces. First, the simple
statement that positive answers affirm the prejacent, while negative answers negate
the prejacent only applies, as stated, to ONPQs, where the prejacent is a positive
proposition. It does not hold of INPQs, where the prejacent is negative. For ex-
ample, if a positive answer affirmed the prejacent of an INPQ like (42b), a simple
yes response would convey that Jane is not coming, while a negative answer would
mean that she is. In her brief explanation, Romero (2005) seems to want to exclude
negation from the prejacent of INPQs. However, I see no justification for this move.
Indeed, central to the “scope account” of Ladd’s ambiguity is the position that nega-
tion in INPQs forms part of the descriptive content of the question. Relatedly, much
of the research on expressive content notes that it does not semantically embed with
respect to truth conditional operators (Potts 2005). It seems, then, that Romero’s
(2005) assumption that verum is an expressive operator contradicts Romero and
Han’s (2004) analysis of the inside-negation/outside-negation ambiguity as a gen-
uine scope ambiguity. Again, this does not imply that a principled solution along
the lines suggested by Romero (2005) is impossible, but any fully formed solution
is going to be significantly different from the one in Romero and Han (2004).
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Finally (and related to issues raised in the preceding paragraph), von Fintel
and Gillies (2007) point to certain problems with the view that epistemic modals
do not contribute to truth conditions, but rather comment on the at-issue core of
an utterance. Specifically, they show that not only do epistemic modals felicitously
embed, but that when they do so they contribute modalized truth conditions to
interpretation. (48) (from von Fintel and Gillies 2007) does not mean that Bill
thinks that there has been a mistake, but rather that Bill thinks that it is compatible
with the evidence that there as been a mistake.
(48) Bill thinks that there might have been a mistake.
The tension between the examples in (47) and (48), von Fintel and Gillies argue,
suggests that an analysis of epistemic modals other than the expressive content one
is in order. To the extent that Romero (2005) bases her revised analysis of verum
on the kind of data in (47), the data in (48) is equally problematic for her, as she
explicitly assumes some kinship between verum and more familiar epistemic modals.
Furthermore, I take (48) to suggest that even if verum sometimes commented on the
prejacent proposition, as Romero (2005) suggests, it need not do so. For example,
when embedded under a propositional attitude, as in (45a), it might contribute
modalized truth conditions. However, intuitions about the meaning of (45a) suggest
that this is not the case.
4.5 The Discourse Function of NPQs
§4.2.3 presented evidence based on the co-occurrence of certain discourse markers
with specific speech acts that the positive epistemic bias endemic to outside-negation
polar questions is an assertion, rather than a conversational implicature as van Rooy
and Šafářová (2003) and Romero and Han (2004) would have it. The current section
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provides additional support for this claim based on a closer examination of the
discourse function of ONPQs. Romero and Han (2004) come close to recognizing the
existence of the assertion that I argue for. They note, for example, that ONPQs are
often used to suggest φ. However, they never note that suggesting φ is tantamount
to weakly asserting φ (Vanderveken 1990, p. 172). In other words, suggestions are a
type of assertion. Similarly, in what Romero and Han call “contradiction scenarios”
ONPQs can be used as denials, another flavor of assertion (Vanderveken 1990,
p. 170). Following Reese (2006b), I focus on the use of negative polar questions in
“contradiction scenarios”, providing additional evidence for the claim that ONPQs
convey an assertion. At the same time, I show that INPQs are not associated with
an assertion.
Outside-negation polar questions pattern with positive assertions that deny
an antecedent assertion, as shown by the example dialogues in (49) – (52). (49c),
for example, is a weak, or indirect, denial of (49a).
(49) a. A: None of the students turned in their assignment.
b. B: Jane turned in her assignment.
c. B: Didn’t Jane turn in her assignment?
It is impossible to use an INPQ for a similar purpose. Some care is required to
establish this point, however. The INPQ reading of (49c) is a felicitous response to
(49a), but it does not deny it. Rather, INPQs are generally grounding questions
(see the discussion below). Intuitively, (49a) is inconsistent with B’s prior belief
that Jane turned in her assignment. The INPQ is a request for additional evidence
for the claim that Jane did not turn in her assignment before A revises his or her
beliefs accordingly.
Denial readings can be coerced by including a “priming” phrase that indicates
that the utterance that follows it challenges a previous assertion on some grounds.
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In (50), for example, B prefaces his turn with That’s not true, which introduces
a reasonable expectation that the following utterance provides counterevidence or
corrects the assertion in (50a).
(50) a. A: All of the students submitted their paper to L&P.
b. B: That’s not true.
c. B: Some of them submitted it to LI.
d. B: Didn’t {some/#any} of them submit it to LI?
Assuming that each student wrote exactly one paper and submitted it to exactly one
journal, (50a) entails the negation of (50c) and vice versa. Given this inconsistency,
(50c) corrects or denies (50a). Similarly, the ONPQ interpretation of (50d) can
follow the priming expression in (50b) and, as a result, correct the entailment of
(50a) that no student submitted their paper to LI. I take these observations as
evidence that (50d) asserts a proposition that is inconsistent with the proposition
asserted by (50a). Intuitively, this proposition is the same one asserted in (50c).
The inside-negation reading of (50d) is not felicitous following (50b), despite the
fact that it conveys a positive bias whose propositional content is similar to the
proposition asserted by (50c). Thus, the positive biases of ONPQs and INPQs have
distinct discourse functions.
Denials can also target the presuppositions and implicatures of an utterance.
In (51), (51c) and the ONPQ reading of (51d) correct the presupposition triggered
by the implicative verb manage in (51a) that it was difficult for Nicholas to prove
the theorem. The priming expression in (51b) provides a useful cue that B objects
to A’s use of manage.
(51) a. A: Nicholas managed to prove the theorem.
b. B: I wouldn’t say he [managed]F to prove the theorem.
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c. B: It was rather easy for him.
d. B: Wasn’t it {rather/#at all} easy for him?
As before, (51c) functions as a correction of (51a) because its propositional content
is inconsistent with the presupposition triggered in (51a). The felicity of the ONPQ
reading of (51d) again provides evidence that it asserts a proposition that is inconsis-
tent with (51a)’s presupposition, viz. the proposition asserted by (51c). The INPQ
reading of (51d), which is coerced by including the ppi at all, is infelicitous in the
discourse context including (51b). If one omits (51b), the inside-negation reading
of (51d) is permitted. However, as before, it seeks evidence for the presupposition
that it was difficult for Nicholas to prove the theorem.
(52c) and (52d) object to a potential implicature of (52a), viz. that not all of
the packages have arrived. Again, the priming expression in (52b) indicates that the
utterance that follows it rejects (52a) on some grounds, viz. that there is a logically
stronger, true proposition that the speaker could have asserted instead.
(52) a. A: Some of the packages have arrived already.
b. B: Well, that’s not quite right.
c. B: All of the packages have arrived already.
d. B: Haven’t all of the packages arrived {already/#yet }?
The argument here is the same as above. That both the simple assertion in (52c)
and the ONPQ in (52d) can function in the discourse context as denials suggests
that both share some propositional content that is inconsistent with the implicature
associated with (52a). Forcing the INPQ reading of (52d) by including the npi yet
results in an infelicitous discourse. On the other hand, the INPQ can be used to
help ground the implicature that not all of the packages arrived.
The examples in (50) – (52) also illuminate an as yet unresolved puzzle:
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the role of polarity items in disambiguating inside-/outside-negation PQs. To re-
cap briefly, ONPQs can be used to deny or correct an utterance based on false
entailments, presuppositions or implicatures, echoing Horn’s (1989) description of
metalinguistic negation as a “device for objecting to an utterance on any grounds
whatever, including the conventional and conversational implicata it potentially in-
duces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization” (p. 363). This
description matches the uses of ONPQs above, suggesting that perhaps the negation
in ONPQs is metalinguistic. As discussed in the previous chapter, metalinguistic
negation does not license npis, nor does it block the use of ppis (Horn 1989). The
assumption that outside-negation is metalinguistic negation, then, provides a plau-
sible alternative to Romero and Han’s (2004) account of the distribution of polarity
items in NPQs.
Additional evidence for this assumption comes from consideration of the into-
national characteristics of assertions used as denials and ONPQs. The intonational
tunes of (49b) and (49c), for example, share certain features. Impressionistically,
both include an L*+H pitch accent on Jane. In addition, it is possible for both
to end with final rising intonation, e.g. the sequence of L-H% of phrase accent and
boundary tone. This contour – L*+H L-H% – corresponds to the “contradiction
contour” of Liberman and Sag (1974) (see also Walker 1996). The tune is also typ-
ical of utterances containing metalinguistic negation (Horn 1989). More recently,
Steedman (2000, 2003) analyzes this contour as conveying information to the effect
that it is not the case that the hearer supposes φ, where for (49b) and (49c) φ is
the proposition that Jane turned in her assignment (assuming that metalinguistic
negation in (49c) does not form part of the propositional content of the question).
Thus the meaning Steedman assigns to the tune is a plausible way for the speaker to
remind the hearer of information that the speaker deems relevant to the discourse.
A neutral assertion of (49b) and the INPQ interpretation of (49c), on the other
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hand, intuitively to contain an H* pitch accent. Intonational information, therefore,
again distinguishes ONPQs and INPQS, ONPQs having intonational characteristics
typical of certain types of assertion.
I will not comment further on the interpretation of metalinguistic negation
in ONPQs here, though further research is certainly needed. Rather, for the time
being, I simply assume that (i) the negation in ONPQs plays a discourse function,
signaling that the utterance acts as a denial or suggestion, and (ii) that the negation
does not form part of the propositional content of the question. The next section
provides an analysis in sdrt of the use of ONPQs and INPQs. Given the evidence
in §4.2.3 and §4.5, I assume that ONPQs are assigned a complex speech act type
assertion • question by the grammar. This type assignment influences the role
that ONPQs play in discourse and accounts for the fact that they pattern with
assertions. INPQs, on the other hand, are typed question. The discussion below
provides some evidence for this, showing that INPQs are more like PPQs than they
are like ONPQs, another strike against theories like the verum approach that treat
the ONPQ/INPQ distinction as a syntactic ambiguity.
4.6 NPQs and Discourse Logical Form
The current section examines the contribution of negative polar questions to the
interpretation of discourses in which they occur. The discussion above argued for
two central claims. First, outside-negation polar questions are assigned a complex
speech act type assertion • question by the grammar. Second, inside-negation
polar questions and positive polar questions are semantically equivalent, contrary
to analyses such as Romero and Han (2004).
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4.6.1 Outside-negation Polar Questions
I discuss the use of ONPQs in “suggestion scenarios”, before addressing their use
in “contradiction scenarios”. This choice is for purely expository purposes, as there
is no essential difference in their use in each kind of context. For any ONPQ, the
assertion component has some discourse function as determined by its rhetorical
connection to the preceding discourse context. The nature of the discourse context,
i.e. whether it is neutral or biased, constrains the type of discourse relation that is
used, as described below. ONPQs, on this score, are like any other assertion.
Suggestion Scenarios
The discourse context in (53), in particular the context provided by (53a) – (53c), is
neutral with respect to the proposition that Jane is coming. The discourse segments
π1 and π2 elaborate the segment in π0 by providing more information about which
good syntacticians are attending the workshop. The sdrs for this part of (53) utilizes
the relations Elaboration and Continuation. Elaboration is a subordinating relation,
and links two discourse segments α and β just in case Kβ describes in greater
detail some part of Kα (Asher 1993, Asher and Lascarides 2003). Continuation is
a weak coordinating relation that requires the segments it relates to be in the same
relation to any segment that dominates them (Asher 1993). The intuition is that
π1 elaborates π0 and π2 continues that elaboration.
(53) a. (π0) A: Many good syntacticians are attending the workshop.
b. (π1) A: George is coming;
c. (π2) A: Mary is coming;
d. (π3) B: Isn’t Jane coming too?
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The sdrs τ for the discourse through (53c) is:10
• A = {π0, π1, π2, π′, π′′}
• F(π0) = Kπ0 , F(π1) = Kπ1 , F(π2) = Kπ2
F(π′) = Elaboration(π0, π′′)
F(π′′) = Continuation(π1, π2)
• LAST = π2
A number of things follow from τ : that George and Mary are good syntacti-
cians, that they are both attending the workshop, etc. It does not follow, however,
that Jane is coming, so the context is neutral with respect to the proposition that
Jane is coming. The next step is to update τ with the ONPQ in (53d) (labeled π3).
I refer the reader to Asher and Lascarides (2003) for the gory details of sdrt
update. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that updating τ with π3 consists
of finding a suitable discourse segment within τ to attach π3 to. This amounts to
adding ?(α, π3, λ), for some α and λ, to the set of glue logic premises. However,
because π3 is assigned a complex speech act type this premise incurs a type clash,
which is resolved by introducing two new speech act discourse referents: π3a (π3
qua assertion) and π3q (π3 qua question). Intuitively, π3a weakly asserts that Jane
is coming, continuing the elaboration of π0 started by π1 and π2, so τ is updated by
conjoining Continuation(π2, π3a) to the sdrs formula labeled π′′.
Next, the discourse contribution of π3q is computed. π3q must be rhetorically
linked to π3a in order to satisfy the coherence requirements on complex types (see
Chapter 2). It is important to keep in mind in computing this connection that π3a
is only weakly asserted. Following the discussion of rising intonation tag questions
in chapter 3, this means that A can infer that B believes that it is possible that Jane
10I what follows I enumerate speech act discourse referents that label utterances with sub-scripted
























Figure 4.1: sdrs graph for dialogue (53).
is coming, i.e. BB(♦pπ3a), and is not certain that she is coming. If B was certain
that that Jane was coming, he would have no reason not to use standard declarative
syntax to make his assertion. The partition denoted by the question π3q (as argued
at length above) is just the set of propositions:
{λw[Jane is coming in w], λw[¬Jane is coming w]}
The situation is reminiscent of the analysis of rising intonation tag questions
from Chapter 3. Because B weakly asserts π3a, it follows that he assigns it a
probability less than 1. As a result, the direct answers to π3q either increase or
decrease the probability that B assigns to K3a. Any direct answer to π3q, therefore,
is relevant to π3a, as defined in Chapter 3, and the antecedent to the axiom for
inferring Confirmationq (repeated in (54)) is satisfied. By defeasible modus ponens,
it follows that Confirmationq(π3a, π3q). The final sdrs graph for (53) is shown in
Figure 4.1.
(54) Axiom on Confirmation Questions:
(?(α, β, λ) ∧ Sanswer(β, p) ∧ relevantτ (pα, p)) > Confirmationq(α, β, λ)
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The discourse function of the ONPQ in (53d), given the graph in Figure 4.1,
is equivalent to that of a rising intonation tag question, as can be seen by replacing
(53d) in (53) with (55).
(55) B: Jane is coming too, isn’t she?
This result follows on the present analysis from the assumption that ONPQs and tag
questions are both instances of the complex speech act type assertion•question.
Furthermore, the component types of (53d) and (55) have the same semantic content.
It is not surprising, then, that they have equivalent discourse functions.
Contradiction Scenarios
The details of the use of ONPQs in “contradiction scenarios” has the same general
outline as their use in “suggestion scenarios”, as described above. The primary
difference is in the type of discourse relation that connects the associated assertion
to the preceding discourse context. Specifically, given the incompatibility of the
contextual bias and the assertion, it follows that the assertion attaches with a diver-
gent discourse relation such as Correction or Counterevidence (Asher and Lascarides
2003). These discourse relations mark disputes in dialogue. Hence, divergent re-
lations require the content of the segments they relate to be incompatible in some
sense. For Correction, α and β must be inconsistent.11 For Counterevidence, Kβ
must defeasibly entail that Kα is false, or less believable (Asher and Lascarides
2003).
Because divergent relations introduce disputes, updating an sdrs τ with
one requires some revision of the information already contained in τ (as described
in Chapter 2). In particular, if R(γ, α) holds, where R is right-veridical, and
Correction(α, β) or Counterevidence(α, β) is subsequently added to the discourse
11In addition, there are constraints on the focus-background structure of the discourse segments
that are related by Correction. See Asher (1995) for details.
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logical form, then R(γ, α) is replaced with Dis(R)(γ, α), indicating that the content
R(γ, α) is disputed. Dis(R)(γ, α) entails that S(β) believes R(γ, α), but ¬R(γ, α)
is entailed by the discourse context (Asher and Lascarides 2003).
In the dialogue in (56), π1a attaches to π0 with Counterevidence – again
implicating that Jane is a syntactician – and π1q attaches to π1a with Confirmationq.
In this context, Confirmationq functions as a challenge to A to, colloquially speaking,
“put up or shut up”. That is, A must either accept B’s assertion, and revise his
beliefs appropriately, or provide counterevidence to B’s contribution.
(56) a. (π0) A: No syntacticians are attending the workshop.
b. (π1) B: Isn’t Jane coming?
c. (π2) B: No./#Yes.
Reese (2006a) notes that this analysis accounts naturally for the markedness
of simple positive answers to (56b), as shown in (56c). Figure 4.2 shows the sdrs
graph for a simple negative answer to the confirmation question. Most important
about this sdrs is the fact that not only does the negative response answer the
confirmation question, hence QAP(π1q, π2), it also corrects B’s assertion that Jane
is coming, hence Correction(π1a, π2). As a result, Counterevidence(π0, π1a) is re-
placed with Dis(Counterevidence)(π0, π1a); A has provided counterevidence to B’s
counterevidence, meeting the challenge. More importantly, the sdrs is consistent.
The graph in figure 4.3, representing the sdrs for a simple positive response,
is not consistent, providing a plausible account of the relative infelicity of the simple
positive answer. The answer that Jane is coming answers the confirmation question
and provides evidence for the weak assertion in π1a. A cursory glance at Figure 4.3
reveals a problem, however. π1a and π2 convey the same proposition, viz. that Jane
is coming. Yet this proposition, given the discourse logical form, is required to be














Figure 4.2: sdrs graph for dialogue (56): a simple negative response.













Figure 4.3: sdrs graph for dialogue (56): a simple positive response.
This does not mean that positive answers are ruled out a priori. They do
require some extra content to be felicitous, however. Intuitively, what is needed is
information that addresses the alleged counterevidence in π1a. Either A must ex-
plicitly reject his previous assertion that no syntacticians are coming, as in (57a), or
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offer information that disputes the counterevidence relation between π0 and π1a, but
which is nonetheless consistent with the assertion that Jane is coming. For example,
(57b) corrects the implicature associated with π1a that Jane is a syntactician.
(57) a. A: Yes. You’re right. I forgot about Jane.
b. A: Yes. But she doesn’t do syntax anymore. She absolutely refuses to
talk about weak islands.
4.6.2 Inside-negation Polar Questions
§4.2.3 and §4.5 established that inside negation polar questions, unlike outside-
negation PQs, are not assigned a complex speech act type by the grammar. Rather,
INPQs are questions, as predicted by the default alignment of linguistic form with
discourse function. However, the range of discourse functions that INPQs play in
a dialogue is rather narrowly constrained. Specifically, they appear to be confined
to grounding questions. That is, they are requests by the speaker for evidence that
would help him to ground information in the discourse or situational context. To
ground information, following Clark (1996), is “to establish it as part of the com-
mon ground well enough for current purposes” (p. 221). Normally, the information
targeted by the grounding question is inconsistent with a prior belief or expectation.
Intuitively, the speaker holds off updating her epistemic state, or her model of the
common ground, with the new information until the addressee provides additional
evidence for it, or simply reaffirms it.
I model grounding questions with the sdrt relation Evidence, which relates
two discourse segments α and β just in case β defeasibly entails α. Specifically,
a grounding question β is related to an utterance that conveys information that
is not yet grounded with the Evidenceq. Recall that when a relation of the form
Rq links α to β, any answer to β must be linked to α with the relation R. The
glue logic axiom for computing the discourse contribution of grounding questions is
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given in (58). Recall from chapter 2 that the core proposition of a drs K is the
drs K ′ obtained by removing any markers of sentence mood, e.g. interrogative or
imperative operators.
(58) Axiom on Grounding Questions:
(?(α, β, λ) ∧ β : question ∧ (Kα > core-proposition(Kβ))) >
Evidenceq(α, β, λ)
In plain English, (58) states that if a question β attaches to α within the discourse
context λ and Kα defeasibly entails the core propositional content of β, then nor-
mally β attaches to α with Evidenceq, i.e. β is an request for evidence supporting
α.
The requirement thatKα entail the core propositional content of the question
captures Büring and Gunlogson’s (2000) observation that an INPQs are restricted to
contexts that contain compelling contextual evidence for the underlying proposition
associated with the INPQ. The constraint also permits the use of PPQs as grounding
questions when there is contextual evidence for a positive proposition. There is an
indirect relationship between the content of the ungrounded information and the
form of the grounding question. Normally, new information φ contributed by an
agent A entails the falsity of some proposition ψ which a second agent B believes
to be true. To establish φ as part of the common ground, B requests additional
evidence for ¬ψ.
Depending on how an agent conceptualizes the information that conflicts
with the ungrounded information, either a positive or negative polar questions might
be felicitous. Consider the examples in (59), in which the definite description the
king of France presupposes the existence of an entity matching that description.
If the presupposition is new to the hearer and, furthermore, she has a prior belief
that conflicts with it, she may utter either (59b) or (59a). The content of the
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presupposition defeasibly entails that France is not a republic and that France is
a monarchy.12 Presumably, if the belief that France is a republic is salient to the
hearer, she will utter (59b); if the belief that France is not a monarchy is salient,
she will utter (59c). In either case, the question attaches to (59a) with Evidenceq,
as the intention behind B’s utterance is for A to provide information to help them
ground the presupposition that France has a king.
(59) a. A: The king of France is bald.
b. B: Isn’t France a republic?
c. B: Is France a monarchy?
(60) illustrates the contribution of the discourse relation Evidenceq in more
detail. Given the INPQ in (59b), we can assume that B (mistakenly) believes that
Britain is an absolute monarchy. (60a) entails that it is not, so B bases her polar
question on the negative answer, viz. that Britain is not a monarchy. The negative
answer is the one entailed by the discourse context and so represents the information
that B is attempting to ground. Axiom on Grounding Questions is satisfied, so
A infers that B intends Evidenceq(π0, π1). The answer in (60c) provides additional
evidence for the presupposition introduced by the definite description, viz. that
Britain, although a monarchy, is a constitutional monarchy. B acknowledges the
answer with the response in (60d), successfully grounding the presupposition.
(60) a. (π0) A: The prime minister of Britain supports President Bush.
b. (π1) B: Isn’t Britain a monarchy?
c. (π2) A: No./#Yes. [It’s a constitutional monarchy and a representative
democracy.]
d. (π3) B: Oh, I see.
12Note that these two propositions are not equivalent, as there are many forms of government
that are neither monarchies nor republics.
125
The simple yes response to (60b) in (60c) is pragmatically marked, since it
does not satisfy the semantic requirements of the discourse logical form. Specifically,
if Evidenceq(π0, π1) and QAP(π1, π2), it follows that Evidence(π0, π2), requiring that
Kπ2 defeasibly entail Kπ0 , according to the semantics of Evidence. If π2 conveys
that Britain is a monarchy – as a simple yes response does, then the semantic
requirements of Evidence are not met (assuming that the default interpretation of
monarchy is an absolute monarchy. A simple positive answer is felicitous if continued
with information that does, in fact, provide evidence for the original assertion, such
as the bracketed material in (60c), which admits that Britain is a monarchy, but
contrasts absolute monarchies with constitutional monarchies, which may also be
democracies.
The verum account from Romero and Han (2004) and the revised verum
account from Romero (2005) have problems dealing with the observations associated
with the dialogue in (60b), especially with the markedness of simple positive answers.
Most of these problems were discussed above and relate to the fact that the meaning
that Romero and Han assign to INPQs does not match intuitions about what simple
yes and no answers to INPQs convey. A simple yes on the verum account, for
example, expresses the proposition that it is certain that the proposition that Britain
is not a monarchy should be added to the common ground. If one reads monarchy
here as absolute monarchy, there is nothing objectionable about this answer: A
expresses with certainty that the presupposition should be grounded. But as I
just demonstrated, a simple yes answer to (60b) is somewhat odd (and at the very
least unhelpful). Furthermore, a negative answer on the verum reading conveys the
proposition that it is not certain that the proposition that Britain is not a monarchy
should be added to the common ground, which runs completely contrary intuitions.
This answer should most certainly be marked in the discourse context. However, as
I argued, simple negative answers are unmarked.
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The revised verum account (if it were to be made somehow explicit) might
fare better. But recall that on that account the meaning of an INPQ is basically
equivalent to the meaning of the related PPQ, with the exception of some extra
expressive content throw in for good measure. But once one accepts that INPQS and
PPQs are equivalent, I see no reason to posit the existence of the alleged expressive
content. This is especially true if one steps back and takes a discourse oriented view
on the use of INPQs. On this view – specifically, on the sdrt view – utterances
in a discourse must be rhetorically linked by (at least) one of a number of binary
discourse relations that themselves contribute to the model-theoretic interpretation
of the discourse. Thus the meaning of a question, or any utterance for that matter,
goes beyond what is given by the compositional semantics of the clause itself. On
the analysis of INPQs, and grounding question in general, presented here, this extra
content is contributed by the relation Evidenceq. Thus while the partition given by
the compositional semantics of (60b), for example, is just
{λw[Britain is a monarchy in w], λw[¬Britain is a monarchy in w]},
the meaning, broadly construed, is closer to the question Do you have evidence that
Britain is not a monarchy? On this paraphrase, the analysis presented here and
that presented by Romero and Han (2004) are entirely compatible.13 On the sdrt
analysis, however, there is no reason to complicate the compositional semantics of
the INPQ, which is good, as there is very little empirical reason to do so. Instead,
the extra content is introduced at discourse logical form rather than clausal logical
form.
Finally, the current approach to INPQs is compatible in many ways with
the decision-theoretic analysis of van Rooy and Šafářová (2003). First, van Rooy
and Šafářová assume, as do I, that PPQs and INPQs are semantically equivalent.
13See the discussion in Romero and Han (2004) on pp. 644–646, e.g.
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Second, they treat the positive bias inherent to INPQs as a conversational implica-
ture. The NPQ is used because the negative answer has a higher utility than the
positive answer, which – assuming that informativity is at stake – implies that the
speaker considers the positive answer to be more likely. In the case of grounding
questions, informativity is computed with respect to the speaker’s belief-desire state
before updating it with new, controversial information. Intuitively, the speaker is
reluctant to ground the new information as it would trigger a significant revision of
the current belief-desire state.
These assumptions are consistent with the current approach, although in the
sdrt setting that positive bias is derived via shallow pragmatic reasoning. Specif-
ically, if A asserts φ and B has no reason to doubt φ, then B should add φ to his
belief set.14 By asking the question ?φ, B implicates that he does not know whether
or not φ (see the preparatory conditions on questions in Searle 1969). Given that
φ has been asserted, it is reasonable to assume, then, that B believes (or suspects)
that ¬φ.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter argued that outside-negation polar questions are assigned a complex
speech act type assertion • question, a fact which distinguishes them formally
from both inside-negation polar questions and positive polar questions, which are
assigned the speech act type question. Whereas the former assumption allows
us to capture in a straightforward manner the ways in which ONPQs behave like
assertions, i.e. their use as denials and suggestions, previous approaches fail on this
account. The bias derived by van Rooy and Šafářová’s (2003) decision theoretic
14This reasoning is captured by the Competence axiom in sdrt’s logic of cognitive modelling
(discussed in chapter 2 and repeated below) (Asher and Lascarides 2003).
• Competence: BAφ > BBφ
This default applies unless over-ridden by a more specific default.
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analysis, for example, is too weak to play this role. While it provides information
about the speaker’s belief-desire state, it provides no information about his intention
in using a biased question. Furthermore, it fails to distinguish the biases inherent to
ONPQs from that conveyed by INPQs. Romero and Han’s 2004 semantic account
builds too much of the typical discourse function of NPQs into their semantics.
The problem with this is that to all appearances INPQs, PPQs and the question
component of ONPQs are semantically equivalent.
The analysis above overcomes these shortcomings by adopting a framework
for the computation of discourse function, viz. sdrt. Pragmatic mechanisms are
employed to model the restricted use of various polar question types. In this respect,
my analysis is in the spirit of van Rooy and Šafářová (2003). In fact, the kind of
decision-theoretic reasoning that they employ can be viewed as an implementation
of the non-shallow version of sdrt’s shallow logic of cognitive modelling (exactly the
kind of deep reasoning that the shallow logic circumvents). However, it’s necessary
to employ a conventionalized linguistic distinction in ONPQs, which they eschew.
This assumption, I believe, is justified based on the linguistic evidence, viz. the




Negative Bias in Questions with
Emphatic Focus
5.1 Introduction
The current chapter examines positive polar questions with an inherent negative
bias. Typical examples of this kind of question are shown in (1). Questions like (1a),
which contains a strong negative polarity item, have received the most attention in
the semantic literature (cf. Borkin 1971, Krifka 1995, Abels 2003, van Rooy 2003,
Guerzoni 2004, a.o.). However, this previous research focuses on the licensing of
npis in interrogative sentences rather than on negative bias per se.1
(1) a. Did John lift a finger to help Mary?
b. Has John ever helped Mary?
c. Did I tell you that writing a dissertation would be easy?
1There are some exceptions. See Abels (2003), Krifka (2003), Guerzoni (2004), and Asher and
Reese (2005).
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Because of this narrow focus on npis, related types of negatively biased polar ques-
tion have been, to some extent, neglected. For example, while questions like (1b)
that contain stressed domain wideners have received some attention in the context
of npi licensing in questions, questions like (1c) that have a marked intonation sim-
ilar to the one in (1b) have received considerably less attention.2 Furthermore, one
seldom sees all of the question types in (1) subsumed under a single analysis.
This chapter has two goals, one related to the form of negatively-biased po-
lar questions, the other to their discourse function. First, I argue that the bias in
the questions in (1) has a common grammatical source related to intonation, rather
than to any lexico-semantic properties of the question. I refer to these questions,
therefore, as emphatic focus questions.3 Intuitively, the questions in (1) require the
primary sentence stress to be marked with either an L* or L*+H pitch accent in
order to be biased. With the exception of Borkin (1971) and Krifka (1995), the in-
tonational properties of negatively-biased questions are rarely noted. On the other
hand, many previous analyses normally do note some kind of emphatic meaning
associated with the examples in (1). The second goal of the chapter is to provide
evidence that emphatic focus questions are conventionalized indirect assertions. As
in previous chapters, the primary evidence for this claim comes from Sadock’s asser-
tion diagnostics, which should be familiar to the reader by now. These tests show
that the distribution of emphatic focus questions overlaps with that of negative
assertions.
The chapter is organized as follows. §5.2 discusses previous analyses of biased
questions with strong npis. I focus in particular on the weak characterization of bias
in Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003). Bias is weak on these analyses because (i)
2Sadock (1971) is an early exception. Han (2002) and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) provide
more recent discussions of “rhetorical questions”.
3In a similar vein, Sadock (1971) referred to the questions in (1) as queclaratives to indicate that
(on his analysis) these questions possess an underlying declarative component, in addition to an
interrogative one.
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it is a conversational implicature, hence cancellable, and (ii) it does not settle the
issue introduced by the question. §5.2.2 discusses strong analyses of negative bias
for the sake of completeness. I do not discuss these analyses further, as they make
the same predictions as weak analyses (modulo the strength of the bias).
§5.3 presents new data that is problematic for the very general pragmatic
analyses in Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003). These counterexamples come in
two varieties. First, I discuss questions with a similar semantic content to the
questions in (1), but which do not exhibit a similar bias. Second, I discuss apparent
lexical exceptions to the pragmatic analysis, which are unexpected on a pragmatic
analysis. Both types of counterevidence mitigate against an analysis of bias as a
conversational implicature on the standard Gricean assumption that implicatures
are calculated on the basis of semantic content and general principles of rationality,
rather than on linguistic form. At the same time, this discussion provides evidence
from our assertion diagnostics that emphatic focus questions convey an indirect
assertion.
§5.4 argues that the common grammatical source of the negative bias in (1) is
the marked intonation contour normally associated with these questions. I discuss
the interpretive contribution of intonation briefly, before linking it to a negative
assertion within the logic of cognitive modelling in §5.5. The intonation based
analysis of negative bias is able to account for many of the problematic examples
introduced in §5.3.
5.2 Previous Approaches
5.2.1 Weak Characterizations of Negative Bias
Krifka (1995, 2003) and van Rooy (2003) provide a weak characterization of the
negative bias endemic to questions with strong npis like those in (2).
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(2) a. Did Larry drink a drop of whiskey?
b. Did Fred contribute a red cent to the campaign?
c. Did Mary bat an eye when you threatened her?
On their analysis, (2a) conversationally implicates – or presupposes following van
Rooy (2003) – that Larry did not drink any substantial amount of whiskey and
asks whether he drank the minimal amount of whiskey or none at all. The bias is
weak because the question is open with respect to the minimal quantity of whiskey.
However, because the question has such a low thresh-hold for a positive answer –
which entails only that Larry consumed some idiomatically small amount of whiskey
– there is a further implicature that the speaker expects that Larry drank no whiskey
at all.
Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003) compute the negative bias of interroga-
tives with strong npis from the interaction of the compositional semantics of npis
and the pragmatic principle articulated in mia below. Following Krifka (1995), the
key ingredients of the analysis are that (i) minimizing npis denote low scalar values
and (ii) introduce a set of alternative expressions.4 The introduction of these alter-
natives is constrained by mia, which requires that the speaker has reasons to invoke
the alternatives. [[α]] provides the denotation of the expression α, whereas alt([[α]])
provides the alternatives associated with α, similar to Rooth’s (1992) distinction
between the ordinary semantic value of an expression and its focus semantic value.
• Motivated Introduction of Alternatives (mia):
If U(. . . α . . .) is uttered, where α introduces a set of alternatives alt([[α]]), then
for all alternative utterances U(. . . α′ . . .), where α′ ∈ alt([[α]]), the speaker
must have reason (i) to introduce these alternatives, and (ii) not to utter
4These two assumptions play some role or another in most theories of negative bias in questions
with strong npis. (See Abels 2003 and Guerzoni 2004 for examples.) Accounts differ, however, with
respect to how these assumptions are used in the derivation of negative bias.
133
them instead of the actual utterance (Krifka 2003).
mia is a general pragmatic constraint, applying not only to npis but to any expres-
sion that introduces a set of alternatives, e.g. the intonational focus of a sentence.
In order to show how mia conspires with the compositional semantics of
npis to produce negative bias, lets examine a specific example in detail, viz. (2a).
Krifka (1995) assumes that drop when used as an idiomatic npi denotes a property
of minimal quantities of liquid, i.e. quantities of liquid that have no proper parts.
This meaning component is shown in (3a). Additionally, drop introduces the set of
alternative expressions in (3b) (Krifka 1995, p. 237). Both Krifka (1995) and van
Rooy (2003) assume that the ordinary semantic value of an npi is not included in its
alternative set. Consequently, the set of alternatives in (3b) consists of properties
of non-minimal quantities of liquid.
(3) a. [[drop]] = λiλx[liquidi(x) ∧ ¬∃y[y @i x]], where x @ y is the proper
part-of relation.
b. alt([[drop]]) is a set satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ∀i∀x[liquidi(x) → ∃P [P ∈ alt([[drop]]) ∧ Pi(x)]]
(ii) ∀i∀P∀x[P ∈ alt([[drop]]) ∧ Pi(x) → liquidi(x)]
(iii) ∀i∀P∀P ′[P ∈ alt([[drop]])∧P ′ ∈ alt([[drop]])∧P 6= P ′ → ¬∃x[Pi(x)∧
P ′i (x)]]
Given the denotations in (3), the interrogative in (2a) has the ordinary se-
mantic value in (4a), in addition to introducing the set of alternative questions in
(4b), where ? is the function λφλp[p = λiφ ∨ p = λi¬φ].
(4) a. [[(2a)]] =?λi∃x[dropi(x) ∧ drinki(l, x)]
b. alt([[(2a)]]) = {?λi∃x[Pi(x) ∧ drinki(l, x)] | P ∈ alt([[drop]])}
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As it stands, (4a) can be answered affirmatively if Larry drank any quantity of
whiskey, say 12 ounces or more, assuming that every amount of liquid has a minimal
part.
Before the addressee answers, however, she must accommodate the alterna-
tive questions in (4b) as stipulated by mia. Specifically, for each alternative, the
speaker (i) must have some reason to invoke it and (ii) some reason not to ask it in-
stead of the actual question. With respect to the former requirement, Krifka argues
that the speaker is aware that the alternatives are potentially relevant, for example,
as sub-questions to the current question under discussion (Roberts 1996), or that
the speaker is aware of being able to ask more or less inquisitive questions.
More interesting for the problem of negative bias are the speaker’s motiva-
tions for not asking any of the alternatives in (4b). van Rooy (2003) argues that the
speaker chooses not to ask any of the alternatives in (4b) because he already knows
the answer to them. For van Rooy, this is a presupposition associated with strong
npis. But this assumption by itself does not yield a negative bias. Crucially, Krifka
(1995, 2003) and van Rooy (2003) assume that in order for (2a) to be felicitously
asked it must not already be settled. This requirement is related to general con-
straints on the assertability of a proposition in a given context. Following Stalnaker
(1978), a proposition φ is assertable in a context c – taken to consist of a set of
worlds or indices – iff c ∩ φ 6= c and c ∩ φ 6= ∅. In other words, a proposition φ
cannot be asserted in a context c if φ or its negation is already part of the com-
mon ground. It is natural to assume a similar constraint for polar questions: the
question ?φ cannot be felicitously asked in c if either φ or ¬φ is not assertable in c.
It follows from this constraint that the alternative questions in (4b) are answered
negatively, since a positive answer to any alternative entails a positive answer to
the actual question (4a). If Larry drank any non-minimal quantity of whiskey, then
he drank a minimal quantity of whiskey. Krifka (1995) notes that this follows from
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the assumptions that if x drinks something, then he drinks every part of it and that
every quantity of liquid has a minimal part. It does not follow, however, from the
statement that Larry did not drink some non-minimal amount of whiskey that he
did not drink the minimal amount.
On the weak analysis of negative bias, then, (2a) implicates that Larry did
not drink any substantial amount of whiskey, but leaves the question open with
respect to idiomatically small amounts of whiskey. This kind of pragmatic analysis
is very general, applying to any lexical item that denotes an extreme scalar value
and which is associated with a set of alternatives. Given the entailment relations
between answers to any alternative question and answers to the actual question,
either a positive or negative bias is possible. For example, Krifka and van Rooy’s
analysis applies equally to strong npis like wild horses or in a million years which
denote maximal scalar values. As is evident in the Web examples in (5), such
maximizing npis also yield a negative bias.
(5) a. Could wild horses have drug them away from any testimony that might
incriminate the Bush administration?
b. Remember how you had to hit your bottom before you found your way
to AA? Could wild horses have dragged you to a meeting before you
were ready?
c. Would he in a million years consider an extra man? I don’t know many
who would, so why should we consider another chick?
For instance, following Krifka (1995) one might assume that in a million years
denotes “a time that is maximally distant in the future with respect to a given
context” (p. 240), the alternatives times being those that are less remote. Krifka in
addition assumes the following “inertia” principle: if φ holds at time t, then φ holds
at all times later than t. It then follows that the alternative questions introduced
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by (5c) must be answered negatively, since it is assumed that if the referent of
the pronoun would consider a certain action at some time that is not maximally
distant, he would consider that action at the maximally distant time, which entails
a positive answer to the actual question. This does not hold for negative answers.
The reasoning just sketched regarding (5c) parallels the reasoning with regard to
(2a). This is to be expected, given that the grammatical ingredients are the same:
an expression denoting a scalar value lying somewhere toward the ends of the scale
and which introduces a set of alternatives.
A second important feature of weak analyses is that they yield a conver-
sational implicature in the purest sense of the term, i.e. an inference that follows
from the semantic content of an utterance and principles of rational and cooper-
ative communication. As a result, it ought to be non-detachable, i.e. related to
content rather than linguistic form (Grice 1975, Levinson 1983). In other words, an
expression with a similar semantic content should give rise to the same implicature.
In §5.3, I argue that negative bias in questions with strong npis is not as
general as the analyses in Krifka and van Rooy predict. First, there are strong,
minimizing npis which do not invariably yield a negative bias. Second, there are
strong npis for which one would expect a positive bias on a pragmatic account that
instead yield a negative bias. Finally, ppis that denote extreme scalar values are not
biasing. Before addressing these issues in detail, however, I briefly discuss analyses
that offer a strong characterization of bias.
5.2.2 Strong Characterizations of Negative Bias
Opposed to the weak characterizations of negative bias in Krifka (1995) and van
Rooy (2003) are analyses that argue for a strong characterization of bias. Recall
that weak characterizations are considered weak because the bias does not settle
the issue raised by the question. This weakness is built into the analyses of Krifka
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(1995) and van Rooy (2003) via the constraint that the actual question is not settled.
Abels (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) provide strong characterizations of negative bias.
On these analyses, biased questions are settled. Abels (2003), for example, assumes
that questions with a strong npi presuppose a negative answer. Similarly, Guerzoni
(2004) provides an analysis on which the positive answer to a biased question is ruled
out on pragmatic grounds, leaving only the negative answer as a live possibility. I
discuss Guerzoni’s proposal below.
Abels (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) share a number of important premises with
Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003). In particular, they derive bias from the lexical
semantic properties of strong negative polarity items and appeal to a salient set
of alternatives. The main difference lies in the presuppositions that they associate
with strong npis. Specifically, they assume that strong npis introduce a covert even
at logical form. As a result, sentences with strong npis share the presuppositions of
sentences with an overt even. Guerzoni (2004) provides the lexical entry in (6), where
the presupposition is given between the curly braces. (Following Rooth (1992), C
is a subset of the focus semantic value of φ.)
(6) [[evenC ]] = λφ.{∀ψ[(ψ ∈ C ∧ ψ 6= φ) → ψ >P φ]}.φ
According to (6), even is a partial identity function on propositions, which is defined
just in case the proposition to which it is applied is less likely than any of the
alternatives in C.5
Guerzoni’s (2004) derivation of negative bias relies on very specific assump-
tions about the logical form of interrogative sentences. These syntactic assumptions
(and the resulting compositional semantics) are shown schematically in the tree in
(7). Most importantly, Guerzoni assumes a covert whether that moves at logical
form over the question morpheme Q leaving a trace. The question morpheme Q is
5Abels (2003) assumes in addition that all of the alternatives are true.
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Whether is analyzed as a generalized quantifier over functions of type 〈〈s, t〉 , 〈s, t〉〉,
i.e. propositional modifiers. As shown in (8), there are two such functions, viz. those
corresponding to the answer particles yes and no. The denotation associated with
the logical form in (7) given (8) is the set of propositions {φ,¬φ}.
(8) [[whether]] = λf〈〈st,st〉,t〉.∃h〈st,st〉[(h = λp.p ∨ h = λp.¬p) ∧ f(h) = 1]
This set is the same as the one provided by analyses of the meaning of
polar questions that do not posit the existence of a covert wh-word or movement
(see Hamblin 1973, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, a.o.). However, this assumption
is central to Guerzoni’s derivation of negative bias. The denotation of (2a) on a
straightforward application of her analysis (see the logical form in (9a)) is shown in
(9b), where φ is the proposition that Larry drank the minimal amount of whiskey.
The presupposition of even provided by the lexical entry in (6) states that φ is less
likely than any alternative proposition in C, all of which state that Larry drank some
non-minimal amount of whiskey. This presupposition is the same for both positive
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and negative answers, since in both cases the same proposition occurs within the
scope of even.
(9) a. [[ [ whether [ 1 [ Q [t1 [ evenC φ ] ] ] ] ] ]]
b. = ∃h.{h([[evenC ]](φ))} = {[[evenC ]](φ),¬[[evenC ]](φ)}
This presupposition is problematic, however. Note that for all ψ ∈ C, ψ ⊆ φ, i.e. all
of the alternatives entail φ. It is impossible then for the presupposition of even to
be satisfied. This follows from standard assumptions about how the probability of
a proposition is computed. Specifically, if P (φ) =
∑
w∈φ P (w) and ψ ⊆ φ, then
P (ψ) ≤ P (φ), as there are at least as many if not more φ worlds then ψ worlds.
Given the logical form in (9a), (2a) has no felicitous answer.
To capture this infelicity formally, Guerzoni (2004) restricts the denotation
of an interrogative Q in a context c to those answers q ∈ Q whose presuppositions
are satisfied in c, which she writes as Q/c. Q/c consists of the answers that the
speaker considers “live possibilities” in c. When the answers to Q share the same
presuppositions — as is normally the case — Q/c is either Q or ∅. The previous
paragraph establishes that for any input context c, [[(9a)]]/c = ∅. In other words,
there is no pragmatically felicitous answer to the question.
However, Guerzoni argues that (2a) is syntactically ambiguous. Specifically,
she assumes that it is possible for the covert even introduced by the strong npi to
scope over the trace of whether, as in the logical form in (10a), in effect allowing one
to quantify the answer particles yes and no into the scope of even. The resulting
partition is shown in (10b).
(10) a. [[ [ whether [ 1 [ Q [ evenC [ t1 φ ] ] ] ] ] ]]
b. = ∃h.{[[evenC ]](h(φ))} = {[[evenC ]](φ), [[evenC ]](¬φ)}
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The positive and negative answers to (2a) given the logical form in (10a) have
different presuppositions. The presupposition of the positive answer is the same
as before and unsatisfiable for the same reasons. The negative answer, however,
presupposes that the proposition that Larry did not drink the minimal amount is
less likely than the proposition that he did not drink any substantial amount. The
entailment relations between the alternatives in C and the assertion are reversed
in this case and the presupposition is satisfied. As a result, for any input context
c, [[(10a)]]/c = {[[evenC ]](¬φ)}. The question leaves a Hobson’s choice (as Hamblin
1973 puts it), which is to say that it leaves no choice at all. The only answer that is
presented as a live possibility is the negative one. In effect, (2a) asserts that Larry
didn’t drink even the minimal amount of whiskey.
Some of the data discussed in §5.3 suggest that biased questions are, in fact,
negative assertions, providing some support for Guerzoni’s analysis. However, I
do not discuss strong characterizations of negative bias any further below. There
are two reasons for this. Most importantly, modulo the strength of the bias, the
approaches in Krifka (1995), van Rooy (2003) and Guerzoni (2004) make very similar
predictions, as both kinds of analysis rely on patterns of entailment between the
same set of propositions. van Rooy (2003), for example, essentially associates a
disjunctive presupposition with a question like (2a),6 which is resolved toward the
negative disjunct given that the positive disjunct entails a positive answer to the
actual question. Guerzoni, similarly, associates with each potential answer a distinct
presupposition. The positive answer is ruled out because its presupposition is not
satisfied, again because of the entailment relations that hold between the positive
answer and the alternatives that it is associated with.
6Recall that van Rooy (2003) associates with a question that contains a strong npi a set of
alternative questions alt(Q), which he assumes are all settled. In other words, for all Q′ ∈ alt(Q),
where Q′ = {q′,¬q′}, the speaker knows either q′ or ¬q′.
141
Second, Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003) make fewer assumptions in their
derivation of bias, in my opinion, and as a result provide a stronger analysis, in
the sense that the assumptions they make are less controversial and are motivated
independently of their analysis of negative bias. The two syntactic assumptions
that Guerzoni requires for her analysis are especially worrisome. First, she assumes
that whether undergoes movement and leaves a trace at logical form. This assump-
tion allows her to quantify into the scope of the covert even, deriving a partition
that has at least one felicitous answer. However, Guerzoni needs to assume some
principle that prevents this movement from occurring non-locally. The question in
(11a), for example, is potentially ambiguous if whether is allowed to move out of
the complement of say, as in (11c). The logical form in (11c) has a the unintuitive
interpretation on which a negative answer means that Sam said that he does not
know Italian.
(11) a. Did Sam say he knows Italian?
b. [ whether [ 1 [ Q [ t1 [ Sam say [ he knows Italian ]]]]]]
c. [ whether [ 1 [ Q [ Sam say [ t1 [ he knows Italian ]]]]]]
Second, allowing the covert even introduced by a strong npi to scope over
the trace of whether is arguably ad hoc, as even appears to be the only scope bearing
element that can do so. Consider the question in (12a), for example, which contains
the focus sensitive adverb only. The logical form in (12b) where only scopes over the
trace of whether results in the partition in (12c). The positive answer on this reading
asserts that no one other than Mary attended, whereas the negative answer asserts
that no one other than Mary did not attend. This is not a possible interpretation of
(12a). Guerzoni (2004) notes this fact, but argues that there is independent evidence
that even has exceptional scope-taking capabilities.7
7The examples in (11a) and (12a) and the problems they pose for Guerzoni’s account were
brought to my attention by Bernhard Schwarz during a seminar at the University of Texas at
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(12) a. Did only [Mary]F attend?
b. [[ [ whether [ 1 [ Q [ only [ t1 Mary attend ] ] ] ] ] ]]
c. = {[[only]](Mary attend), [[only]](¬Mary attend)}
I do not have the space to address these issues in more detail here. But given
that these issues do exist and that the weak and strong theories of negative bias
converge on their predictions for the most part (and modulo the issue of strength),
I limit my attention to the accounts of negative bias in Krifka (1995) and van Rooy
(2003) in the discussion below.
5.3 Polarity Items and Bias
The current section provides a broad survey of the use of polarity items in positive
polar questions with an eye towards evaluating the account of bias sketched above.
In particular, I discuss negative and positive polarity items that denote both low and
high scalar values and ask a series of questions about their use in polar questions.
First, for a given polarity item, does its use in a polar question result in a bias? What
is the nature of this bias? Specifically, is it the type of bias isolated by Sadock’s
diagnostics for assertion? If the question is biased, is the polarity of the bias correctly
predicted by the so-called weak account sketched in the previous section? Finally,
is the bias non-detachable? That is, are questions that differ with respect to their
linguistic form, yet are similar with respect to semantic content, also biased. As
alluded to at the end of previous section, such a detailed survey raises a number of
problems for accounts of negative bias like those described above.
Austin.
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5.3.1 Is Negative Bias Really an Implicature?
In the discussion so far, the only evidence for claiming that polar questions with
a strong npi are negatively biased has been native speaker intuition. Additional
evidence for this bias, however, comes from Sadock’s diagnostics, which should be
familiar from the discussion in the previous chapters. Briefly, the sentence initial
parenthetical expression after all co-occurs with assertions but not with neutral
questions. Furthermore, utterances prefixed with yet can follow assertions, but not
neutral questions. These tests reveal that questions with strong npis do convey a
negative bias, in so far as they are associated with a negative assertion.
(13b), for example, can be felicitously prefixed with after all. The felicity of
(13c) in the same context provides indirect evidence that the propositional content
of the bias in (13b) is the same as that asserted directly in (13c).
(13) a. A: Why did John get the promotion?
b. A: After all, does he lift a finger around the office?
c. B: After all, he doesn’t lift a finger around the office.
The same question can be followed by an utterance prefixed with yet, as shown in
(14c), which also felicitously follows the negative assertion in (14b). Again, I take
this fact as providing an indirect clue as to the content of the bias conveyed by
(14a).
(14) a. A: Does John lift a finger to help around the office?
b. A: John doesn’t lift a finger to help around the office?
c. A: Yet, he continues to be rewarded with promotions.
Polar questions that contain a maximizing strong npi also pass muster when it comes
to Sadock’s assertion tests, as shown by the constructed variants in (15) of the Web
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example (5a).
(15) a. The democrats’ new “non-partisan” rhetoric is surely insincere. Af-
ter all, could wild horses drag them away from testimony that might
incriminate Bush?
b. Could wild horses drag democrats away from testimony that might
incriminate Bush? Yet, they still claim to be pursuing a non-partisan
agenda.
However, these questions are not just assertions, as they pass Sadock’s ques-
tion diagnostics as well, as shown in (16) and (17). Recall that both of the par-
enthetical discourse markers by any chance and tell me select questions, but not
assertions.
(16) a. Does John, by any chance, lift a finger to help around the house?
b. Tell me, does John lift a finger to help around the house?
(17) a. Tell me, could wild horses drag them away from testimony that might
incriminate Bush?
b. Could wild horses, by any chance, drag them away from testimony that
might incriminate Bush?
The diagnostics support the contention that negatively biased polar questions
are both assertions and questions, like tag questions and outside-negation polar ques-
tions. Furthermore, even if one objects to my – and Sadock’s – interpretation of
these tests, they nonetheless establish that the bias present in tag questions and
outside-negation polar questions is formally the same as the bias found in emphatic
focus questions.
This observation is important in evaluating the weak analysis of negative
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bias sketched in the previous section. As I argued in chapter four, positive polar
questions and negative polar questions are semantically equivalent, a result that has
consequences for the weak analysis. Specifically, given the semantic equivalence of
positive and negative polar questions and the fact that conversational implicatures
are calculated on the basis of semantic content rather than linguistic form, outside-
negation polar questions like (18) are predicted to have an equivalent bias to their
positive counterparts.
(18) Doesn’t John lift a finger around the office?
van Rooy (2003) makes this observation himself. And while (18) does intuitively
convey a negative bias, one needs to be careful in equating it with the negative bias
conveyed by the questions in (2). Recall from the previous chapter that negative
polar questions that contain an npi are necessarily understood as inside-negation
questions, the negative bias of which I described as a contextual bias. This bias is
distinct from the one isolated by Sadock’s diagnostics, as shown by the infelicity of
the examples in (19) and (20).
(19) a. A: Why did John get the promotion?
b. #A: After all, doesn’t he lift a finger around the office?
(20) a. A: Doesn’t John lift a finger to help around the office?
b. #A: Yet, he continues to be rewarded with promotions.
(19) and (20) are prima facie counterevidence to analyses, like those advocated
by Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003), that treat negative bias as a conversational
implicature. Implicatures are based on semantic content rather than linguistic form.
Yet, the results of Sadock’s suggest that negative bias is sensitive to the form of the
interrogative.
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5.3.2 Exceptions to the Weak Account
There is a second set of potential counterexamples to weak accounts of negative
bias. These are conceptually related to the kind of counterexamples discussed in the
preceding subsection. As already mentioned, the essential ingredients of the accounts
in Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003) are (i) a lexical item with an inherently scalar
semantic value, in particular, one that falls either on the high or low end of the
scale, and (ii) a set of alternative expressions introduced by that lexical item. Any
lexical item meeting these criteria should have a biasing effect in a polar question.
However, there are apparent exceptions.
Consider the question in (21), which contains the strong minimizer at all,
but which does not appear to convey a negative bias.
(21) Is John at all clever?
Even if one intuits a slight bias in examples like (21), it appears to be qualitatively
different from the strong negative bias in the examples discussed above, as confirmed
by the assertion tests in (22) and (23).8
(22) a. A: I can’t believe that John was awarded the fellowship.
b. #A: After all, is he at all clever?
(23) a. A: Is John at all clever?
b. #A: Yet, he was awarded the fellowship?
On the accounts discussed above, there is no reason that (21) should not
convey a negative bias qualitatively similar to the one associated with (2a). Krifka
8The intuitions reported in (22) and (23) are rather subtle. (22b) and (23b) are meant to be
read with a neutral intonation, specifically with the nuclear pitch accent falling on the predicate
clever and with rising intonation. As I argue below, these same examples can be biased if the npi is
marked with an emphatic focus. I take these observations to be reasons for dissociating bias from
the semantics of polarity items, a point which I discuss in more detail in §5.4.
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(1995), for example, treats at all as a predicate modifier, assigning it the denotation
in (24). He follows Lewis (1970) and Landman (1991) in assuming that indices
include in addition to world and time parameters standards of precision, which
affect the interpretation of vague predicates. Given indices i and j, i ≤s j states
that the standard of precision associated with i is stricter than that associated with
j. For a predicate P and indices i and j such that i ≤s j, Pi ⊆ Pj . The idea is
that predicates like clever are subject to stricter or looser requirements on their
application. While John might not be considered clever at index i, he may be clever
at some less strict index j. Thus, i ≤s j states that i is at least as strict as j with
respect to its precision standard. Krifka provides the denotation for at all in (24a),
on which it relaxes the standard of precision for the application of predicate.
(24) a. [[at all]] = λPλiλx∃j[i ≤s j ∧ Pj(x)]
b. alt([[at all]]) = {λPλiλx[Pi(x)]|∃k[i ≤s k ∧ Pi ⊂ Pk]}
The alternative set associated with at all is the set of predicate modifiers that
evaluate P at non-maximal (as determined by ≤s) standards of precision, as in
(24b). Bear in mind that these “non-maximal” standards of precision are stricter
than the maximal elements of the order induced by ≤. Because Krifka and van
Rooy assume that the ordinary semantic value of an expression is not included in its
alternative set, at all(P )(x) is true only if P (x) is true with respect to maximal – in
the sense that the extension of the predicate is maximized – standards of precision,
i.e. the most relaxed standards.
As before, in asking (21) it is assumed — if the speaker obeys mia — that
he has some reason not to ask any of the alternative questions, in which John’s
cleverness is evaluated with respect to stricter precision standards than in the actual
question. Still following van Rooy (2003), we assume that the reason for this is
that the speaker already knows the answer to the question under these stricter
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standards. Recall that if i ≤s j, then cleveri ⊆ cleverj . It follows that the
alternative questions must be answered negatively, for if John is clever with respect
to a given precision standard, then he is clever with respect to all extensions of that
standard. Thus an affirmative answer to any of the alternative questions entails an
affirmative answer to the actual question, trivializing the actual question. Nothing in
this brief discussion distinguishes (21) from (2a). Yet, Sadock’s assertion diagnostics
do appear to make a distinction between these two.
The upshot of the discussion is that not all strong minimizing npis appear to
yield a negative bias in positive polar questions. This is problematic for a pragmatic
approach like the Krifka and van Rooy’s. One does not expect to see lexical excep-
tions on such an approach. There is good reason to believe that (21) presents a true
lexical exception. Suppose that one responds to the problem introduced by (21) by
claiming that predicate modifiers like at all do not produce a negative bias for some
reason or another. Consider, then, the Web examples in (25), which contain the
attenuating, high scalar npis all that and all that many, the former of which is a
predicate modifier itself.
(25) a. He may be smart - yes? But is he all that clever?
b. But are there all that many players out there who still need to be told
that if you have the English position, it is imperative that you not allow
F/G to ally?
Intuitively, all that is semantically very similar to at all, the main difference being
that whereas at all relaxes the precision standard under which the predicate is
evaluated, all that strengthens it. Thus one might simply take the denotation in
(24) and reverse the strictness relation between indices, resulting in the denotation
in (26).
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(26) a. [[all that]] = λPλiλx∃j[i ≥i j ∧ Pj(x)]
b. alt([[all that]]) = {λPλiλx[Pi(x)]|∃k[i ≥s k ∧ Pi ⊃ Pk]}
All that applies to a predicate like clever, as in (25a), and returns a predicate
that holds of an individual x at an index i iff x is clever with respect to some possibly
stricter precision standard than the one associated with the index i. The alternatives
introduced by all that consist of predicate modifiers that yield predicates evaluated
under non-minimal precision standards, i.e., standards that are less strict than the
one under which the actual utterance is evaluated.
Note that the rhetorical affect of all that is distinct from that associated
with at all. While the former has an attenuating effect, the latter is emphatic
(Israel 2001). In other words, the use of all that in a negative context yields a
weaker assertion than any of the alternative assertions. Consider the example in
(27).
(27) John isn’t all that clever.
That John is not clever under the strictest precision standard does not entail that
he is not clever under any less strict standard. That John is not clever under a
non-minimal precision standard, however, does entail that he is not clever under
the strictest precision standard. Thus the alternative assertions all strictly entail
the actual assertion. As a result, the actual assertion is the weakest assertion the
speaker can make. This is captures the attenuating effect that Israel (2001) notes
for npis like all that.
Now consider the question in (25a). mia requires that the alternative ques-
tions associated with (25a) be licensed appropriately. Specifically, the speaker must
have some reason to ask the actual question rather than any of the possible alter-
natives. Using the same arguments from above, assume that they do not ask the
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alternatives because they already know the answer to them. Furthermore, assume
that the alternatives all receive a negative answer. It is presupposed, in this case,
that for any non-minimal standard of precision, that the referent of the pronoun is
not clever under that standard. This entails, however, that he is not clever under
any stricter standard, including the strictest one, since the extension of a predicate
under a precision standard i must be a superset of the extension under any stricter
standard. As a result, we must assume that the alternatives are answered affirma-
tively, as only this assumption is consistent with the constraint on questionability
imposed by Krifka and van Rooy. That John is clever with respect to every non-
minimal standard of precision does not entail that he is clever with respect to the
minimal, or strictest, standard. The question in (25a) should be positively biased on
the mia account then.
However, if (25a) is biased at all, it is negatively biased. This fact is already
suggested by the semantic properties of the discourse marker but, which requires that
the utterances it relates contrast along some dimension of interpretation. Consider
the constructed discourses in (28). In (28a), the assertion that he might be smart
is contrasted with the assertion that he is not clever. The contrast is good, because
it is unexpected that someone is smart but not clever, as the properties of being
smart and being clever are normally assumed to overlap significantly.
(28) a. He may be smart, but he isn’t clever.
b. #He may be smart, but he is clever.
The mini-discourse in (28b), on the other hand, is semantically anomalous. Given
that smartness and cleverness normally co-occur, it is not unexpected that someone
be both smart and clever.
The observation that questions like (25a) are biased, and that this bias is
negative, is borne out by running Sadock’s diagnostics. (29), which is a naturally
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occurring example from the Web, shows that questions with all that felicitously co-
occur with after all. The bias associated with (29), however, is negative, i.e. the
speaker suspects that it was not all that wrong of Hill to enliven the problem with
a historical example.
(29) After all, was it all that wrong of D.H. Hill to enliven a boring math problem
with a historical example, a mere metaphore for how small a zero can get?
The existence of a negative bias is further supported by the constructed variant
of (29) in (30). Note first of all that (30) establishes that questions with high
attenuating npis like all that pass the second of Sadock’s battery of assertion tests.
(30) Was it all that wrong of him to enliven a boring math problem with a
historical example? Yet, he’s still lambasted for injecting ideology into a
scientific discussion.
Second, the discourse marker yet, like but, requires some element of contrast between
the utterances it relates. This contrast only exists in the given context if the question
in (30) has a negative bias to the effect that what Hill did was not all that wrong.
Furthermore, it is precisely the attenuating nature of this claim that contrasts with
the strong negative reaction to the Hill’s historical example. This contrast does not
exist if (29) conveys the positive bias predicted by weak accounts, viz. that what
Hill did was wrong under even the strictest criteria of wrongness. If this were the
case, then the utterance containing yet could hardly be considered unexpected.
For completeness’ sake, (31) shows the results of applying Sadock’s question
diagnostics to interrogative sentences containing high attenuating npis. Unsurpris-
ingly, such sentences are still questions.
(31) {Tell me, / I’m just want to know.} Was it all that wrong of him to enliven
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a boring math problem with a historical example.
To summarize, there are unexpected lexical exceptions to the weak analysis
which do not appear to apply to semantically similar expressions. Furthermore, the
bias conveyed by these semantically similar expressions is not the one predicted on
weak analyses; a negative bias is present where a positive bias is predicted. Given
in addition the apparent detachability of negative bias, the situation looks grim for
the account advocated by Krifka (1995), van Rooy (2003), etc.
5.3.3 Bias and Positive Polarity Items
There is another class of lexical exceptions to pragmatic accounts of bias: polar
questions that contain strong positive polarity items. ppis, like npis, often denote
extreme scalar values, in addition to introducing a set of alternatives (Krifka 1995).
The Web examples in (32), for instance, include ppis that denote minimal values on
a particular scale. One’s “own shadow”, for example, is the least frightening thing
on the scale of frightening things. Similarly, the drop of a hat denotes a minimal
provocation.
(32) a. As a result of his excessively wary approach, the Cancer/Dog sometimes
gives the impression of being painted into his own corner. Is he afraid
of his own shadow? Is he a little paranoid? To tell you the truth, I
think he is.
b. I’d like to ask John Doe (with what looks to be a fake email): how
many parents of that school district are opposing the curriculum? How
many for? Did they even try to deal with the matter locally, or did
they start a lawsuit at the drop of a hat?
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The use of a minimizing ppi in an upward entailing context results in an emphatic
assertion, as the resulting statement is stronger than any of the alternatives in-
voked by the polarity item. If a person instigates a law suit at the drop of a hat,
i.e. given the minimal provocation, then presumably he will do so given an even
greater provocation.
When applied to the question in (32b), the pragmatic analysis of Krifka
(1995) and van Rooy (2003) predicts a positive bias. As with npis, assume that
the actual question is not settled. The alternatives ask whether the law suit was
instigated on the basis of a non-minimal provocation. As before, assume that the
speaker does not ask any of the alternatives because he or she already knows the
answer to them. It follows from the relationship between answers to the actual
question and the answers to the alternatives that the alternatives must be answered
affirmatively. If any of the alternative questions is settled negatively, then the actual
question is settled, for if someone does not react to a non-minimal provocation, they
presumably will not react to the minimal provocation.
However, neither of the questions in (32) are positively biased, as established
by Sadock’s diagnostics in (33).
(33) a. Are you sure that John is the man to lead the expedition. #After all,
is he afraid of his own shadow?
b. Is John afraid of his own shadow? #Yet, Smith chose him to lead the
expedition.
Minimizing ppis appear to be an exception to the pragmatic reasoning sketched in
§5.2.1. Furthermore, the negative polar question counterparts to the questions in
(33) are positively biased according to Sadock’s tests, as shown in (34).
(34) a. Are you sure that John is the man to lead the expedition. After all,
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isn’t he afraid of his own shadow?
b. Isn’t John afraid of his own shadow? Yet, Smith chose him to lead the
expedition.
As discussed earlier, the difference in behavior between the questions in (33) and
those in (34) suggests that the presence, or absence, of bias in polar questions with
polarity items is sensitive to linguistic form rather than semantic content. If true,
then it is counterevidence to an analysis of bias as a conversational implicature.
To round out the discussion, the examples in (35) contain ppis denoting high
scalar values. ((35b) is from the Web.)
(35) a. Do a great many people object to Bush’s domestic policy?
b. And what of the universe? Is it utterly pointless? If its destiny is a
cold grave in the recesses of outer space, the answer must be yes: it is
pointless.
As with low scalar ppis, the weak analysis predicts a positive bias. Briefly, a negative
answer to any of the alternatives to (35a) entails a negative answer to (35a) itself.
The alternatives must receive affirmative answers, then, in order to avoid trivializing
the actual question. As before, there is no evidence for the existence of this positive
bias, as shown in (36).
(36) a. Why does the MSM continue to pander to the White House? #After,
all, do a great many people object to Bush’s domestic policy?
b. Do a great many people object to Bush’s domestic policy? #Yet, the
MSM continues to pander to the White House.
Once again, the positive bias does manifest itself in the negative polar question
counterparts to the positive questions in (36), as shown in (37).
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(37) a. Why does the MSM continue to pander to the White House? After,
all, don’t a great many people object to Bush’s domestic policy?
b. Don’t a great many people object to Bush’s domestic policy? Yet, the
MSM continues to pander to the White House.
Summarizing, a number of apparent counterexamples to purely pragmatic
approaches to negative bias were introduced. Recall that on these approaches bias is,
in effect, a conversational implicature. Because implicatures are inferences based on
semantic content and principles of rationality, one does not expect arbitrary lexical
exceptions. The examples above, however, provide evidence of such exceptions.
First, positive polarity items do not convey an inherent bias, in spite of the fact
that they possess the lexical semantic properties required by weak accounts. Second,
even within the class of strong npis exceptions exist, e.g. a drop vs. at all, both of
which are low scalar, strong npis. Finally, the bias associated with some pis has the
“wrong” polarity (as predicted by pragmatic accounts).
These kinds of exceptions are unexpected on a pragmatic account, but ex-
pected if negative bias is a conventionalized aspect of meaning. Based on Sadock’s
assertion diagnostics, I maintain that negative bias is an indirect assertion and,
furthermore, that it is a conventionalized indirect assertion. §5.4 argues that the
presence of an npi is not as central to the presence of negative bias as often assumed
in the semantic literature. I explore the contribution of intonation to bias below.
§5.5 discusses how intonation contributes to a negative assertion. This implicature, I
argue, has been “short-circuited” (Horn and Bayer 1984), or partly conventionalized.
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5.4 Intonation and Negative Bias
5.4.1 The Role of Intonation in Bias
The analyses discussed in §5.2.1 are based largely on the lexical semantic properties
of strong negative polarity items. On these accounts negative bias is a conversa-
tional implicature based on the literal meaning of the question and the pragmatic
constraint in mia. There is a direct link, then, between bias and the presence of
a strong npi. The previous section discussed a number of problematic examples
for this kind of account. The current section presents an argument in favor of an
alternative grammatical source for negative bias. Specifically, I argue that all of the
questions in (1) share certain marked intonational features.
First, the approach to bias in §5.2.1 is, in certain respects, already into-
national. Krifka (1995) is explicit about this, noting that npis resemble focused
constituents in that they introduce a set of alternatives (Rooth 1992). In English,
focus is normally marked with a nuclear pitch accent. Furthermore, many strong
npis, notably the indefinite or quantificational ones, must be focused in order to be
felicitous (Krifka 1995). (38b), for instance, is infelicitous when read with a neutral,
or “broad” focus, intonation on Mary.
(38) a. John didn’t lift a finger
L*+H
to help Mary .
H-L%




Furthermore, the pitch accent used to mark the focus in (38a) is intuitively a low
(L) tone, i.e. either L* or L*+H, rather than a less marked high (H) tone.
These observations suggest that intonation may play a more important role in
negatively biased questions than normally thought. That intonation is an important
cue to negative bias is not a new position. Borkin (1971) for one notices that biased
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questions “have an intonation unlike that in comparatively neutral information-
eliciting questions without strong stress” (p. 54). She does not discuss the intonation
of biased questions in any detail, but her comments are provocative nonetheless,
specifically her mention of “strong stress”. Asher and Reese (2005) attempt to
provide an intonational account of negative bias. They argue that the presence of
a strong npi is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for negative bias. The
examples discussed in §5.3, however, suggest that the presence of a strong npi is not
even a sufficient condition for negative bias; see (22) and (23). Predicate modifiers
like at all and all that do not appear to be inherently focused like indefinite or
quantificational npis, despite being associated with an alternative set. That is, they
do not appear to require a pitch accent on the npi itself. (21), for instance, is
naturally read with the pitch accent on clever. When one reads the examples in
(22) and (23) with an L*+H pitch accent on at all, however, the examples improve
considerably, as shown in (39).
(39) a. A: I can’t believe that John was awarded the fellowship.




Similarly, questions with so-called domain wideners, i.e. any or ever, are
neutral, unless the domain widener is pronounced with the same marked pitch accent
as the strong npis in (2) and (39b). Consider the minimal pairs in (40) and (41).
(40) a. Did Fred contribute anything to the campaign?
b. Did Fred contribute anything to the campaign?
(41) a. Has John ever voted for a democrat?
b. Has John ever voted for a democrat?
The (a)-examples in (40) and (41) are neutral, whereas the (b)-examples, in which
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the domain widener carries a L*+H accent, are negatively biased according to the
assertion diagnostics in (42b) and (43b). These tests also show that the bias in
these examples is the same as the bias in the examples in (2), i.e. it has the force of
a negative assertion. The examples with unfocused domain wideners in (42c) and
(43c), on the other hand, do not pass the assertion tests. Some care is required in
confirming these intuitions. (42c) and (43c) should be read with a neutral question
intonation and without any strong stress on democrat.
(42) I don’t understand why you think that John is a liberal.
a. After all, he hasn’t ever voted for a democrat.
b. After all, has he ever voted for a democrat?
c. #After all, has he ever voted for a democrat?
(43) a. John hasn’t ever voted for a democrat. Yet you continue to claim that
he is a liberal.
b. Has John ever voted for a democrat? Yet you continue to claim that
he is a liberal.
c. #Has John ever voted for a democrat? Yet you continue to claim that
he is a liberal.
(39), (42) and (43) suggest that npis only produce a negative bias when they are in
focus and marked with a particular pitch accent, viz. L* or L*+H. The presence of a
strong npi alone is not sufficient for negative bias, as with unfocused at all. However,
these examples do not rule out a significant role for npis in producing negative bias.
For example, one might claim that the meaning of the L*+H pitch accent and the
lexical semantic properties of npis interact to yield a negative bias. This is, in effect,
what Krifka (1995) proposes. Specifically, he assumes that emphatic focus (or strong
stress) is associated with emphatic assertion, a pragmatic operator that mirrors the
effect of the focus sensitive adverb even. Given the contribution of intonation, it
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may be important that the alternatives introduced by strong npis are ordered by
entailment. See Abels (2003) and Guerzoni (2004), for example.
A marked pitch accent alone, however, can produce negative bias, as shown
by the examples in (44b) and (45). Again, these examples are most naturally intoned
with an L* or L*+H pitch accent.9
(44) a. Do you need that porkchop?
b. Do you need that porkchop?
(45) Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy?
Sadock’s assertion diagnostics place these examples in the same class as questions
with strong npis, as demonstrated by (46a) and (46b).
(46) [Nicholas is reaching for the last porkchop, after already having had three.]
a. You should have some fruit instead. After all, do you need another
porkchop?
b. Do you need another porkchop? Yet, I know you’ll eat it anyway.
The result of the preceding discussion is that it is possible to dissociate
negative bias in polar questions from the presence of a strong negative polarity item
and isolate it instead in the interpretive contribution of the intonational contour
typically associated with biased questions, viz. L*+H H-L%. In §5.5, I argue that
all of the examples discussed above can be captured under an intonational account.
9The placement of this pitch accent need not fall on the matrix verb, as it does in (44) and (45).
Consider the examples in (i), for instance.
(i) a. Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy?
b. Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy?
c. Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was going to be easy?
The polar question in (ib) expects a negative answer and might be plausibly followed by the same
speaker with No. I told you that defending it would be easy.
160
For instance, idiomatic minimizers like a finger or a drop require an L*+H pitch
accent. Predicate modifiers like at all or all that and the domain wideners any and
ever may or may not be focused. When they are marked with an L*+H pitch accent,
the question is negatively biased. Interrogatives with some constituent marked with
an L*+H, but without any special lexical item, are also negatively biased. So even
if a question contains a strong npi, intonation alone is the source of negative bias.
Before presenting the details of the intonational analysis, I discuss exactly what
information intonation contributes to interpretation.
5.4.2 The Meaning of Intonational Tunes
I loosely follow Steedman’s (2000, 2003) compositional semantic account of intona-
tional tunes, which is summarized in tables 5.1 and 5.2. Steedman provides relatively
sparse meanings to intonational contours, as required by the range of implicatures
that may be associated with any one tune (Cutler 1977).
According to Steedman (2000, 2003), pitch accents make two orthogonal con-
tributions to interpretation: information structure and polarity.10 The information
structural contribution provides information about the discourse status of a given
bit of information. For instance, simple H* and L* pitch accents mark the rheme,
i.e. the new information conveyed by an utterance. The bitonal L+H pitch accents,
on the other hand, mark information that the speaker presents as presupposed. In
(47b), for example, Anna is marked with an H* accent, since it provides the infor-
mation that answers the question in (47a). Manny is marked with an L+H* accent,
as it is background information that Manny will marry someone.
(47) a. Q: I know emma will marry arnim. But who will marry manny?
10There is third dimension of meaning contributed by pitch accents which Steedman calls kontrast
(following Vallduv́ı and Vilkuna 1998) and which corresponds roughly to the idea that focused
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The information structural contribution of the pitch accents is shown in the
rows of table 5.1. ∂φ indicates that φ is presupposed, while ρφ indicates that φ
is new information. φ may be a proposition or a λ-term, depending on intona-
tional phrasing. In (47b), for instance, the L- phrase accent after Anna marks its
denotation as the rheme, i.e. ρλP.P (anna), while the presupposed information is
∂λx.marry(x,manny).
The second dimension of interpretation contributed by pitch accents is po-
larity. The L* and L*+H pitch accents indicate a negative polarity. Steedman
characterizes this contribution in terms of whether or not a given information unit
is, or is to be made, common ground. (48a), for instance, is understood as a simple
assertion. The speaker indicates by the H* pitch accents that it should be made
common ground that the addressee put the speakers trousers in the microwave. A
further implicature conveys that (48a) is possibly intended as a protest.












In (48b), on the other hand, the speaker indicates by the L* accents that the propo-
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[S] L-, L-L%, H-L%
[H] H-, H-H%, L-H%
Table 5.2: The meaning of boundary tunes (Steedman 2003).
sition is not to be made common ground. Given this information, the contour may
implicate skepticism or incredulity on the part of the speaker (though this may in
part also follow from the final rising intonation).
Boundary tunes, phrase accents and combinations of the two, contribute a
modal operator [X] on Steedman’s account. Non-rising intonation – L-, L-L% or
H-L% – together with the polarity contributed by the pitch accent indicate the
speaker’s suppositions about what is, or is not, common ground or to be made
common ground. Similarly, rising intonation – H-, L-H% or H-H% – indicates
the hearer’s suppositions about what is, or is not, common ground or to be made
common ground. Non-rising intonation, then, introduces a speaker modality [S],
while rising intonation introduces a hearer modality [H]. Gunlogson (2003) provides
a related analysis, as she also associates the non-rising/rising distinction with the
speaker/hearer distinction. The contribution of the boundary tones is summarized
in table 5.2.
In the following section, I adopt certain aspects of Steedman’s semantics
of intonation, specifically the association of a negative polarity with the family of
L pitch accents. However, I pursue the idea that intonation provides information
about the speaker’s cognitive state rather than his model of the common ground. It
is natural on this assumption to reinterpret Steedman’s modalities in terms of the
belief operator from sdrt’s logic of cognitive modelling. Specifically, I assume that
boundary tones provide information about the degree of strength associated with
sincerity axioms (Vanderveken 1990, Krifka 2004, Faller 2006). This analysis was
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introduced above in Sincerity (Final Rise) in the analysis of rising intonation
tag questions. In the case of non-rising intonation, I adopt the axiom Sincerity
from Asher and Lascarides (2003).
• Sincerity: R(α, β, λ) > BS(β)R(α, β, λ)
• Sincerity (Final Rise): (R(α, β, λ) ∧ rise(β)) > BS(β)♦R(α, β, λ)
The idea pursued here is that non-rising intonation indicates that the speaker be-
lieves the information being presented, while rising intonation conveys only a weak
belief. In other words, rising intonation introduces some measure of uncertainty
on the part of the speaker with respect to the illocutionary contribution of his ut-
terance. Since both belief and weak belief are closed under logical consequence, it
follows on this analysis that if R is a right veridical relation, i.e. R(α, β, λ) → Kβ,
then BS(β)pβ (or BS(β)♦pβ as the case may be). This analysis is thus very similar to
Šafářová’s (2005) treatment of final rises as introducing an epistemic possibility op-
erator. The important difference is that I assume that this information contributes
to the understanding of an utterance at the level of cognitive modelling rather than
at the level of semantic content. This analysis improves on Šafářová’s, I believe,
while maintaining her core intuition that rising intonation expresses, in some sense,
epistemic uncertainty. In §5.5, I show how this model of the interpretive contribu-
tion of intonation can be used to calculate a negative assertion from the use of a
polar question with a particular intonation contour.
5.5 Linking Intonation to an Assertion
In the previous section, I argued for a new characterization of emphatic focus ques-
tions with respect to both their linguistic form and their discourse function. With
respect to linguistic form, I argued that the characteristic grammatical feature
of negatively-biased questions was the presence of a particular intonational tune,
164
viz. L*+H H-L%. At the level of discourse function, I presented evidence from the
assertion tests in Sadock (1971, 1974) that negatively-biased questions are conven-
tionalized indirect assertions. Following previous chapters, this entails assigning
them a complex speech act type assertion • question.
In the current section, I argue that this negative assertion follows from the
literal meaning of the question and the information contributed to cognitive mod-
elling by the L*+H H-L% intonation contour. Because I assume that the indirect
assertion is conventionalized, this exercise is not strictly necessary on the treatment
of indirect speech acts in Asher and Lascarides (2001). It is a useful exercise nonethe-
less, as it establishes that while the implicature may not be calculated online, it is
in principle calculable (Morgan 1978, Horn and Bayer 1984).
Asher and Lascarides (2001) assume that indirect speech acts occur when a
sarg φ is associated with an utterance β that is not normally associated with that
sentence type, but which is associated with another, incompatible, sentence type
γ. This assumption is formalized in Inferring Dot Types (repeated from chapter
2). Recall that R consists of the axioms of cognitive modelling, while C encodes
conventionalized linguistic knowledge, including sdrt’s glue logic axioms.
• Inferring Dot Types:
Suppose for some γ that:
(a) R, C, ?(α, β, λ), Info(λ, β)|∼sarg (β, φ);
(b) β : t1,¬(Info(β) > sarg (β, φ));
(c) γ : t2, (Info(γ) > sarg (γ, φ)).
Then:
(d) β : t1 • t2
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In plain English, Inferring Dot Types states that if an agent can infer from the
literal meaning of an utterance and from principles of rational and cooperative
behavior that the speaker has a particular goal in uttering a sentence (clause (a))
which is not the goal one normally associates with that sentence type (clause (b))
but which is associated with a distinct sentence type (clause (c)), then that agent
can infer that the speaker intends to convey an indirect illocutionary act (clause
(d)).
The speech act related goals normally associated with declarative and in-
terrogative sentences are those specified in IRG and QRG respectively. The default
sarg of an indicative sentence, for example, is that the addressee believe some
proposition, while the sarg of an interrogative sentence is that the speaker believe
an answer to his question.
• Indicative Related Goals:
Suppose Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β))|∼R(α, β, λ).
Then: Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(β)) ∧ veridical(R, λ)|∼sarg (β,BH(β)pβ).
• Question Related Goals (QRG):
Sanswer(α, p) > sarg(α,BS(α)p)
Suppose that from an utterance of an interrogative β and the information in the
discourse context – which includes information about the intonation contour of β –
that one infers that the sarg associated with β is φ. Furthermore, assume that φ
is not the sarg that follows from QRG, but rather the one that follows from IRG. By
Inferring Dot Types, then, β is assigned a complex speech act type assertion •
question.
Against this background, the next section argues that polar questions with
an L*+H H-L% intonation contour can be associated with the default sarg of an
assertion, viz. that the addressee believe some particular proposition. The contribu-
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tion of intonation as described in §5.4 is crucial in the calculation of this implicature.
5.5.1 Calculating an Indirect Assertion
In order to derive the indirect assertion associated with emphatic focus questions,
one must show that the speaker has a particular sarg, viz. the one specified in IRG
that the addressee believe some proposition φ. In order to establish this sarg, it is
necessary to add an additional axiom to the logic of cognitive modelling. The new
axiom should be uncontroversial, as it is direct formulation of Searle’s (1969) sincer-
ity and preparatory conditions on assertive speech acts. The sincerity condition for
asserting φ is that the speaker believe φ, i.e. BSφ. The preparatory condition is that
the speaker believes that the addressee does not already believe φ, i.e. BS¬BHφ.
Searle presents these conditions as necessary and sufficient conditions for a suc-
cessful act of assertion. I follow him in this and assume that if it follows from an
utterance in a given context that the speaker has beliefs matching the sincerity and
preparatory conditions, then the speaker has a certain intention, viz. that the hearer
adopt the speaker’s belief. This intention matches the sarg that is associated by
default with an indicative sentence.
I formalize this idea in the axiom Sufficient Conditions on Asserting,
which states if it can be inferred from an utterance α and the information in the dis-
course context τ that a speaker has beliefs that are consistent with Searle’s sincerity
and preparatory conditions, then the sarg of α is the same as that associated with
a typical assertion.
• Sufficient Conditions on Asserting:
Suppose for some utterance α and discourse context τ that:
(a) Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(α))|∼BS(α)φ (sincerity condition)
(b) Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(α))|∼BS(α)¬BH(α)φ (preparatory condition)
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Then:
(c) Info(τ) ∧Done(Say(α))|∼sarg(α,BH(α)φ) (belief transfer)
I argue below that the sincerity and preparatory conditions follow from the L*+H
H-L% intonation contour, other contextual information, and certain independent
pragmatic assumptions. I start with the sincerity condition.
The Sincerity Condition
§5.4 introduced my assumptions about the contribution to interpretation of into-
national tunes. Specifically, I assume intonation provides information about the
speaker’s beliefs about certain information and the status of that information in the
discourse context. I also argued that emphatic focus questions are typically read
with an L*+H H-L% intonation contour. This tune, for example when associated
with (49b), adds to cognitive modelling the information that ¬BS(π2)∂φ, where φ is
the proposition that the addressee needs another porkchop.
(49) [Nicholas reaches for the last porkchop, after already having had three.]
a. (π1) A: Have some fruit instead.




In other words, one learns from intonation that the speaker does not believe that
it is presupposed that the addressee needs another porkchop. Furthermore, one can
argue that it is possible to to infer from this information that the speaker does not
believe φ, i.e. ¬BS(π2)φ.11
11This step is not obvious. From the information that the speaker does not believe that φ is
presupposed alone, it is not possible to infer that he does not believe φ, for his reason for not
believing φ to be common ground may be that he believes that the addressee does not believe φ. It
might even be the case that the speaker lacks some necessary higher-order belief, e.g. the speaker
does not believe that the addressee believes the speaker believes φ. Within cognitive modelling,
the information that φ is presupposed is cashed out in terms of mutual belief. Formally MBA,Bφ
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This information does not yet satisfy the sincerity condition for a negative
assertion. It merely establishes that the speaker has at least one belief alternative
at which φ does not hold. What needs to be established is the stronger statement
that the speaker believes ¬φ, that all of the speaker’s belief alternatives are ¬φ
worlds. The stronger statement can be inferred on the assumption that the speaker
is competent with respect to φ, i.e the speaker has considered φ and taken a definite
stance on its truth or falsity. (50c) follows from this competence assumption (50a)
and the information contributed by intonation (50b) by disjunctive syllogism.
(50) a. BAφ ∨ BA¬φ (competence assumption)
b. ¬BAφ (from intonation)
c. BA¬φ (from (50a) and (50b) by disjunctive syllogism)
Is this competence assumption reasonable? The answer to this question will
vary between contexts. In (49), for example, there is evidence that it holds. Given
the fact of Nicholas reaching for the last porkchop, the interpreter can assume that he
at least wants it. The speaker then suggests an alternative action in (49a), viz. that
he have some fruit, and conveys by intonation that he does not believe that Nicholas
states that it is mutually believed between A and B that φ and is defined as follows (Asher and
Lascarides 2003):
MBA,Bφ→ (BA(φ ∧MBA,Bφ) ∧ BB(φ ∧MBA,Bφ))
Given this definition, A might not believe that φ is mutually believed because either he does not
believe φ himself or does not believe that the addressee believes it, or does not believe that the
addressee believes that he believes it, etc.
As discussed below, negatively biased questions require evidence in the discourse context that
indicates that the addressee believes the underlying propositional content of the question, viz. φ. In
the case of (49), for example, the fact of Nicholas reaching for the last porkchop defeasibly entails
that he believes that he needs it. It is reasonable to conclude on the basis of this evidence that
the speaker does not believe φ when he conveys the information that he does not believe that φ is
mutually believed. This follows if one assumes that φ is not mutually believed because a particular
first-order belief fails, i.e. either ¬BAφ or ¬BBφ. Given evidence that BBφ, it follows from this
assumption that ¬BAφ. Of course, this assumption does follow as a matter of logic, for it may be
some higher-order belief that is problematic. I do believe, however, the the first-order beliefs are
more salient than the higher-order ones, and, as a result, that the necessary inference follows as a
best explanation for why the speaker does not believe that φ is mutually believed.
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needs another porkchop. It seems obvious given this additional information that the
speaker has considered the issue of whether Nicholas needs the porkchop and taken
a stance on the issue. Otherwise why suggest that he have fruit instead? The
competence assumption follows in this case as a kind of abductive inference.
The competence assumption is also reasonable with respect to polar questions
with strong npis. Recall that Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003) assume that
questions such as (51) (repeated from (2a)) are associated with a set of alternative
questions. According to the principle MIA, the speaker must have some reason not
to ask any of these alternatives. Krifka and van Rooy argue that they are not
asked because the speaker already knows their answers. Furthermore, they must be
answered negatively in order to assure that the actual questions is not settled.




In other words, if φ is the proposition that Larry drank a minimal amount of whiskey,
intonation provides the information that ¬BSφ, while the semantics and pragmatics
of strong npis yields the implicature that for all alternatives ψ that entail φ, BS¬ψ.
This implicature amounts to the claim that the speaker has considered every stronger
alternative question and taken a definite stance on the issue it raises. Given that
φ is an especially weak proposition, one might reasonably assume that the speaker
has some definite opinion on the truth of φ, as well.
The contribution of strong npis to negative bias on this account is indirect.
In particular, it provides evidence for the assumption that the speaker is competent
on the issue raised by the question. An interesting example of the interaction of
Krifka and van Rooy’s implicature and the intonational account presented here is
provided by the constructed discourse in (52). Recall that polar questions containing
all that presented a challenge to Krifka and van Rooy’s analyses, as these accounts
predict a positive bias where a negative bias is observed. I analyzed all that as
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a predicate modifier that strengthens the criteria of applicability for the predicate
to which it applies. On this analysis, (52b) literally asks whether John is clever
under the strictest standards of precision. The alternatives to (52b) ask about
John’s cleverness under less strict standards. The alternatives must be answered
positively, in order to keep the issue raised by the actual question open, since if
John is not clever under a certain standard of precision, then he is not clever under
any stricter standard.
(52) a. A: How did John manage to ace the calculus exam?




There is something to this result. Even though the speaker believes that John is
not clever under the strictest criteria of cleverness – the negative bias predicted
on the intonational account (with the competence assumption) – he still admits
that John is clever under less strict criteria. Furthermore, the implicature that the
speaker has considered the alternative questions and taken a stance on the issues
they raise supports the competence assumption. But note that it does not determine
the polarity of the assertion. It merely provides evidence that the speaker believes
either φ or ¬φ. The negative bias follows from this assumption and the information
that the the speaker does not believe φ as sketched in (50). That information is
provided by the interpretation of the intonation contour.
The competence assumption is based on rather weak abductive reasoning. I
see this as a strength of the argument, rather than a weakness. The idea is that
by default the best explanation for the information that ¬BAφ is that BA¬φ. This
default may be overridden by contradictory information. In fact, it is enlightening to
consider contexts in which the default competence assumption is canceled. Consider,
for example, (53) and (54).
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(53) [Nicholas reaches for the last porkchop, after already having had three.]
a. A: It’s really none of my business, I’m just curious.
b. A: Do you need another porkchop?
c. #A′: You don’t need another porkchop.
(54) a. A: Oh my god! The alcohol has been poisoned!
b. A: Did anyone drink a drop of whiskey?
c. #A′: No one drank a drop of whiskey.
In both of these discourses, there is no assertion conveyed by the polar questions
in (53b) and (54b). Evidence for the absence of an assertion is provided by the
infelicity of a simple negative assertions in the same discourse contexts, as in (53c)
and (54c).
Finally, the competence assumption is needed independently of the problem
of negative bias. Russell (2004) and van Rooij and Schulz (2004), for instance, appeal
to it in order to strengthen the weak epistemic implicatures that follow from Grice’s
Maxims of Quality and Quantity (Grice 1975). Given an assertion φ, these maxims
predict that the speaker does not believe any proposition ψ that is strictly stronger
than φ. They note that the stronger implicature that the speaker believes ¬ψ is
sometimes possible. This implicature follows from the competence assumption in the
same manner as discussed above. Similarly, Bartsch (1973) relies on the competence
assumption to derive the strong reading in cases of negative transportation. That
is, belief statements like (55a) are often interpreted as equivalent to the statement
in (55b).
(55) a. Mary doesn’t believe John left.
b. Mary believes that John didn’t leave.
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These independent uses of the competence assumption motivate, I believe, my ap-
peal to it the derivation of a negative assertion, especially if there is no contextual
evidence that it does not hold.
The Preparatory Condition
Inferring that the speaker believes that the addressee does not believe ¬φ is not
directly tied to the meaning contribution of intonation. Rather, it follows from
contextual constraints on the use of emphatic focus questions. Asher and Reese
(2005) note that the use of a biased question requires contextual evidence supporting
the bias of the question, in addition to evidence that the addressee considers φ a
live epistemic possibility. For example, Asher and Reese argue that the progression
of the dialogue in (56a) – (56e) supports the bias that John does nothing to help
around the house.
(56) a. (π1) A: John is a decent husband.
b. (π2) B: Does he do the dishes?
c. (π3) A: Well. . . no.
d. (π4) B: Does he do the laundry?
e. (π5) A: No.
f. (π6) B: Does he lift a finger to help around the house?
More important for present purposes, A’s turn in (56a) defeasibly entails that she
believes that John does at least the minimal amount of housework (assuming that
decent husbands do their fair share of housework). The dialogue in (57) demon-
strates that the negative bias cannot be jointly accepted by the discourse partici-
pants (Asher and Reese 2005).
(57) a. (π1) A: John never does the dishes, never cleans the house. All he does
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is lie about, drink beer and watch TV.
b. (π2) #B: Does he lift a finger to help?
The preparatory condition follows from these contextual constraints, in par-
ticular from the requirement that the addressee consider φ an epistemic possibility.
The reasoning is sketched below in (58). With respect to (49), for example, I ar-
gue that the speaker assumes that the addressee has (at least) a weak belief in the
proposition that the he needs another porkchop (58a). (As already noted, this much
follows from the fact of his reaching for it.) It follows from the fact that ♦ is the
dual of BA that the addressee does not believe ¬φ (58b). It then follows by negative
introspection that the addressee believes that he does not believe ¬φ (58c). Finally
from the Competence axiom from cognitive modelling, it follows that the speaker
believes that the addressee does not believe ¬φ (58d).
(58) a. ♦φ (assumption)
b. ¬BH(π2)¬φ (def. of ♦)
c. BH(π2)¬BH(π2)¬φ (from (58c) and 5 Axiom)
d. BS(π2)¬BH(π2)¬φ (from (58c) and Competence)
The preparatory condition follows on this analysis from the rather weak assumption
that the addressee has not ruled out φ. When this assumption is not tenable, as in
(57), the question is infelicitous.
The discussion above and in the previous section show that it follows from
Done(Say(π2)), Info(τ) and what I hope were reasonable assumptions about the
rationality of the discourse participants that BS(π2)¬φ (the sincerity condition) and
BS(π2)¬BH(π2)¬φ (the preparatory condition). On the basis of these inferences, one
can infer that the speaker has a particular intention in uttering a polar question
with an L*+H H-L% contour. Specifically, the speaker has the sarg specified by
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by Sufficient Conditions on Asserting) that the hearer adopt the belief that
¬φ. In the context of (49b), this is the proposition that the addressee does not need
another porkchop.
The interpreter will also note that this is not the sarg normally associated
with questions by QRG, but rather is the sarg associated with assertions by IRG. By
Inferring Dot Types, it follows that π2 is assigned the complex speech act type
assertion • question. The implicature derived in the previous two sections, I
maintain, is conventionalized. That is, I do not assume that interpreters go through
this process each time a polar question is uttered with a L*+H H-L% contour. Part
of the reason for assuming this comes form Sadock’s assertion diagnostics. I assume
that it is part of the lexical semantic content of the discourse markers after all
and yet that certain of their arguments are grammatically specified as assertions.
The same reasoning is applied to conventionalized indirect requests such as (59a).
Preverbal please occurs with requests issued with imperative sentences such as (59b)
and conventionalized indirect requests such as (59a).
(59) a. Could you please pass the salt?
b. Please pass the salt.
It does not occur felicitously with the indirect request in (60), however. This is
taken as evidence that indirect requests issued via assertions like (60) are not con-
ventionalized indirect speech acts. Rather the implicature that (60) is intended as
a request that the addressee close the window, for instance, is computed online in a
particular discourse context.
(60) #It’s cold in here please.
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5.5.2 Emphatic Focus Questions in Dialogue
Having established that emphatic focus questions are instances of a complex speech
act type assertion • question, it is natural to ask what rhetorical function they
play in discourse or dialogue. For the most part, this question has already been
answered by the analyses in the previous chapters. Given that tag questions, outside-
negation polar questions and emphatic focus questions are all assigned the type
assertion•question, it is to be expected that they have similar range of discourse
functions. One place where emphatic focus questions diverge from the other types
of biased question discussed in this dissertation is in the rhetorical function that
the assertion component plays. Specifically, tag questions and ONPQs intuitively
take part in a wider range of assertion types than emphatic focus questions do. One
reason for this difference is the contextual constraints on the use of emphatic focus
question discussed above. Recall that Asher and Reese (2005) argue that there
must be a positive bias in the discourse context that the indirect negative assertion
attacks. Thus the assertoric component of emphatic focus questions often functions
as correction or counterevidence.
Other, non-divergent, rhetorical functions are possible, however. Consider
the dialogue in (49) again (repeated in (61)). In this discourse context, the negative
assertion associated with (61b) is related to (61a) with the sdrt meta-talk relation
Explanation∗. On this reading, Kπ2a (the assertoric component of π2) explains why
A has π1’s sarg . In other words, the negative assertion explains why A wants to
see to it that Nicholas have fruit instead of another porkchop.
(61) [Nicholas reaches for the last porkchop, after already having had three.]
a. (π1) A: Have some fruit instead.
b. (π2) A: After all, do you need another porkchop ?
What still needs to be established is the rhetorical connection between the
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component types of the complex type as required by the Coherence Constraint
on Complex Speech Act Types. In other words, we need to establish the rhetorical
role of the question. I assume that the question component of an emphatic focus
question takes part in the same discourse functions as the question component of
tag questions and ONPQs. Evidence for this assumption comes from the fact that
the tag question in (62) intuitively plays a very similar discourse function to the
emphatic focus question in (61b) (Sadock 1971).
(62) (π′2) A: After all, you don’t need another porkchop, do you.
Given this fact, one would expect the question component of (61b) to either function
as an acknowledgement or confirmation question. This expectation is confirmed by
the possible responses to (49b) in (63). For example, (63a) is a strong indicator that
the question is linked to the assertion with the relation Acknowledgementq. Recall
from chapter 3 that answers to acknowledgement questions entail that the sarg of
the discourse segment to which the question is attached has been achieved. This is
precisely what the response in (63a) does. Note that (63a) is infelicitous as a response
to an information seeking question such as Do you want another porkchop?. A simple
negative answer can also serve as an answer to an acknowledgement question (63b).
(63) a. (π3) B: You’re right. Thanks.
b. (π3) B: No, I don’t.
c. (π3) B: Yes, I do. (I’m allergic to fruit and I start fasting tomorrow.)
On the other hand, the addressee may protest the bias as in (63c), suggesting
that they have interpreted the question as a confirmation question. B’s response in
(63c) attaches to π2q with QAP (since it answers the question), but also attaches to
π2a with Correction, since the content of the answer is inconsistent with the content
of the indirect negative assertion. (63c) might also attach to π1 with the relation
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Plan-Correction, since π3 entails that B does not accept or is unable to achieve A’s
sarg of π1, viz. that B have fruit instead of another porkchop (Asher and Lascarides
2003). As with tag questions and ONPQs, the felicity of a response that goes against
the bias of the biased question is strengthened if additional material is included that
explains why the speaker does not accept the bias, as in the bracketed material in
(63c).
5.6 Conclusions and Open Issues
In this chapter I argued that the negatively-biased questions in (1) are convention-
alized indirect assertions. This was modeled formally by assigning them a complex
speech act type assertion • question. This assertion was linked by pragmatic
reasoning to an intonation contour that is typical of questions like those in (1). This
analysis straddles the weak and strong characterizations of negative bias discussed
in §5.3. For example, I share with Guerzoni (2004) the assumption that negative
bias issues from an assertion. In this respect, I assume a strong characterization of
negative bias. I diverge from Guerzoni, however, in my assumption that there is still
an interrogative component to the interpretation of biased questions. Furthermore,
I assume along with Krifka (1995) and van Rooy (2003) that bias is the result of
an implicature (hence the calculable link between the question and negative bias).
However, I assume that this implicature is short-circuited (Morgan 1978, Horn and
Bayer 1984). That is, I do not assume that it is calculated “online” each time an
emphatic focus question is used in a discourse or dialogue, but rather is a convention
of language use. Thus, the information that emphatic focus questions are assigned
the complex type assertion • question is available to the grammar, for example
in satisfying the selectional restrictions of discourse markers like after all and yet.
I believe that once one concedes that intonation makes a significant contri-
bution to the computation of negative bias it is hard to avoid the kind of analysis
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that I argued for in §5.5. The accounts in Krifka (1995), van Rooy (2003) and
Guerzoni (2004) rely on the presuppositions of strong npis in their derivation of
negative bias. If one believes that the questions in (1) should be given a uniform
analysis, then these accounts would appear to be non-starters, given the absence
npis in examples like (1c) and (49b). One might claim, however, that the intonation
associated with emphatic focus questions introduces a presupposition similar to the
one introduced by strong npis. On this account, for example, one might assume that
the L*+H H-L% contour shares certain presuppositions with even. Krifka (1995)
suggests something along these lines.
There are several obstacles that such an attempt must overcome. First, the
analyses discussed in §5.2 make incorrect predictions in certain cases (see §5.3).
Simply assigning intonation the presuppositions of strong npis will not solve these
problems. More fundamentally, pinning down the meaning of intonation contours,
or even specific elements of a contour, is a notoriously difficult task. (Cutler 1977,
p. 106), for example, claims that the “effects exercised by intonation contours can
be shown to be context-dependent to such a degree that the attempt to extract
from them an element of commonality valid in all contexts must be reckoned a futile
endeavour.” While I do not believe that the situation is as hopeless as Cutler does,
there is something to her observation that intonational meaning is highly context
dependent. In order to account for this, it is necessary to assign the elements of the
intonational lexicon relatively impoverished, or underspecified, meanings. On such
an account, it is problematic to assume that an L*+H pitch accent, for example,
has the same presupposition as even simply as a matter of lexical semantics. Of
course, it might be possible to derive this meaning in a specific context from the
underspecified meaning one assumes and reasonable assumptions about rational and
cooperative behavior, etc. But then the account begins to resemble in important
respects the one presented above.
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Finally, in §5.3 I mentioned that negative polar questions such as (64) present
a problem for the pragmatic accounts of negative bias in §5.2.1. These examples
are also potentially problematic for the intonation based account, as it predicts a
positive bias. This follows by substituting ¬φ for φ in (50).




As discussed at length in Chapter 4, this is not the case. (64) does not assert that
Larry drank a drop of whiskey. Other negative questions with the same intonation
do convey a positive assertion, however. Consider (65b).
(65) a. A: Go ahead, have the last porkchop.




It appears then that strong npis block negative questions from conveying a pos-
itive assertion. The difference between these examples is the difference discussed
in Chapter 4 between inside-negation and outside-negation polar questions. Recall
that npis forced the INPQ interpretation of polar questions. Since (65b) does not
include an npi, it is free to be interpreted as an ONPQ, which are indirect assertions.
Still, what blocks the reasoning from §5.5 from applying to (64)? It is hard
to say. One might argue that the addressee in these cases has some reason to
believe that the competence assumption does not hold. But it is not clear how this
follows from the presuppositions of the npi. What I believe may be at work in these
cases are the blocking effects often noted with regard to conventionalized indirect
speech acts (Asher and Lascarides 2001). For example, Morgan (1978) notes that
the expression in (66a) has become a conventionalized way to wish someone luck.
The semantically similar locutions in (66b) and (66c) cannot be used in the same
way.
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(66) a. Break a leg.
b. Fracture a tibia.
c. I hope you break a leg.
Similarly, Are you physically able to pass the salt? is blocked from being interpreted
as a request by the conventionalized expression in (59a).12
It is possible, then, that the use of the INPQ in (64) to convey a positive
assertion is blocked by the potential to use the conventionalized indirect assertion
provided by ONPQs. As it stands, this is merely speculative. But to the extent that
a coherent blocking account could be developed, it counts as further evidence for
the conventionalized status of the indirect assertions conveyed by emphatic focus
questions and ONPQs.
12In lexical semantics, specialized expressions like pork to refer to foodstuffs blocks the use of pig




6.1 A Unified Analysis of Biased Questions
The questions discussed in the preceding chapters were argued to instantiate the
complex speech act type assertion•question. That is, each is a conventionalized
indirect assertion. In addition, these sentences maintain their literal force, i.e. they
are attempts by the speaker to have the addressee provide some information. What
this information is depends, I argued, on the rhetorical connection between the
assertion and the question. Since, in general, the asserted proposition is a semantic
answer to the question, biased questions are not neutral requests for information.
That is, they are not, generally, requests for information about what the world is like.
Rather, they request specific kinds of feedback from the addressee, asking whether
some goal or intention of the speaker has been achieved or requesting information
that may help ground information that the speaker is reluctant to accept. I modeled
these interpretations with discourse relations like Acknowledgementq, Confirmationq
and Evidenceq.
For tag questions, this outline is mostly uncontroversial, though there are
those who argue for certain alternative approaches (see Chapter 3). Nonetheless,
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because tag questions possess both declarative and interrogative syntax, it is natural
to assume that they convey both an assertion and a question. This follows from the
default alignment of declarative and interrogative sentences with the illocutionary
acts of asserting and questioning, respectively (Searle 1969, Sadock and Zwicky
1985). In other words, the “complex speech act” approach is, to some extent,
obvious in the case of reversed-polarity tag questions.
The analysis predicts outside-negation polar questions and what I referred
to as emphatic focus questions (what Sadock calls “queclaratives”) to be equivalent
to tag questions. The form of the tag question depends, of course, on the polar-
ity of the indirect assertion. ONPQs, recall, assert a positive proposition roughly
equivalent to the negation of the underlying proposition of the question; emphatic
focus questions, on the other hand, assert a negative proposition, again equivalent
to the negation of the underlying proposition. Thus, the analysis predicts that ON-
PQs and reversed-polarity tag questions with a positive anchor have the same range
of discourse functions. Similarly, emphatic focus questions and tag questions with
a negative anchor share discourse functions. Moreover, given that inside-negation
polar questions do not instantiate a complex speech act type, the analysis does not
predict any overlap in the distribution of INPQs and tag questions.
These predictions are borne out by a quick examination of the distribution of
these sentence types in particular discourse contexts. Consider the discourse in (1)
(repeated from Chapter 4). As before, the priming expression in (1b) indicates that
the utterance that follows objects to (1a) on some grounds, presumably associated
with the use of the implicative verb manage. The alternative continuations in (1c)
and (1d) reveal that the speaker objects to (1a) because of what he perceives to be
a false presupposition, viz. that it was difficult for Nicholas to prove the theorem.
Both the outside-negation question in (1c) and the reversed-polarity tag question in
(1d) are felicitous in this context and both have equivalent discourse functions.1
1The tag question in (1d) is felicitous with either rising or falling final intonation. The falling
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(1) a. A: Nicholas managed to prove the theorem.
b. B: I wouldn’t say he [managed]F to prove it.
c. B: Wasn’t it rather easy for him?
d. B′: It was rather easy for him, wasn’t it?
Inside-negation polar questions, on the other hand, are not assigned a com-
plex type and are, therefore, unbiased in so far as the speaker does not commit
herself to a particular answer. The use of an INPQ does carry a contextual bias
toward the negative answer. However, this bias is qualitatively different from the
positive bias conveyed by ONPQs (as argued in Chapter 4). There is no reason to
expect INPQs, then, to share any discourse functions with tag questions. This ex-
pectation is confirmed by the examples in (2). While the INPQ in (2b) and the tag
questions in (2c) and (2d) are felicitous responses to (2a), they each have a distinct
discourse function: (2b) requests evidence for the presupposition introduced by (2a),
i.e. it is a grounding question; (2c) is, like (2c), a denial of (2a); (2d) expresses the
speaker’s agreement with the presupposition introduced by (2a).
(2) a. A: Nicholas managed to prove the theorem.
b. B: Wasn’t it at all easy for him?
c. B′: Is was easy for him, wasn’t it?
d. B′′: It wasn’t at all easy for him, was it.
The analysis developed in the preceding chapters has no problems accounting
for these observations. ONPQs and tag questions have complex discourse functions:
they assert a proposition and request additional information related to the status
of that proposition. INPQs, on the other hand, do not convey an assertion and,
therefore, cannot be paraphrased with a tag question, since tag questions invari-
intonation variant is a more forceful denial of (1a), than either the rising intonation variant or the
ONPQ in (1c).
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ably assert the proposition expressed by their anchor. It is instructive to ask how
alternative approaches fare in this respect. The gist of the discussion so far is that
any analysis of negative questions should account for the observation that outside-
negation questions are “like” tag questions, in some sense, while inside-negation
questions are not. Does the analysis in Romero and Han (2004) meet this criterion?
It is not clear that it does and to the extent that it doesn’t, this counts as a strike
against it.
Consider the paraphrases in (3) and (4) showing the intentions that Romero
and Han associate with ONPQs and INPQs in contradiction scenarios. The observa-
tions in (1) and (2) suggest that outside-negation questions and tag questions have
the same “intent”, while inside-negation questions and INPQs do not.
(3) Intent of an ONPQ in a “contradiction scenario”:
a. Given that I assume that p (implicature)
b. and that you implied ¬p, (contextual entailment)
c. are you not certain we should add to CG that p? (intent)
(Romero and Han 2004, p. 647)
(4) Intent of an INPQ in a “contradiction scenario”:
a. Given that I assume that p (implicature)
b. and that you implied ¬p, (contextual entailment)
c. are you certain we should add to CG that ¬p? (intent)
(Romero and Han 2004, p. 646)
But is there any difference between (3) and (4)? Specifically, is there any difference
between them that would account for the data in (1) and (2)? As far as I can see,
there is not. Take the conversational implicatures shown in (3a) and (4a). Both
are triggered by the Principle of Economy described in Chapter 4. Similarly, the
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contextual entailments in (3b) and (4b) have the same source, viz. the presupposition
associated with (1a) and (2a)
That leaves (3c) and (4c) and it is difficult to view these as distinct conditions.
Romero and Han interpret (4c) as a request for evidence for the proposition ¬p.
But any evidence for this proposition is evidence against the proposition p; and any
evidence against p implies that the person supplying the evidence is not certain that
p, which is just (3c). Furthermore, the description in (4) is perfectly consistent, as
far as I can see, with the use of an ONPQ in a contradiction scenario. If so, (4)
does not really distinguish INPQs from ONPQs and, as a result, does not explain
why we cannot paraphrase an INPQ with an appropriate tag question.
The problem with (3) and (4) is that the speaker “assumption” in (3a)
and the speaker “assumption” in (4a) need to be distinguished and the analysis
in Romero and Han (2004) does not do so. According to (1), the anchor of a
reversed-polarity tag question and the alleged implicature in (3a) have the same
cognitive status. To the extent that one can show that anchors are asserted, one
must also treat the implication in (3a) as an assertion. Thus whereas in Chapter 4
I argued independent of the interpretation of tag questions that ONPQs are associ-
ated with an assertion, here we arrive at the same result by noting the overlap in
the distribution of ONPQs and tag questions. The same method can be applied to
emphatic focus questions, as shown by (5b) and (5c) (repeated from Chapter 5).
(5) [Nicholas is reaching for the last porkchop, after having had three already.]
a. A: You should have some fruit instead.
b. A: After all, do you need another porkchop?
c. A′: After all, you don’t need another porkchop, do you.
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6.2 Other Kinds of Biases
Bias as indirect assertion is not the only bias one encounters in the linguistic wilder-
ness. For example, looking more broadly at “rhetorical questions”, one finds a range
of biases that have distinct cognitive statuses and distinct functional roles. (The
difference between outside-negation and inside-negation polar questions already tes-
tifies to this fact.) Yet, I think the failure to note the existence of these different
kinds of bias has caused much confusion, especially when evaluating competing anal-
yses. The current thesis attempts to provide a formal account of just one kind of
bias, viz. that characterized by an indirect assertion. However, it is instructive to
look at a few other types of bias before closing.
Chapter 5 examined positive questions that assert a negative proposition.
However, Rohde (2006) correctly notes that not all positive rhetorical questions
assert a negative proposition, pointing to (6b) as a case in point. (6b) intuitively
asserts that Clinton is a liberal.
(6) a. A: Is Clinton a liberal?
b. B: Is the Pope Catholic? (Han 1998, cited in Rohde 2006)
The analysis I presented in Chapter 5 does not account for examples like these. Nor
should it, I would argue. Rhetorical questions like (6b) have a number of properties
that distinguish them from “emphatic focus questions” like (5b). Most notably, the
proposition conveyed by (6b) is in no way connected to the form of the question used
to convey it. As a result, there is no way to identify the proposition expressed by
(6b) independently of the utterance it is related to, normally another polar question.
Intuitively, rhetorical questions like (6b) are examples of the use of a polar question
whose answer is obvious to both the speaker and addressee to convey a positive
answer to an antecedent question, indicating that its answer is similarly obvious.
Rohde sees such obviousness as characteristic of rhetorical questions. But it is not
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clear to me that the answer to questions like (1c) or (5b) is in any sense obvious to
both the speaker and addressee. This is especially true for questions like (1c) where
the addressee is committed to a proposition contradicting the bias.
Examples like (7) (from the Switchboard corpus) are closer to the kind of
bias addressed in Chapter 5, as the content of the alleged bias is related to the
underlying proposition of the question. As Rohde notes, there is a reading of (7) on
which it conveys a positive bias: the speaker feels the educational system has been
watered down. But is this bias the same as the negative bias addressed in Chapter
5?
(7) Has the educational system been watered down so that anybody who’s above
average is now gifted? (Rohde 2006)
Again, the answer is “no”; the positively-biased interpretation of (7) is formally dis-
tinct from the negatively-biased interpretation. Positive polar questions conveying
a positive bias do not pass the assertion diagnostics (Sadock 1971). Any felicitous
use of (8) with the discourse marker after all is negatively biased.
(8) After all, has the educational system been watered down so that anybody
who’s above average is now gifted?
There is no reason, then, to assume that the two readings of (8) should be given a
unified analysis, as the biases associated with each appear to be different beasts.
There are rhetorical questions that are problematic for the current account,
viz. biased wh-questions. While some biased wh-questions are associated with a
negative assertion, the same question can also convey a positive bias that passes our
assertion diagnostics. The latter type of biased wh-question can be accounted for
as in Chapter 5. Take (9), for example, which intuitively conveys that the speaker
believes that Onavi knows nothing about semantics.
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(9) I don’t think we should have Onavi on our short list. After all, what does he
know about semantics? (Caponigro and Sprouse 2007)
(10a) shows the logical form for the interrogative in (9) in which the question op-
erator ‘?’ applies to a lambda abstracted formula. If we take the contribution of
intonation in this case to apply to the existential closure of this formula, we arrive at
the formula in (10b), which is similar to the information that intonation contributes
to the interpretation of emphatic focus polar questions. If, as before, one can justify
pushing the negation inside of the belief operator one arrives at the correct bias, as
shown in (10c).
(10) a. ?(λx.knows-about-semantics(Onavi, x)) (logical form of (9))
b. ¬BS(∃x.knows-about-semantics(Onavi, x)) (intonation)
c. BS(¬∃x.knows-about-semantics(Onavi, x)) (from the competence
assumption)
However, as already noted, not all biased wh-questions convey a negative
bias. Take the example in (11). According to the after all test in (12), this question
is biased. However, the speaker asserts that Mary fed and educated the addressee,
not that no one did. The analysis just sketched does not account for this positive
assertion, at least on any straightforward application.
(11) Who fed you and gave you a proper education? (Han 1998, cited in Rohde
2006)
(12) You should be nicer to Mary. After all, who fed you and gave you a proper
education?
That does not mean that an account along the lines in Chapter 5 is impossible.
For instance, one might argue that the assertion conveyed by (12) is that nobody
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but Mary fed the addressee and provided him a proper education. That is, for
some a ∈ De it is not the case that the speaker believes that there exists an x,
x 6= a and x fed and educated the addressee. On this analysis, (12) conveys a
negative assertion similar to the one sometimes associated with exclusive sentences.
This is pure speculation, of course, and further investigation must remain for future
research.
In closing, the set of rhetorical questions, as conceived by Rohde (2006)
and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007), among others, encompasses a wide variety of
sentence types. However, there is no reason to assume that the set of rhetorical
questions is uniform. That is, within the set of rhetorical questions there may exist
well-defined subsets that exhibit their own formal and functional characteristics.
This dissertation has looked at one such subset, viz. the set of biased questions.
These questions, I argued, are defined by the existence of an indirect assertion as
diagnosed by Sadock’s diagnostics. It is useful, I believe, to isolate these subsets
and identify the unique formal and functional characteristics that set them apart.
Not only does this deepen our understanding of rhetorical questions, it allows us the
isolate the interpretive effects of aspects of linguistic form that often go unrecog-
nized, like intonation, and in so doing broaden our understanding of language and
communication. I hope this dissertation has taken a step in this direction.
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